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Abstract
The purpose of this quantitative case study was to address the problem of domestic
terrorism facing the United States. This concern led to a comprehensive examination of
historical documents that focused on the temporal evolution of the problem beginning
with the Carter administration and continuing through the Obama administration. The
conceptual foundation centered on resolving the research question and validating three
hypotheses directed at qualifying the escalation of domestic incidents of terrorism. This
led to developing a behavioral model to assist law enforcement agencies in combating the
issue of domestic terrorism. Bivariate and clustering statistical analysis validated the data
while qualifying the demographics of the various typologies of U.S. domestic terrorists.
The use of case study analysis, which drew on historical documents for evidence,
considered the evolution of various groups, motivations, their ideologies, and goals.
These variables were compared to successes and failures of relevant federal policies. The
lack of understanding and oversight that led to an escalation of the number of incidents
was also evaluated. Using ethical and scientific guidelines and protocols, the study’s
findings promote the need for future research and highlight the dangers of repeating the
past. By developing a behavioral model, this study gives law enforcement a valuable tool
for resolving domestic terrorism. Additional considerations relate to future policy
implications and the course of future research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“Surprise! When it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse,
bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility but also responsibility so poorly
defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence,
but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to
give those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has
gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the
one who knows he’ll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed.
It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes
somebody else is taking care of it. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also
decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of
individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasionwhich is usually too late (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical backgrounds to tip
us off to the climax). Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of
genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck. The results
of Pearl Harbor were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was the
cumulative, wide-spread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it
happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at
Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government’s (or
in an alliance’s) failure to anticipate effectively.” -Thomas C. Schelling, Forward to
Pearl Harbor; Warning and Decision by Roberta Wohlstetter
“There is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by
guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by
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infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy
instead of engaging him…It preys on unrest…” - John F. Kennedy, Address to the
Graduating Class, US Naval Academy, 6 June 1962
In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary
Janet Napolitano released a report titled, Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and
Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment (Department of
Homeland Security, 2009). The report warned that Lone Wolf terrorists, Right-Wing
extremists, White supremacists, Sovereign Citizens and disgruntled military veterans
were potential terrorist threats and their anger was possibly being fueled by the economic
recession, unemployment, the inability to obtain credit, and the election of the first
African-American president (DHS, 2009). The report sparked outrage among several
Republicans in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate.
Then House Minority Leader Rep. John Boehner (R-OH), sharply criticized the
DHS Secretary saying that her Department was not focusing on the real threats the United
States faces:
[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security owes the American people an explanation
for why she has abandoned using the term ‘terrorist’ to describe those, such as al
Qaeda, who are plotting overseas to kill innocent Americans, while her own
Department is using the same term to describe American citizens who disagree
with the direction Washington Democrats are taking our nation. Everyone agrees
that the Department should be focused on protecting America, but using such
broad-based generalizations about the American people is simply outrageous.
(Mehta, 2011)
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U.S. Congressman Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, chairman of the House Homeland
Security Committee, said in a letter to Ms. Napolitano that he was “dumbfounded” that
such a report would be issued and “This report appears to raise significant issues
involving the privacy and civil liberties of many Americans - including war veterans”
(Lake & Hudson, p.1, 2009). Napolitano, under intense criticism from both Democrats
and Republicans issued the following statement in defense of the agency’s report:
Let me be very clear: we monitor the risks of violent extremism taking root here
in the United States," Napolitano said in a written statement issued by her
department. "We don't have the luxury of focusing our efforts on one group; we
must protect the country from terrorism whether foreign or homegrown, and
regardless of the ideology that motivates its violence……. We are on the lookout
for criminal and terrorist activity but we do not -- nor will we ever -- monitor
ideology or political beliefs," Napolitano said in the statement. "We take seriously
our responsibility to protect the civil rights and liberties of the American people,
including subjecting our activities to rigorous oversight from numerous internal
and external sources. (O'Keefe, 2009)
Despite her statements explaining her position on the DHS report, the criticism
was relentless. Republicans accused Napolitano of offending the American people
especially those military veterans who served their nation. While some Republicans
demanded an apology, others demanded that she be fired. The polarization of the issue
became so contentious that Napolitano issued a statement apologizing to all military
veterans. This was unfortunate because it deflected from the real issues and concerns of
the report, which was ultimately to assist law enforcement in keeping all Americans safe.
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Moreover, under President George W. Bush, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
issued a report entitled, White Supremacist Recruitment of Military Personnel since 9/11
(7 July 2008). Ironically, this report went virtually unnoticed by right-wing conservatives
because the strategy was to contest “all things Obama.” The political partisanship diluted
the seriousness of the threat and unfortunately, based on historical evidence, when the
anger manifests itself into violence, the innocent become the causalities of political
gamesmanship. On January 08, 2011, anti-government extremist Jared Lee Loughner
shot and injured 19 people including U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, and
murdered another six people, including Chief U.S. District Court Judge John Roll (Orr,
2013).
This phenomenon of politicizing and ignoring domestic terror warnings is not a
new phenomenon. According to Aaron Winter (2010), a senior lecturer in criminology
and criminal justice, it can almost be expected. Winter wrote:
Throughout American history, both terrorism and extremism have been
constructed, evoked or ignored strategically by the state, media and public at
different points, in order to disown and demonize political movements whenever
their ideologies and objectives become problematic or inconvenient – because
they overlap with, and thus compromise, the legitimacy of the dominant ideology
and democratic credentials of the state, because they conflict with the dominant
ideology or hegemonic order, because they offend the general (voting) public, or
because they expose the fallacies of national unity and bi-polar opposition in the
face of foreign enemies or international conflicts, such as the war on terror (p.
156)
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This scientific research study into U.S. domestic terrorism focuses on the
temporal nature of domestic terrorism as a criminal phenomenon. In addition, it accounts
for a wide variety of social influences and variables. Using an enhanced mixedmethodology, it connected past and current domestic terrorism events and offered depth
and scope to the research. The research established its foundation on the potential causes
associated with domestic terrorism and highlighted individual and organizational causes.
What is presented is a research opportunity to draw on the past, prevent future attacks,
and empower law enforcement with the tools to move beyond reactive ideologies and
positions.
For purposes of clarity and the direction of this study, the link between
international and domestic terrorism goals is acknowledged. However, what is essential is
understanding that domestic terrorists are an internal threat to the United States; they
operate from an agenda that does not include international funding, mandates, messages,
or goals. Centralizing the problem as domestic, President

Ronald Reagan, in his 1981

Inaugural Address stated that, “government is not the solution to our problems, it is the
problem” (Stoken, 2004). To promote their ideology, domestic terror groups determined
that our government and its leaders are evil by their own acknowledgment, thus allowing
self-justified actions to support what they perceive as a positive end. As a result, the U.S.
domestic terrorist is unique, having turned his or her back on society to pursue its
destruction. Thus, they present a clear and present danger, requiring ongoing evaluation
and study (Borucki, 2014).
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Statement of the Problem
The United States of America came into existence from acts of domestic terrorism
that would later be hailed as acts of patriotism because Americans decided rebellion was
the most effective action to free them from tyrannical leadership by the British. Citizens
felt it necessary to engage in civil disobedience (e.g., the Boston Tea Party, the founding
of the Sons of Liberty, and Massachusetts’s social elite) to provoke a revolution that
would dismantle the heavy-handed social construct of totalitarian rule. Although these
actions seemed reasonable under the circumstances, in 18th century society, these groups
and acts would be classified as terroristic.
As a nation that is predicated on free speech and democratic principles that call
individuals to action if they believe their government is operating contrary to the will of
the people, determining who is a terrorist or freedom fighter ultimately rests in the mind
of the individual and society. While the birth of the United States provides a starting
point, the focus of this research will be on the growth of American extremism between
1977 and 2015; that is beginning with the administration of former President Jimmy
Carter and ending with the term of President Barack Obama.
In reviewing this period, my inquiry discovered a lack of current research
focusing on domestic terrorism as a criminal phenomenon, which subsequently created
gaps in the research that this study will attempt to fill by addressing emerging issues and
problems. Timothy McVeigh and his bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City (1995), the Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta (1996), and
the shooting at Knoxville’s Unitarian Universalist Church (2008) are examples that
highlight sustained domestic terrorist assaults in the United States (Weiner, 2012).
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In his research, terrorism expert Alberto Abadie (2006) notes that while
international terrorist attacks has been the primary focus of the American media and its
elected officials, statistically, domestic terrorism presented the greatest threat towards
government facilities and public spaces. During the period 1998–2005, the Memorial
Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism dataset recorded 26,445 fatalities, but only 6447
resulted from international terrorism, of which more than 3000 were due to the 9/11
attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 447).
A scientific assessment of these and other events will highlight the realities of the
domestic terrorist beyond media sensationalism and address the true nature of these
individuals. Currently, the domestic terrorist is identified as evil, destructive, and remains
hidden within U.S. society. By responding to the misinformation about domestic
terrorists, problems associated with identifying domestic terrorist groups are resolved,
thereby elevating the awareness of both law enforcement and society through empirical
study, and thereby assist in preventing future tragedies.
Purpose of the Study
On October 12, 2001, while providing testimony to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Government Affairs, terrorism experts Zoe Budinger and Jeffrey
Smith provided the committee with this observation:
The attacks on 9/11 showed all of us that the Cold War “need to know” system for
managing classified and sensitive information drove a culture of information security that
resulted in countless stovepipes and secretive pockets of the nation’s most valuable
information. It may have worked in the Cold War, but it was not adequate to keep
America safe in a world of asymmetric threats. Many realized that protecting America in
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this new threat environment would require the government to operate in an entirely new
way (p. 1).
Domestic terrorism and its perpetrators remain in the consciousness of America,
the distinction between various groups, their goals, and their methods of operation remain
unclear. The purpose of the research is to assist law enforcement in destabilizing
domestic terror cells by understanding their motivations for engaging in terroristic
activity. In addition, this study will show that from 1977-2001 (pre-9/11), every president
since Jimmy Carter failed to develop a comprehensive domestic counter-terrorism
strategy. The only constant under each president during this period was their
commitment to fighting international and transnational terrorism.
The recurrence of domestic terrorism events support the notion that this
phenomenon is escalating, and there is a need for ongoing study to ensure current and
relevant responses that minimize organizational growth and capacity to inflict damage on
U.S. citizens. To achieve this goal, correlations were drawn between incidence of
domestic terrorism and changes within the economy, political climate, and influences
related to religious faith. Defining key variables that underlie this research study allows
for developing models, which can assist law enforcement in their approaches to
combating domestic terrorism. These models considered social, political, and
environmental contexts that influence individuals and organizations, drawing the
domestic terrorist out of the darkness and subjecting him or her to intensive scrutiny that
could ultimately save the lives of citizens.
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Importance of the Study
The importance of studying past and contemporary domestic terrorist groups and
their actions, is to aid in developing methods to thwart their attacks, which are presented
as outcomes in the conclusion of this study. A mixed-method approach that uses case
study analysis and bivariate correlations of quantitative data, makes this research unique,
as previous researchers used a single methodology. With emerging technology reshaping
society and education, the ability to conduct detailed analyses of statistical trends that
consider key demographic variables provided hard data and evidence. This evidence,
drawn from multiple sources and evaluated in dynamic scientific approaches, supported
creating profiles, which could assist law enforcement. By creating a valid and reliable
study, which promotes outcomes that can be generalized and replicated in future studies,
this research can serve as a foundation and benchmark for further studies examining this
social phenomenon to promote positive social change (Yin, 2012).
Definition of Terms
Anti-terrorism. According to Joint Publication 3-07.2 (2010), anti-terrorism is
defined as defensive measures strategically used to minimize the vulnerability to the U.S.
citizens, allies, and property from terrorist acts, to— including rapid containment by
local, state, federal, military, and civilian forces.
Counterterrorism. The FBI (1999) defined counter-terrorism as activities and
operations taken to neutralize terrorists, and their organizations and networks, in order to
render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or
societies to achieve their goals.
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Domestic terrorism. According to the FBI (1999) and for the purposes of this
paper, domestic terrorism is dangerous acts to human life that violate federal and/or state
law and are designed to intimidate or coerce the U.S. civilian population; influence the
state/federal policy of a U.S. government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the
conduct of the government by engaging in guerilla tactics that involve mass destruction,
assassination(s), or kidnapping(s).
Homegrown Terrorist. The Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007
defines homegrown terrorism as the use, planned use, or threatened use, of force or
violence by a group or individual, born, raised, or based and operating primarily within
the United States or any possession of the United States, if its purpose is to intimidate or
coerce the United States government, the civilian population of the United States, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Patriot Act. Section 802 of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (Public Law No. 107-52)
was expanded to include acts covering “domestic” (as opposed to “international”
terrorism) post 9/11. The act allows for expanding the earlier definition of terrorism to
include that any act dangerous to human life can be considered domestic terrorism.
Propaganda. Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, that is used
to promote or publicize a particular political cause or point-of-view. The use of social
media outlets such as YouTube has become a popular tool by which domestic terrorists
support their causes.
Terrorism. Terrorism, as defined in the Code of Regulation (28 C.F.R., Section
0.85), is act driven by political violence that is designed to induce terror and
psychological fear through violent victimization and destruction of non-combatant
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targets. The purpose of terror is to send a message by exploiting the media in an effort to
obtain maximum publicity coverage.
Characteristics of Domestic Terrorism
As policy makers, law enforcement officials, and terrorism experts seek to
identify specific internal characteristics and conditions that might make countries such as
the United States more likely to experience domestic terrorism on its soil, The notable
increase in empirical research on the causes associated with terrorism in the aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks is noted. The completion of these studies is essential to not only educate
counter-terrorism policy makers, but the general public must also be informed as to
emerging patterns that terrorists use in qualifying the use of violence as a domestic
weapon (Abadie, 2014).
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush, politicians, world leaders,
and terrorism experts immediately hypothesized that the motive for the attack was
economic disparity. They argued the following point:
Why else would the attacks be directed toward New York City, the financial
capital of the world, and the World Trade Center the symbolism of capitalism and
international commerce unless economic depravity was the root cause?
In a speech given in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002, President George W.
Bush stated, “we fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Bush, 2002).
This was a provocative statement; given the time, right-wing extremist ideologues were
searching for answers and more importantly, a scapegoat to justify their anger and overt
bigotry. While the comments on the relationship between poverty and terrorism make
sense intuitively, what can result are anger and grievances—leading to a sense of
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hopelessness that some domestic terrorist organizations used for their benefit (Frey,
2004).
The empirical evidence from studies focusing on democracy and terrorism
generally failed to validate the idea that promoting democracy was an antidote to
terrorism. While numerous researchers concluded that democracies do not experience
fewer domestic terrorist attacks or produce fewer terrorists, there are some studies
showing that political participation is a way to reduce domestic terrorism. Though
research in this area continues to find interconnections and divergences, with discussions
in some empirical studies offering that recent democracies are at a higher risk of domestic
terrorist activities than more established democracies such as the U.S., there is
nonetheless a need to continue to seek unifying variables to assist all democratic, and
even non-democratic, nations in preventing domestic terrorist attacks (Collier & Hoeffler,
2004).
Though democracy is not a complete remedy for terrorism, what appears to be
central to reducing domestic terrorist threats is protecting and preserving human rights.
Countries whose governments choose to abuse citizen rights can expect elevated attacks,
leading to government responses, and thus creating a destructive cycle. To reduce human
rights violations, which often occur in crackdowns against protesters who are affiliated
with organizations that covertly support political violence, escalating confrontations that
lead to violence should be avoided. This can defuse potentially explosive situations.
The U.S. created programs of torturing confirmed and suspected terrorists, after
9/11, and did not allow constitutional rights for foreign nationals who committed acts of
terror on U.S. soil. These techniques likely diminished the government’s ability to act as
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a positive role model. By not protecting the human rights of even the worst offenders of
domestic terror, the United States may have taken retribution, but when the offenses
came to light, the government’s standing as a beacon around which citizens could rally in
denouncing terror was diminished (Frey, 2004).
Additional recurring findings in the literature relate to countries where ethnic
and/or religious minorities occupy a lower status in society. Such groups are more likely
to experience and engage in terrorism. This is most notable when the disenfranchised
groups also experience significant economic discrimination and/or are excluded from
political power and are unable to promote change in society. Exclusion and
discrimination leads to grievances by these groups against the government, and makes
them more likely to challenge the majority population, and the status quo.
In these scenarios, the lack of social integration routinely hinders government
attempts to elicit cooperation from members of minority groups. Lack of cooperation and
cohesion promotes the alienation of these groups, and leads to them identifying with
domestic terrorist groups, thus generating the worst possible outcomes (Claude, 2007).
Potential Causes of Domestic Terrorism
According to Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab (1970), right-wing extremism
is the “politics of backlash” that evolves in response to economic and social changes,
which will ultimately result in “the displacement of some population groups from former
positions of dominance” (Martin et al., p. 3., 1970). Although empirical research supports
this analysis, it must be noted that the potential causes of domestic terrorism can be
attributed to numerous variables related to individual and/or organizational perceptions.
These variables can lead individuals beyond rational thought and into overt and/or covert
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dissent, validated by criminal acts of defiance, which can be connected to the following:
religious ideology, government positions or actions which the individual views as
contrary, racist, or affecting socio-economic status, and/or environmental conditions.
These variables routinely occur together and create convergences that further dilute the
reasons that may have caused an individual or organization to move in open defiance of
the government and engage in criminal activity. When analyzing the causes of terrorism,
law enforcement and policy makers must exercise academic caution and not use poverty
as the primary metric in determining terrorists acts. Terrorism expert, Jeff Victoroff
(2003) conducted and extensive study and found that many terrorist were not the
stereotypical young and uneducated. In fact, his study uncovered that in the late 1990s,
terrorists were a very diverse. Some were professionals, college students, married, and
some were even older men well into their forties.
This study sought to understand the evolution of domestic terrorists, and the
changes in their perceptions, positions, and ideologies regarding society. In addition, the
study also considered the legitimacy of the primary perceptions of terrorists who are U.S.
citizens through historical examination and by conducting psychological and sociological
assessments of the individuals and their motivations (Schuck, 2011).
Encouraging Extremism
When examining the alignment of the research variables historically, while
accounting for external sources that motivate individuals or groups to engage in extremist
action, as a researcher, you must first move beyond the simplistic narrative of extremists
merely being disgruntled, xenophobic, racist, or politically partisan without justification.
For example, in the book, The Politics of Terrorism, Brannan (2006) posited that right-
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wing extremists who subscribe to a seed-line theology wholeheartedly believe that nonWhites deserve enslavement, expulsion, or even death if Whites are to stave off the “leftwing’s” socially manufactured plot to force them into the abyss of extinction. Their
justification and absolution are rooted, according to their interpretation, in the Holy
Bible, which, according the right-wing extremists is just as important or superior to the
U.S. Constitution. But religion does not hold a monopoly on agitating extremism. The
political divisive rhetoric espoused by politicians and media outlets since 2009,
revitalized organizations promoting domestic terrorism. There is a typology that links
right-wing extremists’ behavior to their underlying political ideology that provides the
framework for these individuals or groups to engage in violence to shape their message.
This approach reinvigorated various causes and ushered in a new and energetic breed of
domestic terrorists. As such, it is essential that law enforcement have the necessary
intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques and resources to respond to this threat.
By describing the how, what, and why of participation, and considering the ongoing
support and encouragement from domestic terrorist organizations, law enforcement
agencies can qualitatively assess motivation and develop appropriate responses
(Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2012).
Conclusion
The study’s purpose, significance, and rationale for the study of domestic
terrorism was established. The nature of this study requires an understanding of essential
terms and concepts associated with domestic terrorism; these are defined in Chapter 2. A
review of the typologies presented are central to developing profiles that can assist law
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enforcement agencies in creating a significant deterrence aligned with validated
outcomes.

17
Chapter 2: What is Domestic Terrorism?
To create a foundation for this study, the operational definition of domestic
terrorism concerns using violence against a civilian population or infrastructure of a
nation often, but not always, by citizens of that nation and usually with the intent to
intimidate, coerce, or influence national policy (Vohryzek-Bolden, Whamond, & OlsonRaymer, 2001). Definitions of domestic terrorism overlap; however, what is central to
domestic terrorism is that the acts are violent and dangerous to human life, and are a
violation of the criminal laws of a state and, for this study, the United States. The purpose
of these acts is to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of the
government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by
assassination or kidnapping (Reitan, 2010).
Defining Terrorism
The definition of terrorism is given in Chapter 113B of the United States Code,
entitled, “Terrorism”. It stipulates that in order for any action to be characterized as a
terrorist act, it must have specific characteristics. An act of terrorism must be inherently
dangerous to human life, violate federal and/or state law and appear to be intended to: (a)
intimidate the civilian population; (b) influence policies of the U.S. government by using
intimidation and/or coercion and/or; (c) affect the conduct of government officials
through the use of mass destruction, assassination, and/or kidnapping. A domestic
terrorist attack by its nature must be directed at the state and, for the purpose of this
research, occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, n.d.).
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Key domestic terrorist definitions in law include 18 U.S.C. §2332b, which defines
“federal crime of terrorism” as an offense that is designed to influence or affect the
conduct of government organizations and officials through the use of intimidation or
coercion, and/or retaliation against government conduct. This law is one of several
statutes aimed at qualifying a general understanding of terrorism, which include §930(c).
The latter identifies domestic terrorism as engaging in activities that relate to the killing
or attempted killing of government officials during an attack on a federal facility with the
use of a dangerous weapon. Also, §1114 addresses the killing or attempted killing of U.S.
officers and employees by organizations determined by the government as being involved
in domestic conspiratorial activities. As domestic terrorism has evolved, what is seen is
the need for updated legislation, ongoing studies, and creating deterrents that will assist
the nation in remaining current as to both under-standing domestic terrorism and
prosecuting it (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.; Smith, 1994).
Defining American Extremism
A review of contemporary research on violent American extremism supports the
premise that a series of theoretical frameworks evolved that seek to explain individual
involvement in politically or religiously motivated violence—and correct the poor
understanding of causal mechanisms. Building on situational action theory, in the current
study the researcher proposed that an understanding of movements and causations
beyond dominant risk factors is necessary and requires developing integrated models. In
seeking explanations for politically and religiously motivated violence, the challenge
facing researchers is the ability to distinguish direct mechanisms from other causes
(Schils & Pauwels, 2016). Though models emerged that seek to understand the
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motivation of the domestic terrorist by combining existing theories and mechanisms from
different but complementary traditions, further insight is needed (Schils & Pauwels,
2016).
In earlier primary and secondary studies that considered the underlying causes of
domestic terrorism, a central focus has been evaluating the influence of key direct
mechanisms. These mechanisms incorporate a propensity towards violent extremism and
exposure of potential recruits to violent extremist moral settings. However, what is also
sought is the ability to explain—from a political perspective—foundational premises and
variables that are used to support political and religious violence. Various theoretical
models of domestic terrorism have been used to test structural equation modeling that
estimates the strength and power base of domestic terror organizations. The main results
from these studies indicate that violent extremist propensity, as well as exposure to
violent extremist moral precepts and settings, were found to have direct effects on the
likelihood of individuals engaging in domestic political and religious violence.
Such research highlight explicit and direct mechanisms thought to be connected to
a series of exogenous factors, including perceptions which lead to a sense of injustice,
and manifest as poor social integration. Feelings of perceived injustice and poor social
integration converge with political and religious violence and are strengthened by a sense
of alienation, belief in the failure of the judicial system, and a background of religious
authoritarianism. As a result of the convergence of these social mechanisms in people
throughout the country, organizers capitalized on these feelings in order to create
extremist groups across America. Displaced and marginalized individuals who join these
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groups believe that violent action can restore a balance of power, as well as restore
perceived injustices (Kushner, 2003; Schils, & Pauwels, 2016; Simmons, 1999).
Domestic terrorism, because of the definitional impediments associated with its
antecedent term, terrorism, scholars and terrorism experts, for the sake of contentious
academic debate, simply defined domestic terrorism, in its most basic form, as a set of
actions, beliefs, feelings, attitudes, and strategies of an individual or group who are far
removed from the mainstream, or what is commonly considered ordinary. In conflict
settings, those engaged in extremist activities show severe forms of conflict engagement.
However, caution is urged when labeling particular activities, individuals, and groups as
extremist. While acknowledging an idea or position that is commonly believed by society
as being ordinary, these assessments become subjective when considering political and
religious beliefs, concepts, and ideologies that are outside the norm.
As a result, discussions regarding extremism must consider that researchers will
have different perspectives; some will consider various acts just and moral (“freedom
fighting”). Others will see these same acts as unjust, immoral, and consistent with
ideologies associated with anti-social “terrorism.” The point-of-view depends, of course,
on an observer’s politics, moral scope, values, and the nature of his or her relationship
with the member and his organization. Further, an individual’s sense of the morality of a
given act must be considered and assessed within current and historical contexts of
extremist acts, as well as support the shaping of an overall view on these individuals and
their organizations (Wilcox, 2013).
One of the most important and relevant factors in determining the drive of
extremists is their awareness and consolidation of power differences, which are both
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essential when defining domestic terrorism/extremism. As social disparities increase and
lead to conflict, the activities of the members of low-power groups are often viewed as
more extreme than similar activities done by members of groups advocating the status
quo. Political terrorist/extremist acts are more likely to be used by marginalized
individuals and organizations that believe in a more radical form of engagement because
traditional forms of protest are considered of little worth. It is worth noting, though, that
high-power terrorist groups also commonly employ extreme activities to achieve their
ends (Goble, 2015).
The separate ideologies of the extremist support actions that routinely employ
violent means, although groups differ in their choices of and preferences for the use of
and/or level of violence. Also, there can be a range of choices for targets of their
violence: infrastructure, law enforcement, military personnel, and civilians (including
children as primary targets). Although low-power groups are more likely to employ
direct, episodic forms of domestic terrorist violence, higher-power groups are more likely
to be associated with structural and/or institutionalized forms of terrorism, such as covert
and overt torture. Although extremist individuals and their groups in the country are often
viewed by the general population as being evil, their indoctrination and belief systems
allow them to violate societal norms and break federal and state laws by their acts
(Coleman & Bartoli, 2003).
Typologies of Domestic Terrorism
Domestic terrorism has been the most common form of terrorism in the United
States and until 9/11 became the deadliest. The FBI recorded 353 incidents or suspected
incidents of terrorism in this country between 1980 and 2001; 264 of these incidents were
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attributed to domestic terrorists (Lewis, 2004). Domestic terrorism cases nearly doubled
from 1999 to 2003 according to the FBI (2003). Between 1999 and 2001 the FBI
prevented 10 possible domestic terrorist incidents, including two potentially large-scale,
high-casualty attacks by right-wing groups (Mueller, 2003).
A significant oversight by researchers has been accepting the premise that
terrorists are a uniform class who lack diversity. As studies continue, terrorist groups are
now seen as not all the same; their characteristics, means, and goals ultimately define
their actions. Thus, continuing analysis of such groups is necessary and relevant to
understand this unique social phenomenon. Terrorist groups develop goals and frame
strategies, just as other groups do. In researching and understanding the war on domestic
terrorism and individual groups, it is necessary to understand how their typologies,
defined by their ideologies, are related to their behaviors.
Viewing domestic terrorism as a monolithic entity overlooks key points when
describing the platforms and tactics used by various groups against the government and
its citizens for a variety of reasons. These organizations believe violence is a reasonable
response to what is seen as the government’s incorrect policies, legislation, and choices.
A review of past presidents, beginning with Jimmy Carter, demonstrates how shortsighted approaches to domestic terrorism exacerbated the problem, and led to increased
levels of criminality and violence (Boxall, Rosevear, & Payne, 2015).
By examining the goals, strategies, and tactics of different groups, this study
seeks to understand why domestic terrorists have various strategic logistical platforms
and approaches, and how these variations should inform and augment federal and state
policies. A typological analysis divides terrorist groups into four main categories: ethnic,
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ideological, political, and religious. They are distinguished by the nature of their
ideologies and identities. Key questions concern the aims of each group and a
consideration of whether they are bound to the idea of a single nation or state and their
laws, or whether they seek to affect changes throughout the United States and want
changes to or dissolution of the federal government.
For domestic terrorists, important considerations include the race, ethnicity,
religious affiliation, shared language, customs, and traditions. These help researchers
define members of extremist groups. Central issues and beliefs are important when
determining longevity—which is driven by continuously enrolling or reaching out to likeminded individuals. Terrorist groups routinely use similar methods and tactics to achieve
their goals. However, the basic characteristics that define these organizations and their
goals vary based on the desired outcomes. The result is a differentiation of strategic logic
that dictates their commitment to the level of violence.
By qualifying the variables and tactics that affect the domestic terrorist’s ability to
act, along with his or her potential for survival, dictates the group’s level of sophistication
and the potential damage they can inflict on society in promoting their message. By
identifying unifying variables that can develop predictive behavioral models based on the
identified variables and expected outputs, law enforcement can create and promote
counter-terrorism strategies to address threats to all levels of society from domestic terror
groups (Rosenthal, 2006).
With terrorism routinely deployed as an attempt to wreak havoc, create fear
among the population, draw attention to a particular cause, and affect change, what is
important to note is that all groups that opt to use terrorist tactics do not all share the
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same ends. Some domestic terrorist groups seek political autonomy, statehood, or are
looking for greater political freedoms within the U.S., while others promote extreme
ideas of anarchy and, consequently, also engage in criminal behaviors for profit. In
addition, there are domestic terrorist organizations that use violence in hopes of bringing
about what has emerged as the idea of the final clash of civilizations: cataclysmic
destruction (Huntington, 1993).
Terrorism in the U.S. has become a frightening and all too-common experience.
Extremist groups employ these tactics to force policy changes commensurate with their
stated goals and objectives while simultaneously considering it their “patriotic duty” to
liberate the masses from the tyranny of government by destabilizing it to a point of
lawlessness. If law enforcement fails to categorize the domestic terrorist groups correctly,
counter-terrorism strategies will be flawed. These flaws, in turn, could create situations
that risk exaggerating domestic terrorist threats, create policies that are inconsistent,
thereby alienating potential allies and strengthening the very groups the U.S. is seeking to
undermine (Huntington, 1993).
On September 15, 2010, terrorism expert, Stephen Flynn, provided testimony
before the U.S. House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee on The
Evolving Nature of the Terrorism Threat: Nine Years after the 9/11 Attacks. In his
testimony, Flynn pointed out the seriousness of domestic terrorism in America stating
that:
When terrorists are homegrown, it is the streets of Bridgeport, Denver,
Minneapolis, and other big and small communities across America that become
the frontlines. That translates into local cops on the beat and increasingly the
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American public at large who must be better informed and empowered to deal
with the terrorism threat.
Since 9/11, both current and past terrorism experts have sought to examine how
ethnic, ideological, religious, and financial terrorist groups are ideologically different,
while seeking methods of political and military deterrence. Acknowledging the
differences among terrorist groups, and analyzing them, can lead to new methodologies
that can generate appropriate policy which may reduce violence and save lives. One of
the more current methods by which to assess extremist groups that opt for terror is using
deconstruction.
The purpose of deconstruction and its associated analytical strategy is to
understand and define terrorism by dividing groups according to their identities, focusing
on the group’s ideological imperatives, and subsequently creating viable group-specific
strategies for use in counterterrorism (Hutchinson, 1972). These foundational concepts,
first used by the Carter administration, supported law enforcement in promoting response
strategies based on group typologies to provide law enforcement with the ability to
respond to the ongoing threat of domestic terrorism (Hutchinson, 1972).
Religious Extremism
A review of the literature on the threat of religious extremist groups to national
stability demonstrates that their past actions influenced domestic and foreign policies.
Why some such groups fail, while others flourish, can be understood by identifying
common attributes, which informed and enhanced government policy, leading to current
response strategies. Characterizing key variables within various extremist groups reveals

26
two major typologies: those based on religion and those driven by religious and political
ideologies. According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (1999):
Religious and secular terrorists also have starkly different perceptions of
themselves and their violent acts. Whereas secular terrorists regard violence as a
way to instigate the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good,
religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth
preserving at all but as “outsiders” seeking fundamental changes in the existing
order. This sense of alienation further enables the religious terrorist to
contemplate far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than
secular terrorists—and reinforces the tendency to embrace a far more open-ended
category of “enemies” for attack.
The extremist groups that emerged from these religions generally share the
following four common attributes: (a) the search for meaning, (b) sense of religious
responsibility, (c) the quest for purity, and (d) inspirational leadership often using
scripture as justification for violence. The success of groups that are highly effective can
be attributed to these unifying attributes. In some instances, Jewish, Christian, and
Islamic extremist groups that engaged in domestic violence not only achieved their goals,
but also transformed themselves into political parties that operate within the boundaries
of traditional society and follow the normal channels of protest.
Using comparative case studies, Zisk (1981) determined that Islamic groups
present the greatest threat to society as domestic terrorists. Islamic extremist groups since
the 1970s having bonded due to the common perceived threats of modernity and
globalization. Domestic Islamic extremist groups routinely engaged in supporting

27
traditional Islamic identities within various communities, resulting in cultural clashes that
are ongoing examples of extremist domestic violence. However, by the 1980s, according
to the 1986 FBI Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States Report, there was a
significant shift in the domestic terror threat. An analysis of Figure 1 reveals that during
the Reagan Era, specifically, from 1980-1986, Middle-Eastern (Islamic) and Right-Wing
extremist groups only accounted for seven terrorism incidents each. In contrast, AntiCastro terrorism groups accounted for twenty-one (21) incidents, Jewish terrorism groups
accounted for twenty-four (24) incidents, Left-Wing terrorism groups accounted for thirty
(30) incidents and Puerto Rican terrorist groups accounted for seventy-four (74)
incidents.

Figure 1. Analysis of U.S. Extremist Groups Terrorism Incidents 1980-1986. Note. FBI
Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United States Report 1986
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According to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (1986), since their failed mission to
assassinate President Harry Truman on November 1, 1950, Puerto Rican extremists have
consistently sought there independence from the United States by specifically targeting
U.S. symbols of power and commerce which they understood to be tools of political
repression and economic exploitation (p. 10).
It is unclear as to what specific variable(s) precipitated the significant increase in
the number of terrorist incidents perpetrated by Puerto Rican extremists under the Reagan
administration. Nevertheless, Puerto Rican extremists were considered a top priority
when a 1980 police raid uncovered documents that revealed plans to kidnap several U.S.
politicians and business leaders. More importantly, there was one name on that list
peaked law enforcement’s interests and that was the name of the newly elected president,
Ronald Reagan (Hoffman, 1986). Between 1980-1985, federal and local law enforcement
authorities came to a consensus that dismantling Puerto Rican extremists organizations
such as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional Puertorriqueña (FALN), which in
English translates to Armed Forces of National Liberation, had to be their primary focus.
In 1980, eleven FALN members were arrested Illinois (Hoffman, 1986, p. 11). In 1983,
FALN’s bomb expert, William Morales and four other members were taken into custody
and two (2) safe houses were raided in Chicago, Illinois (Hoffman, 1986). Law
enforcement authorities uncovered a cache of weapons, bullets, explosives, disguises,
bullet proof vests and significant subversive documentation (Hoffman, 1986). The seizure
of this arsenal by law enforcement led to the decline of the organization (Hoffman, 1986).
By 1985, authorities arrested seventeen (17) key members of both FALN and Macheteros
(a Puerto Rican extremist group) which ultimately decimated both groups to the point
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where they were no longer a threat to the United States or their interests (Hoffman,
1986).
Government domestic policies and response strategies would likely be more
successful in uprooting and ending extremist groups if they had a better understanding of
their organizational dynamics, and able to identify why some groups fail and others
succeed. Behavioral models that integrate a proper balance of soft and hard power within
domestic terror organizations are essential for success in developing strong law
enforcement responses, which include de-radicalization and political inclusion, supported
by civilian intelligence and law enforcement.
The most effective way to prevent domestic terrorism is to have an effective
community policing policy embracing different groups within the community which can
possibly assist in deterring people from joining terrorist organizations (Portland State
University, 2013). McGarrell, Freilich, and Chermak (2007) suggested when law
enforcement personnel develop strong relationships with community members, they are
more likely to gain knowledge of critical information. Information that can alert
authorities to behaviors or actions that can metastasize into homegrown terrorism.
Extremist groups thrived during the past decades, drawing new recruits by their
divisive rhetoric and condemning national political leaders who failed to resolve or
respond to anxieties about the country’s shifting demographics (Southern Poverty Law
Center [SPLC], 2016). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) determined that the
number of hate-groups organized against religious and/or racial characteristics rose to
892 in 2015, from 784 the previous year. This 14% increase came after 3 years of decline
in the number of extremist groups, which suggested a decrease in religious extremist
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growth. However, a shift in demographic attributes, owing to White Americans’
heightened fears over their shrinking majority during the Obama administration, let
religious extremist factions capitalize on these fears and end the downward trend
(McPhate, 2016).
The SPLC (2016) also identified 34 anti-Muslim groups having heightened anger
in 2015 after the terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California. Over the course
of 2015, a year in which battles over same-sex marriages occurred, the National Coalition
of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP), received reports on 24 hate-violence related
homicides of LGBTQ and HIV-affected people in 2015, which was a 20% increase in the
number of reports compared to 2014 (NCAVP, 2016).
As extremist religious groups used new laws and acceptance as a rallying cry to
validate their criminal behavior and attacks on pro-LGBT groups and infrastructure, an
increase in future religious violence is anticipated (Norwitz, 2011; Southern Poverty Law
Center, 2015).
Political Extremism
When the American economy struggles, its woes emerges as a unifying theme
among citizens who continually blame politicians and big government for its failures. For
example, the right-wing extremist do not share political and social values with left-wing
extremist, but each group points to, and fixates on, the same political and economic
stories: bank insolvencies, currency devaluations, securities fraud, total-collapse
scenarios (e.g., the mortgage crisis of 2008), the short-comings of the Federal Reserve,
and the need to return to the gold standard (Stern, 2016).
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Political extremists in America, ranging from militias, the Black Bloc, to
Sovereign Citizens (who style themselves as homegrown radicals united by political and
economic ideology and not race), highlight the failures of politicians who have grown
corrupt (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shapiro, 2005). By examining data convergences for
various studies, core questions (such as how many extremists and/or groups are active in
the United States) remain unanswered. Yet, their pervasive influence is undeniable, as
seen in the 400+ U.S.-based websites that generate thousands of extremist posts each day
(Mulloy, 2004). This level of traffic suggests that these groups are a clear and present
danger to the government. Therefore, research must focus on the growth of political
terrorist groups and their individual and group-unifying behavioral characteristics
(Berger, 2012).
Political terrorists in the United States seek to manipulate every piece of so-called
credible evidence that supports end-of-the-world scenarios driven by economic collapse
which can be leveraged to spread other extreme ideologies (Applegate, 2016). As
perceptions of the social, economic, and political milieu are filtered and shaped by this
ideology, ultimately, what terrorists wholeheartedly believe is what will affect their
decision to employ violence as a means to achieve their social and political goals
(Crenshaw, 1988).
The exercise of militia training in the woods, hoarding gold and food, arming
wives and children in anticipation of political insurrection, massive civil unrest or
government collapse is extremist propaganda that is effective in the proliferation and
justification of terrorist action as a means of survival. By appealing to one’s fears, these
pseudo-reality scenarios produce a two-fold effect. First, promoting these concepts can

32
lead to increased political awareness by potential followers. By choosing to believe the
worst about humanity, the ranks of politically extreme organizations will grow and
reinforce the commitment of those who are already members of what Eric Hoffer (1951)
described as “true believers” (Brecher, Devenney, & Winter, 2010). Second, extremist
anti-government websites offer the premise for their existence by suggesting that:
citizens should arm themselves, have the courage and determination to face this world,
and challenge political mandates and laws (Lombardi, Ragab, & Chin, 2014).
Despite the deep moral opprobrium that the word terrorism carries, certain
national, sub-national, and extremist groups have often employed terrorist tactics when
more conventional means of conflict resolution have been exhausted or ignored (Weeber,
2011). In fact, every violent extremist movement or group requires an ideology or belief
system “to nourish, motivate, justify, and mobilize [its] use of terror violence”
(Wilkerson, 1998, p. 205).
By promoting insurrection against existing political structures and laws, their
hope is the fall of society, implosion of the collective order, and destruction of the rule of
law. The raison d’ȇtre (justification) for political extremists is that government is
intrusive, only benefits the aristocracy of society, and manufactures internal strife, civil
unrest, repression, wars, and misery. Although this is the basic premise for their actions,
not all political extremists subscribe to the concept that violence is the necessary means
that produces desired results. Like a duplicitous anarchist, some political extremists have
all but concluded that government is a great unnecessary evil, and that anarchy, in the
literal sense of no government, need not mean anarchy in the popular sense of violence
and disorder (Carter, 2010).
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These differences and typologies are essential to understanding the ongoing
changes of the U.S. political terrorist by law enforcement agencies (Jenkins, 2012).
National Extremism
“The up-tick in moderate-to-small scale attacks in the West since last summer by
individual extremists reinforces our assessment that the most likely and immediate threat
to the Homeland will come from Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) or individuals
with loose affiliation to terrorist groups overseas.” - Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen,
National Counterterrorism Center, February 12, 2015
The United States has faced significant challenges from national domestic
terrorists since the 1970s. According to Dale L. Watson (2002), former Executive
Assistant Director of Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division of the FBI,
between 1980 and 2000, the FBI recorded 335 incidents or suspected incidents of
terrorism. Of those, 247 were confirmed and attributed to acts of national domestic
terrorists. As threats from national extremist movements have grown, the need to address
this reality has become a priority. National terrorists continue to refine and expand their
methods, the threat they pose will grow. In response, the FBI divided the national
terrorist threat facing the United Stated into two general categories: national and
international.
The FBI leads terrorism investigations at the federal level (Bjelopera, 2013).
Their agents have been on the front lines for the past 40 years (Bjelopera, 2013). What
emerged from their experience with domestic terror groups is a coordinated effort by
them to undermine the federal government. Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or
threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within
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the United States. In the case of national terrorism, precedents for criminal prosecution
are set. Terrorist acts directed and coordinated by U.S. citizens, committed against
persons or property with the intent to intimidate or coerce the government and/or civilian
population, is a message cloaked in terror. These acts seek to further personal,
organizational, political, and/or social objectives.
Through continued research, some national terrorist groups have been sponsored
by, or received financial support from, international terrorist groups. However, the central
objective of national terrorist groups is to promote internal change within the national
government. In some cases, the objectives of international groups support this, and lead
to collaborations (Wager, 2009). During the past decade, the United States witnessed
dramatic changes in the nature of the national terrorist threat. In the 1990s, right-wing
extremism surpassed left-wing extremist groups as being the greatest domestic terrorism
threat. Right-wing politics had devolved from healthy Christian activism into contentious
and ultra-politically conservative extremist groups who viewed political empowerment as
a Constitutional right particularly when conservative politicians and media personalities
become increasingly tolerable of far right-wing ideals that had been suppressed from the
mainstream for decades. As national extremist groups grew during the past decade,
special interest extremism emerged and reinvigorated this category of terrorists,
characterized by groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth
Liberation Front (ELF), both considered by law enforcement agencies as serious national
threats. In 2002, former FBI Domestic Terrorism Section Chief, James F. Jarboe reported
that ALF and ELF were responsible for approximately 600 criminal acts in the United
States since 1996, causing damages in excess of $42 million. As these nationwide
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organizations, which operate overtly and covertly, continue to seek and gain support by
rationalizing their terrorist acts, the message will continue to be refined for public
consumption and used as a recruitment tool.
Eco-Terrorism
Eco-terrorism is a tactic used by radical environmentalists who believe that the
approach of the mainstream environmental movement has been ineffective. Eco-terrorists
argue that industrialization, urbanization, and corporate expansion, has violently
infringed upon nature, and bringing about the destruction of the earth. As a result, violent
retaliation is needed. Those who are part of left- or right-wing radical environmental
reformists do more harm than good. Eco-terrorists advocate the intentional destruction of
machinery they believe is detrimental to nature and includes bulldozers, cranes, trucks,
and whaling vessels. Their activity has also included releasing animals from laboratories
and zoos (Smith, 2014).
The basis of eco-terrorism can be traced to writing by Aldo Leopold and Edward
Abbey, among the first to advocate for civil disobedience in the preservation of nature.
Organizations such as ALF, who actively embrace the tactics of eco-terrorism, draw
from the “Earth First” movement, and publicly call for direct and radical environmental
actions. Between 1990 and 2000, attacks by ALF and ELF resulted in the emergence of
an anomaly in the United States. In the post-9/11 era, the FBI has warned that the primary
domestic threat to national security is not political or religious terrorism, but rather the
environmental variety. By examining the variables that define eco-terrorists, further
analysis finds a gap between the description of eco-terrorism and devising and enforcing
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public policy. As a result, there is a need to advocate for research that supports a better
understanding of this dangerous social phenomenon (Smith, Tunno, & Smith, 2002).
Synthesizing relevant findings suggests that the definition of eco-terrorism
remains ambiguous. As a result, it is subject to numerous interpretations, which affect
how public policy responds to eco-terrorism. Attacks coordinated by ALF and ELF have
not been adequately deterred to-date. A majority of the attacks by these groups are most
likely to occur in states which rank in the 80th percentile of per capita income, meaning
that the attacks occur primarily on the West Coast. The significance of the relationships
between the ELF and ALF attacks in conjunction with U.S. public policy demonstrates
that these two facts (infusion of capital and location) are related. With researchers
seeking a better understanding of what constitutes eco-terrorism, along with identifying
radical elements within the environmental movement, this study provided a model for
seeing the cycle of terrorist attacks and government responses in a fresh way. In
developing and providing a framework of inquiry for understanding eco-terrorism, the
expected result will be a reduction in this form of extremism, and deterrence due to
sentencing of eco-terrorists (Smith, 2014; Smith et al., 2002).
By returning to an ideology that supports terrorist actions in conjunction with civil
disobedience to be distinguished through definition and the assignment of penalty, the
argument is presented where people will be more confident in their ability to engage in
their rights of free speech and engage in political opposition. The loss of civil liberties, a
direct result of the increases in eco-terrorism, suggests a correlation between these
variables. Miller, Rivera, and Yelin (2008) argued the opportunity to prevent escalations
at the domestic level.

37
The United Nations conducted a review of civil liberties assignments in
developing their official policy against all forms of terrorism, including eco-terrorism. It
should be an example to the United States and the rest of the world in the fight against
international and domestic terrorism. What is called for is a balance and notes that, while
domestic security is necessary, but should not come at the expense of civil liberties. The
U.S. government is required to continue a course of due diligence while adjusting to everchanging societal expectations and norms, but yet uphold Constitutional rights. It is clear
that this is going to be a delicate balance indeed (Miller et al., 2008).
Anti-Abortion Extremism
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court legalized abortion in the Roe v. Wade,
(410 U.S. 113, 1973) decision. Since that decision, anti-abortion protesters have for the
most part, peacefully protested against the decision or actively making the argument to
their elected officials that Roe v. Wade (1973) must be overturned and the only way to
accomplish that is nominate anti-abortion Supreme Court judges. In fact, in order to
receive the endorsement of the powerful evangelical voting bloc, a candidate must be a
pro-life hardline conservative. But discontentment quickly grew within the ranks of the
pro-life movement and proselytizing, picketing and praying were rapidly being
considered as ineffective by radical anti-abortionists who literally wanted sweeping
policy change by any means necessary even if that meant intimidation or murder.
In 1985, Joe Scheidler, president of the Pro-Life Action League, wrote a book
entitled Closed: 99 Ways to Stop Abortion. In his book, he advocated for pro-lifers to
engage in disruptive activities such as blockades, preventing water from entering the
clinic and clinic sit-ins (Jacobson & Royer, 2010). Like many pro-lifers, Scheidler did
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not openly advocate violence, he did not openly oppose its usage. The Army of God
(AOG) however, openly embraced terrorism and was one of the most prolific antiabortion informal terrorists group in America in the 1980s and 1990s (Jacobson &Royer,
2010). According to the National Abortion Federation, AOG scripted a manual on h ow
to target abortion clinics using bombs, arson, and butyric acid (Jacobson & Royer, 2010).
Moreover, AOG would post a “Wanted List” on their website listing the names, pictures,
addresses, license plate numbers and names of family members (Jacobson & Royer,
2010). The AOG was so effective in intimidating abortion clinic providers, that other prolife organizations would adopt their tactics.
In Pensacola, Florida, Dr. David Gunn decided to perform abortions in the rural
south because other doctors had refused to do so because of religious convictions or
concerns for safety of themselves and their family. But Dr. Gunn was determined, and he
wholeheartedly believed in a woman’s right to choose. So much so, that at one point in
his career he gave up his own practice to travel to surrounding clinics to perform
abortions (Rimer, 1993). Pro-life radicals were on a mission to put an end to what they
deemed as a “sin against God.” Anti-abortionists employed every means of intimidation
at their disposal. They posted “Wanted” posters with Dr. Gunn’s name, address, work
schedule and telephone number (Salcedo, 1990). Those actions were followed by daily
hate mail, frequent tails that followed him around from clinic to clinic, he received a
consistent barrage of death threats, and he was greeted with anti-abortion protesters
everywhere he went standing outside calling him a “murderer” and a “baby killer.”
(Rimer, 1993). Doctor Gunn was not dismissive of these threats from pro-life radicals.
For protection, he strategically placed three firearms in his car for his personal safety
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(Rimer, 1993). He positioned one in his glove compartment, one under the driver’s seat,
and one in the trunk of his car (Rimer, 1993). Despite his precautions, on Wednesday,
March 10, 1993, Doctor David Gunn arrived at his Pensacola, Florida office and was
greeted by routine pro-life protesters, but before he could enter the clinic, thirty-one year
old Michael Griffin yelled, "Don't kill any more babies!" and shot Doctor Gunn three
times in the back with a .38 caliber revolver (Booth, 1993). When the police arrived, they
identified the perpetrator as 31-year old pro-life protester, Michael Griffin.
The murder of Doctor David Gunn was met with disaffection and disillusionment
from pro-life radicals. Joseph Foreman, the dogmatic pro-life ideologue and president of
Milwaukee’s Missionaries to the Pre-born, stated that Gunn was a "mass murderer. He
was preparing to kill five to ten babies. I'm genuinely happy these lives are spared."
(Robinson, 1993). This glorification of the murder of Doctor Gunn may have appalled
non-violent anti-abortionist, but not to the point where they were willing to actively
challenge pro-life radicals to supplant their pro-violence narrative. The unquestioned
radical dogma at the end of the day was self-serving to non-violent pro-life protesters in
that pro-life radical terrorism, although horrific, was silently embraced as both quixotic
and salvific.
Left-Wing Terrorism
The ideology of leftist groups, often referred to as Marxist-Leninist terrorism
and/or revolutionary/terrorism is a form of domestic extremism designed to overthrow
capitalist systems and replace them with socialist constructs. The concept of left-wing
terrorism draws its roots from later 19th and early 20th century anarchist and Bolshevik
forms of domestic terrorism and became pronounced during the Cold War. Modern left-
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wing terrorist movements developed in the context of the political unrest of in Western
Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Notable factions include the West German
Red Army Faction and the Bader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, the French
Action Directe, and the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells. Asian groups included the
Japanese Red Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, although the latter
organization later adopted nationalist terrorism. In Latin America, groups that became
actively involved in terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s included the Nicaraguan
Sandinistas, the Peruvian Shining Path, and the Colombian 19th of April Movement. This
international movement challenges the ruling elite and the premises of democracy, along
with traditional understandings of law and order (Department of Homeland Security,
2008). Between 1973 and 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army committed bank
robberies, two murders, and other acts of domestic violence. One of the most infamous of
these was the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, one of the grand-daughters of newspaper
magnate William Randolph Hearst. During the 1980s, left-wing terrorist actions grew to
include groups such as the May 19th Communist Organization and, later in the decade,
the smaller United Freedom Front, both engaging in covert/overt domestic, left-wing
terror. However, in 1985, with the end of these groups, there was a reduction in the
confirmed acts of left-wing terrorism reported in the U.S. Further, left-wing terrorism
incidents dropped-off dramatically at the end of the Cold War in 1991, primarily due to
loss of support for communism, and lack of money (Department of Homeland Security,
2008).
Left-wing extremism often has developed from working-class movements seeking
in theory to eliminate, not preserve, class distinctions (Seger, 2001). In the 1980s
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through the mid-1990s, domestic leftist terrorist groups and state-sponsored cells and
continued their espionage activities and the planning of terrorist actions against the U.S.
government which at times, paralyzed local law enforcement agencies who did not have
the resources to combat extremism (Seger, 2001). Leftist extremists were so prolific that
they were responsible for three-fourths of the officially designated acts of terrorism in
America in the 1980s (Seger, 2001). To put this in perspective, of the 13,858 people who
died between 1988 and 1998 in attacks committed by the 10 most active terrorist groups
in the world, 74% were killed by leftist organizations (Seger, 2001).
Between 1973 and 1975, the Symbionese Liberation Army committed bank
robberies, two murders, and other acts of domestic violence. One of the most infamous of
these was the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, one of the grand-daughters of newspaper
magnate William Randolph Hearst. During the 1980s, left-wing terrorist actions grew to
include groups such as the May 19th Communist Organization and, later in the decade,
the smaller United Freedom Front, both engaging in covert/overt domestic, left-wing
terror. However, in 1985, with the end of these groups, there was a reduction in the
confirmed acts of left-wing terrorism reported in the United States. Further, left-wing
terrorism incidents dropped-off dramatically at the end of the Cold War in 1991,
primarily due to loss of support for communism, and lack of money (Department of
Homeland Security, 2008).
Despite their success in earlier decades, there are currently no equivalent groups
fashioning themselves as left-wing extremists. Bands of protestors, who periodically
engage in bouts of smashing windows or throwing rocks at police (for instance, the
Occupy Wall Street protestors), have become the norm. Bombings, bank robberies, and
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terrorist engagements with law enforcement have now become the province of extremist
right-wing groups. Unlike earlier decades, there are only a few true left-wing extremist
organizations still operating. This reduction, believed to be the end of left-wing
extremism, was chronicled by Daryl Johnson (2012) in his book, Right-Wing
Resurgence: How a Domestic Terrorism Threat is Being Ignored. However, in 2009,
Johnson’s research noted that cyber-attacks are now viewed as an attractive low-cost
option for left-wing extremists. These types of attacks, in which engagement with
economic targets is promoted in order to align with their non-violent agenda and no-harm
doctrines, are seen as producing positive outcomes for these organizations. Prior to 9/11,
their was a serious need for a counter-terrorism strategy that could effectively respond to
the re-emergence of radical left-wing groups before they became pervasive in society.
Considering the success the FBI has experienced in preventing potential domestic terror
threats post 9/11, we now understand the importance of an effective counter-terrorism
strategy in preventing left-wing radicalism from becoming a significant and ongoing
domestic terror threat in the United States (Johnson, 2012).
Right-Wing Terrorism
“I personally regard them as more dangerous than the Klan groups from which they
emanated.” - Director William Webster, FBI, New York Times, April 4, 1985
Right-wing extremists are considered to be on the far-right end of the political
spectrum and they are often called right-wingers or the far-right usually as a pejorative.
According to data from the New America Foundation (2014), in the years since the
September 11th attacks, right-wing extremists committed at least 19 different terrorist
attacks in the United States, resulting in the deaths of at least 48 people.
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Right-extremist are motivated by a deep sense of conviction that a revolution to
overthrow a government is necessary in order to restore the White race to their “rightful”
position of dominance and authority in America. Their views of an American past of selfsufficient, morally righteous, hard-working people is similar to that of the mainstream.
The difference however, are the tenets of the right-wing ideology which is deeply rooted
racial hatred and anti-government sentiment. Moreover, they are willing to exact
violence on anyone they deem as a threat to advancing their cause. Their methods of
effecting change include violence and intimidation which qualifies them to be labeled as
domestic terrorists instead of patriots because they lack the affective or cognitive skills
that would allow for constructive engagement.
The Turner Diaries, the infamous racist dystopian novel by neo-Nazi William
Luther Pierce, inspired more than 200 murders since its publication in 1978, including,
prior to 9/11, the single deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing (Berger, 2016). In the book, the character of Earl Turner was
crafted in a way to connect to the anger and fears of working-class White men became
frustrated with government and their failure to prevent Jews, African-Americans, and
other from “taking over” America. From their perspective, the White man was being
systematically excluded from almost every facet of the American dream. The character of
Earl Turner articulates a litany of missed opportunities by White men that precede the
book’s apocalyptic events, explicitly stating that earlier action would have produced a
better outcome (Berger, 2016):
We have allowed a diabolically clever, alien minority to put chains on our souls
and our minds. These spiritual chains are a truer mark of slavery than the iron
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chains which are yet to come. Why didn’t we rebel 35 years ago, when they took
our schools away from us and began converting them into racially mixed jungles?
Why didn’t we throw them all out of the country 50 years ago, instead of letting
them use us as cannon fodder in their war to subjugate Europe? More to the
point, why didn’t we rise up three years ago, when they started taking our guns
away? Why didn’t we rise up in righteous fury and drag these arrogant aliens into
the streets and cut their throats then? Why didn’t we roast them over bonfires at
every street-corner in America? Why didn’t we make a final end to this obnoxious
and eternally pushy clan, this pestilence from the sewers of the East, instead of
meekly allowing ourselves to be disarmed? (Macdonald, 1978, p. 13)
Right-wing extremists perceived that the marginalization of White Americans
began shortly after World War II, when the armed forces were first integrated, the
United Nations established its general headquarters on U.S. soil, and anticommunism became the driving political force of the early Cold War (Gumbel,
2015).
Although the Klan’s membership had dwindled from three million in 1925 to
roughly 50,000 by 1964, the Klan was still a force to be reckoned with in the south
(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011). By 1964, FBI investigations and congressional
probes had dealt a significant blow to the Klan and their hegemonic ideology of White
supremacy. FBI’s COINTELPRO relentlessly targeted the Klan between 1965-1967, and
the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on UnAmerican Activities conducted hearings into the Activities of Ku Klux Klan Organizations
In The United States, most notably terrorism, and produced the report The Present Day
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Ku Klux Klan Movement (Eighty-Ninth U.S. Congress, 1965). The fanaticism of White
extremist was further crushed by the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the Voting
Rights Act in 1965 and government hearings into the Klan in 1965-1966, in the late
1970s as the farm crisis was starting to affect the population of rural America and stoke
existing White anger and resentment at the federal government, Texas Klansman and
Aryan Nations ambassador Louis Beam Jr. issued a call to arms, ‘where ballots fail,
bullets will prevail’, introducing a period of radicalization and violence that would
become known as the ‘Fifth Era’ (Ridgeway, 1990).
America’s bruising experience in Vietnam radicalized the far right even further,
breathing life into the Patriot movement, whose members referred dismissively to the
American government as the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG), and believed that
only a return to the values of the American Revolution could save the country from its
corrupt leaders who were under the undue influence of Jews at home and abroad.
(Gibson, 1994). By the 1980s the farm crisis reached its apex, plunging entire rural
communities into penury as giant agribusinesses took over family small-holdings, the
movement briefly achieved a Robin Hood-style romantic appeal as two notable rightwing extremists actively resisted what he perceived as government abuse and over-reach
(Gumbel, 2015). Gordon Kahl was a North Dakota farmer who refused to pay his taxes
and emerged as hero when he was killed for his extremist positions. Kahl likened the
government to “Satan”, and died in a shootout with federal law enforcement in Arkansas.
Wayne Snell left his farm in Arkansas to join the efforts of three anti-government
paramilitary groups; The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord. It was during

46
this period where the first abortive plan to blow up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
in Oklahoma City (Gumbel, 2015).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the American extreme right, made up of Ku
Klux Klan paramilitaries, White separatists, neo-Nazis, Identity Christians and antigovernment patriots such as Invisible Empire, White Patriot Party, White Aryan
Resistance, National Alliance, Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus and The Order, was
implicated in numerous robberies, shootouts, murders and terrorist plots that grabbed the
public and state’s attention, such as the 1984 murder of Denver Disc Jockey Alan Berg
by The Order (Winter, 2010).
By the 1990s, right-wing extremism surpassed left-wing terrorism as the most
dangerous domestic terrorist threat in America (Watson, 2002). The most notable attacks
perpetuated by right-wing domestic terrorists during this time was the infamous April 19,
1995 attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City by right-wing
extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, killing 168 people, including 19
children in a day care and injuring 500 others (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2001). In
January 1998, Christian Identity extremist Eric Rudolph was responsible for detonating a
remote-controlled nail bomb in Birmingham, Alabama that instantly killed Robert
Sanderson, an off-duty police officer and severely injured Nurse Emily Lyons (Stack,
2015). Prior to this incident, On July 27, 1996, a pipe bomb, filled with nails and screws,
exploded in Atlanta’s Centennial Park at the Olympic Games. The explosion killed one
person and wounded 111 others (START, 2012).
In the summer of 1992, members of the Christian Identity and Patriot movements
convened at the Rocky Mountain Rendezvous in Estes Park, Colorado (Southern Poverty
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Law Center, 2000). The meeting was organized by Identity Minister Pete Peters in order
to devise a strategic response to the government’s “assault on Ruby Ridge in which they
deemed as tyranny of the government (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). At the
meeting, Beam introduced “Leaderless Resistance”, a strategy based on the formation of
autonomous terrorist cells to combat a better equipped and larger state law enforcement
and military (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000). This meeting is widely believed to
have influenced the development of the Militia movement (Winter, 2010).
Militia and Paramilitary Groups
The defining characteristic of many domestic terrorist groups, include militia
extremists, is that they are all anti-government (Bjelopera, 2013). The characteristic that
differentiates militia groups from others is that they routinely organize themselves into
paramilitary groups that follow military-style rank. These groups seek to stockpile
various kinds of illegal weapons and ammunition and seek fully automatic firearms. They
attempt to illegally convert weapons from semi-automatic to fully automatic and try to
purchase or manufacture improvised explosive devices. They engage in multiple types of
training, some of which include wilderness, survival, or other paramilitary training. Their
primary focus is to generally target the government itself, including law enforcement
personnel, representatives of the courts, public officials, and government buildings. When
members are arrested, they are routinely charged with various explosives, weapons,
and/or conspiracy violations (Mulloy, 2004).
The Patriot movement reached its peak in the early-mid 1990s, as the end of the
Cold War shuttered many defense industries, the country experienced a recession, and a
resurgent militia movement that detested the militarization of federal law enforcement
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agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the FBI (Gumbel, 2015).
On August 21, 1992, the FBI enraged White extremists when during a raid on
Ruby Ridge, Idaho, FBI sniper Lon Horiuchi shot Vicki Weaver in the head (killing her
instantly) as she hid behind their cabin door. Extremists considered it vindication when
Agent William Degan was shot to death in a shootout that killed the Weaver’s 14-yearold Sam Weaver during an exchange of gunfire (Churchill, 2009). The FBI went to serve
a warrant on Randy Weaver after informant Kenneth Fadely advised the FBI that Weaver
had provided him with two sawed-off shotguns with obtaining a 200-dollar government
permit (Churchill, 2009). This transaction, and Weaver’s refusal to turn “state’s witness,”
gave the FBI a reason to raid the Weaver Household (Churchill, 2009). During the trial of
Randy Weaver and family friend Kevin Harris, April 19, 1993, the government assault in
Waco, Texas on David Koresh and the Branch Davidians sent the militia movement into
a frenzy. Right-wing extremists viewed these assaults as grave injustices and an abuse of
power perpetuated by a Zionist Occupation Government (Churchill, 2009). Jim
Mckinzey, the co-founder of Missouri 51st Militia, described his move to action against
para-military policing:
Ruby Ridge was a wakeup call for a lot of people in the country, including
myself. Until Ruby Ridge came down the pike, I could care less about
politics…This is the greatest country in the world, love it or leave it…And then,
they’re starting to shoot children, and shooting unarmed women in the head. Wait
a minute now, I need to pay attention to what’s going on here. Then, what, less
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than a year later, these same people are now down in Texas, taking on women and
children, and that is really what did it. (Churchill, 2009)
Militia extremists see themselves as protecting the U.S. Constitution, other U.S.
laws, or their own liberties (FBI, 2011). Their actions are based on the belief that the
Constitution grants citizens the ability and the right to wrest power from the federal
government by force, if it is deemed that the federal government has become
authoritarian or tyrannical. One of the primary ways this justification to overthrow the
government manifest itself is by intense propaganda that the federal government wants to
disarm the average citizen by violating their second amendment right “to keep and bear
arms.” Militia extremists are often described as subscribing to various conspiracy theories
regarding government; a central one concerns the New World Order. Their training and
preparation is preparation for an inevitable invasion of the United States, coordinated by
United Nations forces. Another fear held by militias is that the federal government will
forcibly relocate citizens to camps controlled by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency or force them to undergo vaccinations against their will (Bill, 2005).
An individual simply espousing anti-government rhetoric is not against the law.
However, when the desire is to advance that rhetoric through violence, it becomes illegal.
That is when the FBI and law enforcement agencies become involved. As the FBI,
backed by the government, attempt to combat militia threats, its primary goal is to gather
intelligence and analyze it in order to successfully identify the gaps in knowledge that
may possibly lead to future terrorist attacks. By developing networks using confidential
informants, tracking and identifying emerging tactics and trends, and proper use of
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effective investigative techniques, militias planning domestic terror plots, can be stopped
and prosecuted before they carry out their plots (Mulloy, 2008).
Lone Wolf Terrorism
“…the most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more
of a lone wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.” - President
Obama, CNN, August 16, 2011
Existing research on “lone wolf” terrorism often interprets it through the lens of
psychoanalytic theory (Meloy & Yakeley, 2014). Numerous defining characteristics,
which can depict the lone wolf include: framing an ideology, a personal grievance, moral
outrage, dependence on a virtual community, failure to affiliate with an extremist group,
lack of occupational goals, radicalization fueled by changes in thinking and emotions,
excitement of clandestine activities, contempt and disgust with various ideologies; failure
to sexually bonding; and predatory violence sanctioned by moral (superego) authority
figures (Phillips, 2011).
The greatest threat for law enforcement agencies, and what makes lone wolf
terrorist so extremely dangerous, is their unpredictability. Although they are driven to
destruction by extremist rhetoric and ideology, lone wolves are individuals radicalized
without significant contact with others and their plots of destruction are without direction
from a top down military styled chain of command. Lone wolf terrorists are free to act
upon any scenario and are only limited by what they can conceive in their minds (Simon,
2013). This freedom to act independently has resulted in some of the most horrendous
domestic terrorist attacks in American history.
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There are three primary types of lone wolves: (a) the secular lone wolf is defined
by the violent nature of attacks for political, ethno-nationalist, or separatist causes; (b) the
religious lone wolf operates under an ideology that perpetrates terrorism in the name of
Islam, Christianity, Judaism, or other belief systems; (c) the third type is the single-issue
lone wolf, who perpetrates attacks for specific issue, such as abortion, animal rights, or
the environment (Simon, 2013).
While secular, religious, and single-issue lone-wolf attacks have similar
objectives and motivations, there is a fourth and fifth type of lone wolf terrorist that is
rather distinctive. The criminal lone wolf is primarily motivated by the desire for money
and personal gain, as opposed to other kinds of terrorists, many of whom may be
motivated by political, social, religious, or ethnic-nationalist goals. The lack of an
ideological objective is why most analysts do not consider lone-wolf criminals to be
‘terrorists’ in the traditional sense. However, there do exist cases where the criminal
activity has so great an effect on society and government that it should be considered
terrorism (Barnes, 2012).
The fifth kind of lone-wolf terrorist is termed the “idiosyncratic” lone wolf. This
person is mainly motivated by personal demons or mental illness. This category of lone
wolf terrorist is unique. Except for cults that commit terrorist acts, there are no
idiosyncratic terrorist groups currently in operation. Although the idiosyncratic lone wolf
may commit attacks in the name of some radical ideological belief, these causes are the
result of irrational desires, and perpetrators are frequently driven to violence mainly by
severe personality disorders or other psychological issues. One of the most classic
examples of the idiosyncratic lone wolf terrorist is Theodore Kaczynski, who called for a

52
revolution against an increasingly industrial-technological society, and although he was a
mathematical genius, it was later determined that Kaczymski was not only an ideologue,
but he was psychologically diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic (Barnes, 2012).
Law enforcement strategies employed to deter homegrown terrorism has not been
significantly useful, and most instances ineffective, against lone wolves. The greatest
challenge is that the modus operandi of the lone wolf is so inconsistent that it is almost
impossible to prevent because their actions are only detectable by authorities after the
terrorist incident has been committed.
Technology has given the lone wolf terrorists significant tools for contacting other
participants and accessing the Internet for planning. On the other hand, it can also cause
problems in carrying out attacks. Lone wolves have become most vulnerable to discovery
by law enforcement agencies when they surface online. Whether announcing to the world
that they are ready, willing, and able to commit a desired terrorist act, or posting online
manifestos (as some have done in the past), they can leave behind many Internet clues
that can ultimately lead to their detection and demise. The chat rooms they visit, and the
online searches they conduct can all become pitfalls leading to their arrest, and highlight
a weakness for this kind of domestic terrorists (Reid Meloy, & Yakeley, 2014).
Because of the relatively recent emergence of the lone wolf threat and the
politicization of domestic terrorism by non-jihadist, legal scholarship is deficient in fully
addressing this specific type of terrorism. Like past presidential administrations dating
back to president Jimmy Carter, previous legal scholarship addressing the more widely
discussed phenomenon of homegrown terrorism focuses primarily on prosecutors’ efforts
to criminalize nascent expressions of criminal intent (Abrams, 2005).
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Sovereign Citizens
The ideology of the sovereign domestic terrorist originates from the Posse
Comitatus movement, which was promoted by William P. Gale, a Christian identity
minister. His theories led to the rise of the Christian Patriot Movement, which was
followed by the Redemption Movement, and further challenged the authority of the
federal government by making use of citizens as a form of collateral to be used against
foreign debt. The 14th amendment to the Constitution, according to Gale and others,
converts sovereign citizens into federal ones by using their agreeing to accept benefits
directly from the federal government, and thereby become indebted to the government,
creating a new problem. To free themselves from their oppressive government, they
instead label themselves as a group that is “seeking the Truth”, and also challenges the
authority of the government and, in some instances, do so by directly engaging in acts of
domestic terrorism (Loreleil, 2014).
One of the central issues debated by and acted upon as Sovereigns, are the various
laws concerning taxes where a variation of the argument that promotes civil disobedience
is that the person is not directly subject to various laws because the person is considered
“sovereign.” These challenges to the government have been repeatedly rejected by the
courts especially, the tax courts (e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
The basis of the argument was that the individual is not to be subject to federal income
tax because they are an “individual sovereign citizen.” This reasoning, if ever validated,
would make every individual a nation unto themselves, such that prosecution using
common and statutory laws would be unlikely. The sovereigns, having been rejected by
the government, have performed isolated and sporadic acts of domestic terrorism, and are
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individuals that need to be monitored by the government in an effort to avoid escalation
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011).
Conclusion
This chapter considered key domestic terror groups and described their
ideological positions, their histories, and their fears. The various groups described offer
insights that can aid in creating a comprehensive, predictive model of future group
behavior and assist law enforcement. Chapter 3 offers an analysis of policies,
determinants, and social and behavioral characteristics that promote an in-depth review of
the domestic terrorist groups.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
This review examined current scholarly articles and studies related to key themes
identified in the study that are useful to incorporate in a prevention model. Based on the
findings of Chapter 2, the factions described there will be reviewed through a temporal
evaluation. Searching for common themes and variables defining a particular time period
supporting the growth and evolution of a domestic terror group will provide insights and
the opportunity to develop deterrent capabilities, such as predictive behavior models
(Davidson & Hudson, 2012).
By developing each group, themes were interconnected and analyzed based on the
literature offered by standard academic databases, including ERIC, Sage, and ProQuest,
focusing on primary and peer-reviewed research articles and studies. Review of the
various domestic organization typologies was developed in response to the problems law
enforcement faces in responding to domestic terror groups. The researcher synthesized
relevant research and provided recommendations at the conclusion of the study for
stakeholders (Rosenau, 2013).
Boolean search terms used to achieve saturation include: U.S. domestic terrorism
groups, governmental responses, evolution of domestic terror organizations, history of
key terrorist groups in the United States, and the future of U.S. domestic terrorism. By
under-standing the past and the creation and growth of the important types of U.S.
domestic terror groups, unifying variables can be identified, thus allowing for statistical
analysis. Supported by research, the analysis can draw from key inputs and outputs to
develop models that can provide U.S. law enforcement agencies the opportunity to
identify trends, hot-spots, and emerging issues related to domestic terrorism. Building on
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past research utilizing quantitative methodological approaches, the potential damage from
these organizations can be minimized, and give law enforcement the upper-hand in
preventing future attacks (Schmitt, 2010).
U.S. Public Policy on Terrorism from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan
“I’m a father and I’m a Christian; I’m a businessman and I’m a Christian; I’m a farmer
and I’m a Christian; I’m a politician and I’m a Christian. The most important thing in my
life beyond all else is Jesus Christ.” - President Carter (Nielsen, p. 18, 1977)
President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)
In examining Jimmy Carter’s approach to terrorism or his overall approach to
policy development, it is important to consider his devotion to his Christian faith.
Reflecting on the tumultuous and politically charged sixties and seventies, some of
Carter’s advisors felt that he should not be so straightforward regarding his faith for the
fear that he would be viewed as a religious ideologue and alienate a new generation of
voters. However, what was underestimated by Carter’s advisors was that even though
Americans were not as indoctrinated or theologically dogmatic as their parents or
grandparents, most Americans still expected that elected leaders, especially the President
of the United States, be of the Christian faith. The uncomfortable or unnerving aspect to
some extent was the time when elected officials, especially a President, gave the
appearance that faith guided all their decisions on domestic and foreign policy. Although
President Carter was aware of this concern, he was so deeply rooted in his religious
convictions it was clear that his Christianity was inextricably connected to his
personality. As a result, any attempts President Carter would have made to sever his
decisions from his faith would often place him in an uncomfortable position.
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In qualifying his moral turpitude, Carter’s religious convictions were essential in
developing policies on terrorism (Ariail & Heckler-Feltz, 1996). As Carter (1976)
believed that his faith would make him a different type of President from his immediate
predecessors, researchers determined that those who knew and worked with Jimmy
Carter believed that his religious faith was the core of his existence. To the Secret
Service, he was known as "The Deacon,” and he would often forthrightly proclaim that
his "religious faith has always been at the core of [his] existence" (Ariail & HecklerFeltz, 1996, p. 28).
When President Jimmy Carter was elected as America’s 39th president of the
United States, combating domestic terrorism was not considered a top priority. By the
time President Carter was elected, incidents of domestic extremism had drastically
declined. Furthermore, Carter was intensely focused on dismantling the hierarchical
modus operandi of the Nixon/Ford administrations and approaching acts of terrorism
from a more humanitarian perspective where conflict negotiation, soft sanctions, coercion
and compromise would be the alternative to military force. One of Carter’s primary
concerns from the outset was to set up his foreign policy machinery in a way that would
avoid the extreme centralization of power that Kissinger, as special assistant for national
security affairs, had acquired during Nixon’s first term and that led him to replace for all
practical purposes the secretary of state (George, George, & Stern, 1998). In an attempt to
inhibit the special assistant from becoming the dominant actor in the system and a de
facto “chief” of staff, Carter planned to rely on collegiality among his principal national
security advisers which consisted of the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, a
special assistant, and the vice president (George et al., 1998). Their mandate was to
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achieve the necessary interaction and coordination required to engage those individuals
or nations perceived as threat or potential threat to America’s national interest (George et
al., 1998).
While Carter accepted that occasionally it was necessary to use military force, he
rejected the Clauswitzian notion that domestic and international conflict be solely
resolved through military and law enforcement intervention. Carter rejected the
imperialist dogma that differentiated between good wars and bad wars. To Carter, all
wars were considered bad because it devalued the human condition. President Carter
based on his religious beliefs, felt that it was imperative for any leader to find paths to
peace and for him, it was not only a presidential priority, but it was in line with biblical
precept found in Matthew 5:9, which states, “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall
be called the children of God.”
Emerging from the Wilsonian southern traditions, Carter’s approach to governing
was far different than his predecessor’s, and he was determined to challenge corruption as
a political and religious necessity. Carter considered himself as a reformer and
progressive, putting his faith in science and technology as well as religion, to advance the
human condition, not only in America, but globally. He thought political leadership
should support a common good, rather than satisfy a small constituency of elites and
lobbyists whom he thought were only interested in defiling the ideals of democracy.
Carter admitted that he never had the stomach for “politics as usual,” whether in
international or domestic affairs; he did not love politics (Gould, 2003). Vice President
Walter Mondale affirmed this sentiment when reflected on Carter’s predisposition about
politics: “Carter thought politics was sinful. The worst thing you could say to Carter if
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you wanted to do something was that it was politically the best thing to do” (Gould, 2003,
p. 182). Like Woodrow Wilson, Carter intended to act with honesty, fairness, and candor,
leading people by example, and asking them to reach for a higher moral plane (Ariail &
Heckler-Feltz, 1996).
Although President Carter’s faith was a key component to how he governed, his
technocratic style and his collegial model of governance, although Nobel, would prove
ineffective in the times of crisis when presidents are expected to “take charge.”
According to Richard Neustadt (1990):
Modern presidents need to be activists, experienced politicians, and possess a
passion for politics. “The Presidency is a place for men of politics,” in fact,
“extraordinary politicians.” Presidents must be political and learn the art of
political compromise; they must exercise “the power to persuade” and “the power
to persuade is the power to bargain.” (pp. 151-53)
President Carter’s quest to “sanctify” and “sanitize” his administration and
Washington, D.C. prevented him from developing the political acumen needed to
advance his policies. The press was routinely harsh and critical of Carter’s frequent
public displays of faith; church historian Martin Marty explained that President Carter
knew no other way to govern (Berggren & Rae, 2006).
Although President Carter was a devout Christian, there were incidents where his
closest advisors would witness a persona that was far different than the congenial
statesman displayed in public. His Chief Campaign Speech Writer, Patrick Anderson
(1994), recounted incidents where President Carter engaged in mild uses of profanity,
was known to be vindictive at times and would occasionally drink scotch and water in

60
moderation. Carter was a complex duplicitous technocrat that proved challenging to work
for. In his book, Anderson (1994) made this observation of what it was like working for
President Carter:
Hiding behind his big smile and pieties about love and peanut farming was a far
more interesting and complex man than the voters knew. He possessed not only
intelligence and high moral purpose, but a mixture of pride and piety that could
make him quite maddening to deal with. I found much to respect in the candidate
and much to regret in the man.
Despite, his shortcomings, his staff was convinced that post-Watergate, Jimmy
Carter was a righteous and descent man who sincerely had a mission to restore integrity
and honesty to government.
Although Jimmy Carter ascended to the president at a time when incidents of
domestic terrorism were on the decline, his presidency was not immune and his decisionmaking in crisis situations would be tested in ways no one anticipated. Carter, like many
of his predecessors, considered incidents of domestic terror as an annoyance better served
by local authorities. This position became evident when on March 09, 1977, Hanafi
Muslim extremists occupied B’nai B’rith headquarters, the Islamic Cultural Center, and
city government buildings in Washington, DC, holding 134 people hostages (Naftali,
2006). By the time the sieges were over, a student reporter from Howard University had
been shot to death and City Council member Marion Barry had been wounded in the
chest (Naftali, 2006). At the time, under the existing procedures, the incident was
managed by the District police (Naftali, 2006). It was the Police who called in the State
department's Office for Combating Terrorism when it became clear that the ring leader of
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the Hanafis, Hamaas Abdul Khaalis was interested in speaking with Arab representatives
(Naftali, 2006). The Carter administration received regular updates regarding the
incident, but they did not take the lead in resolving the crisis. Douglas Heck, the State's
antiterrorism expert and chairman of the Working Group for Combating Terrorism,
worked with Egyptian, Pakistani and Iranian ambassadors who were acting as mediators,
in an attempt to resolve the situations without any more human causalities (Naftali,
2006).
On the evening of March 10, 1977, the Hanafi hostage incident, was resolved and
all involved in the incident were sentenced to prison. The Carter administration
undertook a low-level review of U.S. counterterrorism policy (Naftali, 2006). Initially,
under the guidance of Jessica Tuchman, a National Security Council staffer, the process
did not draw the full attention of the President's national security advisor, Zbigniew
Brzezinski (Naftali, 2006). Brezinzinski did not believe that domestic terrorism was a
strategic issue," recalls William Odom who replaced Tuchman after she lost Brzezinski's
support (Naftali, 2006). As a result, President Carter made no public statement regarding
the Hanafi Hostage Crisis.
Jimmy Carter saw the terrorism problem tied to other international issues, and not
only as threat in the United States (Smith & Thomas, 2001). In that context, Carter took a
“trickle down” approach to domestic terrorism. That is, if he was effective at combating
international terrorism, that would somehow curb or reduce the amount of domestic
terrorism incidents. As a result, Carter was laser focused on dealing with terrorism on an
international level. So much so that the 1980 Statute of Liberty Bombing received
minimal attention from the Carter administration. He placed more emphasis on the
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political character and “warlike” nature of terrorism, and less on its criminality (Smith &
Thomas, 2001). What started out for Carter as political terrorism—a smorgasbord of subnational, transnational groups, some with state sponsorship, willing to operate against
U.S. and allied interests—ended as “microcosmic” warfare, a teapot war, that scalded the
Carter Presidency in the end (Smith & Thomas, 2001). By 1980, the Iranian Hostage
Crisis and international terrorism had consumed the Carter administration to the point
where almost everything else was secondary, including the economy, the oil crisis, and
how to deal with stagflation. Carter, true to his humanitarian world view and JudeoChristian ethics worked tirelessly to create effective solutions to combat international
terrorism through negotiations and sanctions. In May of 1980, the Carter Administration
had developed an aggressive counter-terrorism program with elements that addressed the
increased international terrorism threat (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Domestic terrorism was
neither a concern to President Carter or the senior advisors of his administration. This
was evident when Odom and Brzezinki made their positions known that the United States
did not need an elaborate domestic counter-terrorism strategy (Naftali, 2006). As far as
they were concerned, the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to U.S. interests and
terrorism abroad was more significant than issues of domestic terrorism in the United
States. Odom concluded that as a phenomenon [domestic] terrorism did not exist. "When
it happens here [America], it is a crime." "When it happens abroad, it is war" (Naftali,
2006).
Jimmy Carter was frequently criticized for lacking compelling political vision and
it is noted that he took on too many issues, lacked focus, and lacked priorities (Berggren
& Rae, 2006).
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By the end of the 1970s, state-sponsored terrorism became an unambiguous threat
to U.S. interests, metaphorically devouring President Carter, which ultimately sealed his
fate and re-election looked bleak if not impossible (Smith & Thomas, 2001). In
December 1979, the U.S. Department of State began designating state sponsors of
terrorism, designations that carry harsh penalties in trade and international relations with
the United States (Smith & Thomas, 2001, p. 206). But these sanctions came a little too
late. President Carter was already seen as weak when dealing with acts of terrorism on an
international stage. Despite his efforts to shift the counter-terrorism paradigm from the
United States might to a role of conflict resolution and mild coercion, Americans were
disappointed with the Carter administration and they were looking for a President that
would exude confidence, strength, and military might around the world. They wanted a
leader that terrorists would fear and respect. In 1981, the American people elected former
California Governor Ronald Reagan because was the embodiment of toughness and
confidence. The former actor who was known for his heroic portrayals in cowboy
westerns was able to transfer that personification of “true grit” to the White House where
he was expected to take a more aggressive approach in combating both international and
domestic terrorism.
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
When Ronald Reagan took office on January 20, 1981, he refocused U.S. counterterrorism strategy from conflict negotiation and mediation to military action. Secretary of
State Alexander Haig was emphatic when he announced that President Reagan’s
approach to fighting terrorism would replace the Carter administration’s focus on
advancing human rights throughout the world (Richelson & Evans, 2001). In his
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inaugural speech, Reagan (1981) became the first president in U.S. history to mention the
threat of international terrorism:
Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the
world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is
a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as
Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and
prey upon their neighbors.
His speech was resilient and a warning to terrorist actors around the world that a new
commander-in-chief was in the White House, and his name was Ronald Wilson Reagan.
Reagan would be the first U.S. President to openly announce that he was waging war
against global terrorism (Willis, 2003).
Like the Carter administration, the Reagan administration recognized the global
threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, Reagan and his top security advisors viewed
the Soviet Union far more critically and accused them of being a stealth sponsor of
international terrorism and the Reagan administration was determined to disrupt and
destroy all international terrorist networks that threatened U.S. interests. Throughout the
presidential campaign, Reagan took every opportunity to characterize Carter as weak on
issues of international terrorism particularly in his approach of dealing with the Soviet
Union. While campaigning, Reagan would consistently inject the notion that America, in
order to achieve world peace, we must do so by rebuilding its military and nuclear
capabilities (Smith, Clymer, Silk, Lindsey, & Burt, 1980). The slogan, throughout the
campaign was Peace through Strength and Reagan made it clear that the weakness of the
Carter administration was the primary reason that “our allies are losing confidence in us
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and our adversaries no longer respect us” (Smith et al., 1980). Once Reagan was elected
in November of 1980, he was laser focused on a military arms build-up that rivaled the
Soviet Union (Smith et al., 1980). He wasted no time in appointing long-time friend and
World War II veteran Caspar Weinberger as his Secretary of Defense. Reagan wanted
someone in the position who shared his views, zeal and disdain for the Soviet Union. In
his book, Fighting for Peace, Weinberger (1990) confirmed Reagan’s assessment of his
potential commitment to a position of parity with the Soviets when he wrote:
From then on I became almost totally immersed in defense and security issues,
and would remain so with an intensity and single-mindedness that permitted
thought about virtually nothing else, night and day, every day until the end of
November 1987. (pp. 14-15)
Both Weinberger and Reagan were convinced that the Soviet Union, via instruments of
terrorism, were on a mission to destabilize America’s system of democracy and freedom.
Based on this premise, from 1981-1983, the Reagan administration, with dogged
determination, developed strategies and policies that would counter, what they perceived
as diabolical scheme by the Soviets to one day disrupt America’s system of democracy.
While the terrorism rhetoric-levels were high for incoming President Ronald
Reagan, initially, the administration did not have in place the necessary strategic planning
or the required counter-terrorism infrastructure to take decisive action that would yield
positive results (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Reagan knew that he could ill-afford to
authorize the execution of a military operation that would be a failure. The praxis of
actual policy limped behind the fire-breathing rhetoric of the declared policy (Smith &
Thomas, 2001, p. 238). Throughout his first term as president, Ronald Reagan skillfully
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gave the appearance that he was the first commander-in-chief to develop a policy to
combat international terrorism, when in actuality, he was only the first U.S. president to
synthesize a terrorism protocol in 1986 with the issuance of National Security Decision
Directive 207 (Rosenau, 2014). This directive resulted from the findings of the 1985 Vice
President’s Task Force on Terrorism, headed by then Vice-President George H.W. Bush,
which highlighted the need for improved, centralized interagency coordination of the
federal government’s significant assets to respond to terrorist incidents (Rosenau, 2014).
This directive was primarily focused on terrorist incidents abroad and was crafted to
specifically to coordinate the national response and designate lead federal agencies to
respond to and resolve terrorist incidents overseas and domestically (Rosenau, 2014). The
U.S. State Department was renamed as the lead agency for developing international
terrorism policy, procedures, and programs, while FBI remained the lead law
enforcement agency for investigating and suppressing acts of domestic terrorism
(Rosenau, 2014). However, like his predecessors, domestic terrorism never really became
the primary focus of the Reagan administration. Incidents of international terrorism
always took precedence even though every administration since the 1970s recognized the
threat of domestic terrorism in the United States (Richelson & Evans, 2001). The only
war American soil that Ronald Reagan would focus his attention and the nation’s
resources, was the War on Drugs. On October 02, 1982, President Reagan officially
announced, in his weekly radio address, his administration’s War on Drugs:
The mood toward drugs is changing in this country, and the momentum is with us.
We're making no excuses for drugs—hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad, and
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we're going after them. As I've said before, we've taken down the surrender flag
and run up the battle flag. And we're going to win the war on drugs.
In March 1983, President Reagan announced the formation of the National
Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to interdict the flow of narcotics into the
United States (DEA, 1985). NNBIS was headed by then Vice President George Bush,
and had an Executive Board made up of members from the State Department, Treasury,
Defense, Justice, Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, and White House Drug
Abuse Policy Office (DEA, 1985).
Between 1980 and 1984, FBI anti-drug funding increased from $8 million to $95
million (Beckett, 1997). Department of Defense anti-drug allocations increased from $33
million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1991 (Beckett, 1997). During that same period, DEA
anti-drug spending ballooned from $86 to over $1 billion dollars, and FBI anti-drug
allocations grew from $38 to $181 million (Beckett, 1997).
The Reagan administration was well aware of the disruption and destruction of
domestic terrorists but determined early on in the development of their counter-terrorism
policy that domestic terrorism did not rise to the level of receiving dedicated federal
resources in combatting their subversive activities around the country. However, what the
Reagan administration did not anticipate was that between 1981-1986, there would be a
simultaneous resurgence of domestic terrorism from right-wing, left-wing, and paramilitary extremists. By 1981, there had been a resurgence of left-wing violence
perpetrated by the May 19th Communist Organization (M19CO), Black Liberation Army
(BLA), Jewish Extremist groups, Puerto Rican extremist groups, Anti-Castro/Cuban exile
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extremists, and a few other ethno-nationalist terrorists re-energized their politically
motivated violent campaigns (Rosenau, 2014).
On October 20, 1981, exactly 9 months into the Reagan administration, six men,
comprised of members from BLA and M19CO, donned ski masks and robbed a Brink’s
armored truck in the Nanuet Mall in the upstate city of Nyack, New York. The guards
were ambushed as they were loading the money into the truck (Castellucci, 1986).
Brink’s guard, Peter Paige, was killed immediately while his partner, Joe Trombino, was
severely wounded (Rosenfeld, 2013). While both guards were incapacitated, the men
grabbed the bags, hopped into a red Chevrolet van and headed for a vacant Corvette
dealership where they had a U-Haul truck in waiting (Rosenfeld, 2013). Once they
arrived to the dealership, they abandoned the Chevrolet van and transferred themselves
and the $1.6 million dollars to the U-Haul truck and headed for the New York State
Thruway (Rosenfeld, 2013). A witness, who suspected something suspicious was afoot,
contacted the police and gave a description of what she had seen. Police quickly set up
roadblocks and stopped every U-Haul van in search of the suspects (Smith, Damphousse,
& Roberts, 2006). Finally, on Exit 11, three Nyack police officers, with guns drawn,
stopped Kathy Boudin and begin questioning her (Smith et al., 2006). Boudin feigned
hysteria, and asked the police to “Put the guns down” because they were scaring her
(Rosenfeld, 2013). Almost convinced that they had stopped the wrong U-Haul van,
Sergeant Edward O’Grady decided to let her leave but Detective Arthur Keenen wanted
to be sure and asked could he check the van (Rosenfeld, 2013). As the officers proceeded
to inspect the van, six men emerged from the van and opened fire (Smith et al., 2006).
Officer Waverly Brown and Sergeant O’Grady were both killed. Detective Keenen
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managed to hide behind a tree and he was only slightly wounded (Rosenfeld, 2013).
Kathy Boudin attempted to flee the scene but was captured by New York City
Corrections Officer Michael Koch (Smith et al., 2006). A Honda, carrying a White male,
White female and a Black male, crashed and its occupants were caught (Rosenfeld,
2013). The actual murderer, Chui Ferguson, fled into the woods but was later captured by
the FBI and a Joint Terrorism Task Force (Rosenfeld, 2013). The Brinks robbery was a
concern to federal investigators because it disproved law enforcement’s previous theory
that left-wing groups could not unite because of deep-rooted dogmatic ideology and
diametrically opposed viewpoints. Nevertheless, the death of two officers and one
security guard, domestic terrorist incidents on American soil were simply perceived as
national media events regarding dissidents who engaged in sedition and criminal activity
as a means to undermine U.S. democracy. As far as Reagan and his senior policy
advisors were concerned, illegal drugs and crime were a greater threat to American
society than comparatively low-level incidents of domestic terrorism that were
undergirded by the Soviet Union as a tactic to destabilize democracy and advance
communist ideals (Sterling, 1981).
Figure 2 demonstrates the frequencies of domestic terror attacks and their
casualties over time from 1980-1986. In observing the figure, the height for the frequency
of the attacks over this six (6) year period could be contributed to the disillusionment of
left-wing extremist organizations who became frustrated with the slow-moving U.S.
political process for substantive changes in human rights, peace treaties and trade
agreements. Another reason could be attributed to American imperialism which is
considered a tool for economic exploitation of less developed countries. In addition to
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these possible explanations, there were several instances where left-wing extremist’s
traversed their native infighting to American soil which contributed to the steady increase
of terrorist attacks from 1980-1982.

Figure 2. U.S. Domestic Terrorism Incidents and Casualties 1980-1986. Note. FBI
Terrorist and Analytical Center (1986)
Despite the Reagan administration dismissive approach regarding instances of
domestic terrorism, these attacks would only intensify. In January 1982, two Armenian
immigrants murdered Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles. The group,
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility for the killing, and
one member was arrested (Bureau of Diplomatic Security, p. 263, 1985). The Justice
Commandos demanded that the Turkish Government admit responsibility for “genocide,”
specifically, the deaths of more than one million Armenians in Turkey in 1915 (Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, p. 263, 1985). Initially, Reagan officials though that local officials
should be charged with providing security to foreign diplomats but local police chiefs
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pushed back citing that they were already experiencing manpower and budget shortages
(Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 1985). On January 4, 1983, the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Public Works and Transportation (1982) resolved the
issue and passed Public Law 97-418. This act expanded the authority of the U.S. Secret
Service Uniformed Division, by allowing the agency to provide protective services to
foreign diplomats as well as providing funds to the Department of State and local police
agencies that assist with protection. This incident of domestic terrorism concerned the
Reagan administration because they wanted to assure their allies that diplomats travelling
to America would be kept safe while visiting the United States on diplomatic missions.
Ironically, the issue was not viewed as an American problem.
As far as the Reagan administration was concerned, this was an issue that spilled
over from Armenia to America and should be considered an anomaly. Furthermore,
international incidents of terrorism were given far more media attention and the Reagan
administration wanted to capitalize on American’s fear by channeling these concerns into
support for their aggressive counter-terrorism agenda. High profile incidents of
Americans being kidnapped or killed by foreign terrorists demanded a response from a
president who promised that under his administration, the United States will no longer
appear weak and as a nation, we will command respect through military action. From
1980-1986, the Reagan administration was stretched and challenged by a tumultuous
synchronized wave of unrestrained pandemonium both nationally and internationally.
According to the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Threat
Analysis Division report generated on December 31, 1985, international terrorist attacks
were responsible for 86 American casualties, while the 1986 FBI report listed 57
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casualties that resulted from domestic terrorism incidents and not all the causalities listed
in the FBI report were American citizens.

Figure 3. Number of International Terrorist Incidents 1981-1985. Note. Department of
State Bureau of Diplomatic Security 1985
Figure 3 demonstrates terrorist activities abroad against U.S. interest abroad to
include U.S. businesses and citizens. From 1981 – 1985, there is a steady increase of
attacks on U.S. facilities and interests with a significant increase between 1984 -1985.
This increase of attacks against U.S. interests abroad could possibly be attributable to the
frustration of radical Islamic fundamentalist who wanted to purge U.S. influence and
presence from the Middle-East. Hezbollah waged war against the United States
because members strongly believed that the CIA was responsible for the attempted
murder of their leader, Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. Both Iran and Lebanon
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sponsored terrorism against the United States and they were determined to force America
to withdraw military forces from the Middle-East.
Reagan wasted no opportunity in portraying international terrorism attacks on
American citizens and their interests as acts of defiance and a war on U.S. democratic
principles. Every attack gave Reagan a platform to “go public” and emphatically
denounce international terrorism while his top security advisors were simultaneously
planning an aggressive military response.
Reagan and his administration were driven by their priorities and public opinion.
Fifty-seven casualties on American soil paled in comparison to eighty-six (86)
international terrorism incidents in size, scope, and media coverage. Although Reagan
was not as astute as many of his senior policy advisors on issues of international affairs,
he was a master tactician when it came to understanding how important the media was in
shaping or reshaping the opinions of the American people These seemingly wellchoreographed press conferences allowed Reagan to portray America to the international
community as being strong and confident, especially since these characteristics, many
Americans felt, were severely diminished under the Carter administration. Reagan was
well aware of this sentiment and his focus on international terrorism was unshakable. On
July 8, 1985, while speaking at the Annual convention of the American Bar Association,
Reagan named Iran, Libya, Cuba, North Korea and Nicaragua "a confederation of
terrorist states.” (Reagan, 1985). Reagan (2005) went on to issue a scathing indictment of
state sponsored terrorism:
So, there we have it -- Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua -- continents
away, tens of thousands of miles apart, but the same goals and objectives. I
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submit to you that the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the
increasing involvement of these states in terrorism in every region of the world.
This is terrorism that is part of a pattern, the work of a confederation of terrorist
states. Most of the terrorists who are kidnaping and murdering American citizens
and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or
indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments -- a
new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these states are
united by one simple criminal phenomenon -- their fanatical hatred of the United
States, our people, our way of life, our international stature.
Reagan characterized state-sponsored terrorism of as "an act of war" to which the United
States had the right to respond militarily (Naftali, n.d.). Not only did Reagan hold states
accountable, he was adamant that individual terrorist or terrorist groups would be
apprehended and brought to justice on American soil (Naftali, n.d.). Reagan (1985) was
emphatic as he went on to say:
There can be no place on Earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, or
train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or
unilaterally, if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary - anywhere.
By 1985, domestic terrorism had declined. This decline had less to do with
counter-terrorism measures at the federal level and more to do with aggressive
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions by state governments. In addition, left-wing
terrorist groups were unable to garner massive support for their outdated political agenda
due to diametrically opposed ideologies, internal competition for control, the arrest and
sentencing of charismatic leaders, the demands of being a fugitive and the prevalence of
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multiple cognitive distortions weakened the sustainability of these groups. But the JDL,
although they were less prolific than years past, and their membership in decline, they
would commit a nefarious act of revenge that would reinforce the Reagan
administration’s polemic that all Muslims were complicit in acts of international
terrorism.
On October 11, 1985, at approximately 9:00 am, a bomb exploded at the Santa
Ana, California office of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC),
killing 41-year-old Palestinian activist, husband and father, Alex Odeh (Habib, 2016).
Initially, the murder of Odeh was thought to be as the result of his public reverence of
Yasser Arafat on television the day before his murder (Habib, 2016). But that theory soon
dissipated as the investigation revealed that the plot was too elaborate to be completed in
just one day (Habib, 2016). Furthermore, The Los Angeles Times reported on Oct. 12,
1985, the day after Odeh was killed, FBI spokesman John Hoos stated they had “no
evidence linking Odeh’s remarks to the bombing” (Habib, 2016). A more plausible
theory, and one that was circulated throughout the Arab-Palestinian community, was that
Alex Odeh was murdered by the JDL as retaliation for the October 7, 1985, murder of
Jewish-American Leon Klinghoffer at the hands of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF)
while he was on the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro (Hoffman, 1986). This incident
prompted an immediate response from the Reagan administration and although this
incident occurred in international waters, Reagan wanted the perpetrators extradited as a
guarantee they would be tried for the murder of an American citizen. In fact, when
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak secretly arranged for the hijackers to be smuggled out
of the country, Israeli Intelligence notified American Intelligence who in turn relayed this
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information to President Reagan (Heymann, 1990). Incensed, Reagan immediately
approved for Navy fighter pilots to force the plane carrying the hijackers to land at a
NATO airbase in Sicily with last minute approval from Italian Prime Minister Benedetto
Craxi (Heymann, 1990). What Reagan and his team failed to mention was that there were
also two transport planes carrying Delta Force troops with orders to arrest all the
passengers on Egyptian plane and transport them to the United States to be tried for
murder (Heymann, 1990). Italian officials blocked this move, which strained relations
between the United States and Italy.
The Reagan administration was relentless in their pursuit of those responsible for
the death of Leon Klinghoffer while the investigation of Alex Odeh, in comparison,
seemingly moved at a pace of disinterest. Ronald Reagan exacerbated the Palestinian
community’s suspicions of indifference when he met Mrs. Marilyn Klinghoffer to offer
his condolences for the loss of her husband but the same courtesy was not extended to
Alex Odeh’s widow, Norma Odeh (Palermo, 1985). Despite the sharp criticism from
leaders in the Arab-Palestinian community, a spokesman for the Reagan administration
said the President had no intentions of meeting with the Odeh family (Palermo, 1985).
Ironically, the Department of Justice, in conjunction with the FBI, would finally take over
the Alex Odeh murder investigation from local law enforcement because it had finally
concluded that Odeh’s death was the result of a domestic terror attack (Habib, 2016).
By the end of his second and final term, Reagan and his administration worked
incessantly to restore the credibility and the image of the Great Communicator after the
Iran-Contra Affair stained his reputation and the image. More importantly, Reagan knew
that the closest he would come to serving a third term in office to further advance his
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foreign policy agenda would be the election of his vice-president, George H. W. Bush.
Consequently, the administration never allotted the time or the space required to
aggressively combat domestic terrorism. Like the Carter administration, Reagan
dismissed the notion that domestic terrorism was an existential or societal stability
challenge and continued to stress the criminality of domestic terrorist activities and their
behavior was nothing more than civil disobedience. Not surprisingly, this sentiment
regarding domestic terrorism would carry over to the next administration when George
H. W. Bush was eventually elected the as the 41st president of the United States. Bush
was integral in the development of the Reagan counter-terrorism strategy and like his
predecessor, Bush and his senior advisors would focus almost exclusively on combating
international terrorism.
U.S. Terrorism Policy from George H. W. Bush to Bill Clinton
George H. W. Bush (1989-1993)
George H. W. Bush was a permanent fixture in Washington politics since his
1966 win of a congressional seat to the House of Representatives after defeating
challenger Frank Briscoe (then district attorney) for the 7th district of Texas (O’Reilly &
Renfro, 2006). Bush quickly became a rising star in the Republican Party and was well
known throughout the state of Texas as a staunch conservative. In 1970, President
Richard Nixon convinced Bush to vacate his seat in the House of Representatives and
make another run for the United States Senate. Unfortunately, this was a miscalculation
by both Nixon and Bush. Former congressman Lloyd Bentsen proved to be a formidable
opponent and defeated George H. W. Bush denying him a chance to serve in the U.S.
Senate. Disappointed by his second loss in his bid for the U.S. Senate, Bush’s political
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career seemed uncertain until President Nixon tapped him to become Ambassador to the
United Nations where served from 1971-1973 (Hess, 2001). Bush would continue to
build his foreign policy credentials under President Gerald Ford when in 1974, he
accepted Ford’s invitation to become the Chief U.S. Liaison to China and 3 years later
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Hess, 2001).
On January 20, 1989, George Herbert Walker Bush ascended to the office of the
presidency with more foreign policy experience, and arguably more government
experience, than any of his predecessors (Knott, 2005). In constructing his
administration, Bush wanted to surround himself with people that were more agreeable to
his style of management. Bush was a reserved strategic thinker that did not operate on
emotion or external pressures, more importantly, he did not want to be surrounded by a
cabinet of “yes men.” Therefore, Bush methodically forged an administration that placed
a priority on a collegial exchange of ideas, relying on solid analysis and formal decisionmaking (Rothkopf, 2005). His senior, most trusted advisors included National Security
Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell (Knott, 2005). These
picks were individuals that Bush had established a personal relationship at some point in
his career while in Washington with a temperament mirrored his own. Bush however,
made a notable departure in temperament and style with his selection of John Sununu. A
graduate of the prestigious M.I.T. University and engineer by training, Sununu was very
domineering and was known to block access to the president. Despite his proclivity to be
openly ostentatious, Sununu was brilliant, capable, and he made the controversial
decisions that made President Bush feel uncomfortable.
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The “full court press” against international terrorism began under Ronald Reagan
(Smith & Thomas, 2001). Bush, being the progenitor of the Reagan counterterrorism
Task Force, was expected to approach terrorism with the same zeal as his predecessor.
Bush however, despite the rhetorical statements against acts of terrorism, became content
and preferred that the United States take a defensive or reactionary approach. To the
chagrin of Reaganites, the Bush Administration’s decision to gradually deprioritize the
threat of terrorism was viewed as disingenuous considering that he assured foreign policy
conservatives continuity with the counter-terrorism policies of the Reagan administration
once he was elected president. Bush’s NSC adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said terrorism
never really came up on the White House radar screen during the Bush Administration
except during the release of the hostages in Lebanon (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Overall,
neither Bush nor Scowcroft viewed terrorism as a strategic threat. This position however
would cause Bush’s image to suffer under hardline conservatives. Although Bush
skillfully crafted his image during his presidential campaign as a forceful leader, his
reversal of policy on terrorism had Reagan stalwarts resurrect images and conversations
of a salient theme that haunted Bush throughout his career at the White House: President
George H. W. Bush was still a deferential, indecisive, wimp (O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006).
The Bush administration’s low-key, non-engagement approach to counterterrorism was actually a strategy put forth by then Secretary of State, James Baker. Baker
rationalized that if the administration was less visible and less vociferous, this would
keep terrorists guessing and ultimately give the United States a tactical advantage both
operationally and psychologically. Bush embraced this strategy because it was effective
and it was more in line with his personality traits and management style. More
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importantly, it freed him from the burden of acting like Ronald Reagan in order to
appease a conservative base constantly judged his performance using their own selfcreated and highly subjective Reagametrics. Nevertheless, Bush approached foreign
affairs with characteristic conservatism and pragmatism (Knott, 2005). His approach to
any issue was methodical and he was comfortable in a collegial setting surrounded by
likeminded senior staff members who would give him honest feedback in their critique of
his policy and strategic plans to best accomplish the administrations overall goals. Bush
was never a person to rush into new actions or policy changes because they were popular
with voters or the Congress (Knott, 2005). When he acted, he did so with firm conviction
and determination because Bush and his top advisors would analyze the situation from
almost every angle. Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of any operation,
Bush relished uncertainty and always wanted potential outcomes to be as accurate as
humanly possible.
Although Bush was perceived as weak by many Reagan loyalists for reducing
tough talk rhetoric and lessening threats of terrorism, he maintained and supported many
of the polices of the Reagan administration. He retained the “no quid pro quo” policy
when it came to negotiating with terrorists, continued emphasis on international
cooperation, which allowed him to negotiate the release of the hostages during the
Lebanon hostage crisis without the military force, ransom payments or an exchange of
weapons (Smith & Thomas, 2001). While levels of international terrorism increased
during the Gulf War, they quickly returned to much lower post-Cold War levels when
Bush proved to terrorists that his low-key persona should not be mistaken for weakness
or timidity (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Bush authorized so-called “snatch” military
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operations where U.S. forces would covertly enter another country and capture notorious
drug dealers and terrorist and bring them to America to stand trial (Smith & Thomas,
2001). Despite the international backlash from world leaders who felt disrespected that
the U.S. did not seek their approval, these operations were popular with the American
people and put drug dealers and terrorists on notice they could not out run the long arm
of U.S. justice (Smith & Thomas, 2001).
As the Bush presidency was coming to the end of its first term, the success of
Operation Desert Shield in thwarting Saddam Hussein’s plan to annex Kuwait by force,
was thought to be enough for Americans to elect Bush to a second term. Although the
operation afforded Bush high favorability ratings, his re-election campaign was viewed as
disorganized and off message (O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006). During the re-election
campaign, Bush struck many Americans as a bumbling New England Yankee whose
mangled syntax and unfamiliarity with checkout counter scanners invited derision
(O’Reilly & Renfro, 2006). American voters perceived that President Bush was far too
concerned with foreign policy and not nearly enough on domestic issues (Knott, 2005).
Moreover, during his first-term, he alienated Reagan stalwarts by breaking his promise
not to raise taxes, softening his position on international terrorism, and cutting military
spending (Knott, 2005). Without their backing, hardline Reagan supporters calculated
that Bush’s defeat was inevitable and would guarantee him a spot in the pantheon of
utterly forgettable presidents and the studious successor to the popular Ronald Reagan
never evolved into the heir apparent conservatives voted for in 1988 (O’Reilly & Renfro,
2006). On Tuesday, November 3, 1992, Americans voted for change and elected William
Jefferson Clinton as the 42nd President of the United States.
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Bill Clinton (1993-2001
“Terrorism is at the top of the American agenda, and it should be at the top of the
world’s agenda.” - President Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly, September
1998
On January 20, 1993, after President Clinton was sworn into office, in was
explicitly clear that terrorism did not figure at all as an issue in the presidential campaign
of 1992 and the foreign policy experts of the victorious Clinton team did not list terrorism
as a priority for the incoming administration (Naftali, 2006). Clinton and his senior policy
advisors reasoned that lowered terrorism statistics did not warrant maintaining the
counter-terrorism infrastructure put in place by his predecessor (Smith &Thomas, 2001).
But, what the Clinton administration did not take into account was without American
leadership on issues of international terrorism, and a contingent strategy to combat
potential incidents of domestic terrorism, the United States would lag behind if a
reinvigorated terrorism campaign suddenly emerged. (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Critics of
the Clinton administration’s new approach towards counter-terrorism felt that he had he
had dumbed- down, deemphasized, defunded, and deconstructed counter-terrorism to a
point where it left the U.S. in a vulnerable position (Smith &Thomas, 2001). Thirty-seven
days into the Clinton administration, his critics would be vindicated in their excoriation
of President Clinton’s policy position on terrorism.
On Friday, February 26, 1993, a massive truck bomb exploded in the parking
garage of the World Trade Center’s (WTC) North Tower in New York City. This would
be only the beginning. Like Ronald Reagan, the Clinton presidency would be confronted
with a simultaneous rise of terrorism from various ideological and religious perspectives
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both nationally and internationally. Most notably, on the domestic front, was pro-life
domestic terrorists. President Clinton was the first pro-choice President since Jimmy
Carter and within 1 month of his election anti-abortionist fires caused $1.5 million dollars
of damage to abortion clinics around the country (National Abortion Federation, 1993).
The terrorists involved in 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, the 1995 Tokyo
sarin-gas attack, the 1996 Oklahoma City Bombing, and the 1998 East Africa bombings
were the unmistakable harbingers of a new more vastly more threatening form of
terrorism which were designed to produce casualties on a massive scale (Simon &
Benjamin, 2000). Prior to the World Trade Center bombing, The Department of Justice
(DOJ), the FBI and other law enforcement officials had been complacent about major
international terrorist incidents in the U.S. (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Both the Bush and
Clinton Administrations weakened America’s first line of defense against international
terrorism by cutting budgets, losing experts and refocusing national attention away from
terrorism being a real threat to American security (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Despite the
Clinton administration and DOJ’s lack of terrorists’ response readiness, the FBI
investigation was relentless in finding the perpetrators who committed such a heinous act
that killed six and injured more than 1000 people (9/11 Report, 2004). But like every
president before him, Clinton viewed the bombing as a criminal act and not a security
threat. A responding FBI agent was reported as saying that it was a miracle that the
incident did not yield more fatalities (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). After the
bombing, President Bill Clinton ordered his National Security Council to coordinate a
response to the attack (9/11 Report, 2004). Federal, states, and local law enforcement
agencies worked feverishly to find the culprits (9/11 Report, 2004).
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The perpetrators of the WTC bombing turned out to be a group of New Jersey
men who had been on the FBI’s radar as suspected terrorists for at least 2 years
(Parachini, 2000). The mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, was assumed to be a naturalized
Pakistani citizen who entered the U.S. on September 1, 1992 (Dirgham, 1995). Although
he possessed an Iraqi passport, he claimed to have been born in Kuwait (Dirgham, 1995).
During the investigation, it was discovered that Yousef, attended a terrorist training camp
in Afghanistan, where he perfected his skills as an explosives expert (Parachini, 2000).
After arriving in the United States, Yousef went to live in New Jersey with Musab Yasin,
an Iraqi whose brother, Abdul Rahman Yasin, also arrived in New Jersey from Iraq
shortly after Yousef (Parachini, 2000). Mohammad Salameh attended the Mosque of
Sheikh Omar Abdul an extremist Sunni Muslim cleric who had moved to the United
States from Egypt in 1990 (9/11 Report, 2004). In speeches and writings, the sightless
Rahman, often called the “Blind Sheikh,” preached the message of the Egyptian radical,
Sayyid Qutb and quoted his seminal work Milestones, in which Qutb characterized the
United States as the oppressor of Muslims worldwide and asserted that it was their
[Muslims] religious duty to fight against God’s enemies [America] (9/11 Report, 2004).
Yousef was convinced that the West was evil and a threat to the Islamic way of life and it
was now his duty to punish America for the perceived atrocities inflicted on Muslims.
After the bombing, Salameh made an unsophisticated, dull-witted attempt to
divert investigator’s attention by reporting the truck he rented to commit the terrorist act
as stolen on March 3, 1993 (9/11 Report, 2004). What raised law enforcement’s suspicion
even further was the fact that Salameh called the Ryder truck rental company several
times requesting, and sometimes demanding a refund of his 400-dollar rental deposit
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(9/11 Report, 2004). On March 4, 1993, FBI SWAT moved in and arrested Salameh as he
attempted to collect his deposit (9/11 Report, 2004). As the FBI Task Force connected the
“dots,” and it led them to co-conspirators Ahmed Ajaj, Nidal Ayyad, a trained engineer
who had acquired chemicals for the bomb, and Mahmoud Abouhalima, was the
accomplice who helped mix the chemicals (9/11 Report, 2004). Another associate,
Ibrahim Elgabrowny, while being served with an ATF search warrant attacked the
serving agent but was immediately subdued and arrested (Stewart, 2015). While
executing the search warrant, agents discovered Nicaraguan passports, driver’s licenses,
and identification cards bearing the photos of his cousin, El Sayyid Nosair (Stewart,
2015). As the search continued and after further investigation, it was clear that agents did
not have enough evidence to connect Elgabrowny to the bombing, however, there was
enough evidence to prosecute him for passport and document fraud (Stewart, 2015). The
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York office vigorously pursued
these lesser charges and indicted Elgabrowny on assault and passport fraud charges
(Stewart, 2015).
On May 24, 1994, during the sentencing of four of the convicted WTC bombers,
Judge Kevin T. Duffy asserted that the perpetrators had incorporated sodium cyanide into
the bomb with the intent to generate deadly hydrogen cyanide gas that would kill
everyone in one of the towers. The Judge stated:
You had sodium cyanide around, and I’m sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the
sodium cyanide burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had vaporized,
it is clear what would have happened is the cyanide gas would have been sucked
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into the north tower and everybody in the north tower would have been killed. That
to my mind is exactly what was intended. (Duffy, 1994)
Although the FBI Joint Task Force made the arrest rather quickly, Ramazi
Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, evaded capture (Stewart,
2015). FBI agents worked tirelessly and used all their resources to bring Yousef to
justice. During the course of the investigation, the FBI discovered that Yousef was in the
process of planning more attacks within the United States including the simultaneous
bombing of a dozen U.S. international flights (Stewart, 2015). But with some 700 FBI
agents worldwide, Yousef was captured in Pakistan in February 1995, returned to
America, and convicted along with the truck driver, Eyad Ismoil (Stewart, 2015).
Although the work performed by the FBI Joint Task Force and the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, the swiftness and the efficiency of the investigation created an impression that
law enforcement was well-equipped to deal with this new form of “modern” terrorism
(9/11 Report, 2004).
President Clinton created and reformulated the “new-terrorism” discourse, which
he characterized as borderless and possessing the catastrophic threat of weapons of mass
destruction. Clinton forced Americans to confront to the realization that homegrown
terror was no longer a theoretical abstraction that would be “birthed” from a series of
societal breakdowns. In fact, as President Clinton surmised, terrorism has proven that it
could come from “within or beyond our borders” (Clinton, 1995a, p. 832) and the
tentacles of terrorism no longer skirt the edges of American society while wreaking
havoc abroad, and instead terrorist had “become an equal opportunity destroyers, with no
respect for borders” (Clinton, 1996a, p. 1257). In other words, there was no longer a clear
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boundary between domestic and international terrorism. Terrorists had shown that
resilience paired with criminal ingenuity was difficult to counter and America would
become increasingly susceptible to foreign attacks whether they be random or target
specific. Moreover, Clinton’s discourse on international terrorism highlighted the real
threat of domestic terrorists’ incidents and posited the theory that so-called rogue states
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were skillfully, and strategically
aimed at the United States for the sole purpose of disrupting American democracy and
instilling a fear that would give terrorists de facto political leverage. Rogue states,
according to Clinton, were allies of terrorists, who hated the United States. In his remarks
at a World Jewish Congress dinner, Clinton (1995b) stated, “Nations like Iran and Iraq
and Libya aim to destabilize the region. They harbor terrorists within their border. They
establish and support terrorist base camps in other lands; they hunger for nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction” (p. 616).
Although President Clinton said all the right things after the 1993 World Trade
Center Bombing, there was a reluctance by the President and his administration to lobby
Congress for more resources directed at combatting terrorism (9/11 Report, 2004). Like
past presidents, Clinton’s focus was on combatting white-collar crimes, gang violence,
and the war on drugs (9/11 Report, 2004). On September 1, 1993, President Clinton
chose Louis Freeh as the new Director of the FBI. Freeh immediately recognized that
terrorism was considered to be the greatest threat America and he moved quickly to
protect American interests by increasing the number of legal attaché offices abroad with a
specific focus in the Middle-East and urged FBI agents to be proactive in terrorism plots
(9/11 Report, 2004). In fact, in his efforts to procure more funding for counter-terrorism,
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Freeh told Congress, “…merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally
important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated” (9/11 Report,
2004, p. 76). In 2000, the FBI assigned 76% of its agents to criminal cases, roughly 21%
to counterintelligence, and just 2% to 3% to counterterrorism (DOJ, 2003). Of the FBI’s
12,730 convictions in 1998, more than half involved drugs, bank robberies, and bank
fraud, whereas only 37 related to terrorism (Gulati, Rivkin, & Raffaelli, 2016, p. 13)
Freeh experienced significant “pushback” from the senior agency officials,
Congress, and the Department of Justice even though he had managed to forge a
relationship with the CIA to share intelligence regarding terrorists’ activities. Moreover,
Freeh created a Counterterrorism Division to work in conjunction with the CIA’s
Counterterrorist Center (9/11 Report, 2004). Despite his best efforts, Freeh was unable to
convince Congress, the Department of Justice or President Clinton that counter-terrorism
was significant enough to shift resources away from areas violent crime or drug
enforcement (9/11 Report, 2004).
In 1996, President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (Simon and Benjamin, 2000). Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), prisoners convicted by a state court must file a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus within one year of “the date on which the judgment became final”
unless one of three exceptions applies (Harvard Law Review, 2013, p. 319). In the case
of certain impediments to filing, including unconstitutional state action, recognition of a
new right by the Supreme Court, or recent discovery of facts crucial to the petition, the
limitation obtains one year after removal of the impediment (Harvard Law Review,
2013). In terms of terrorism, it authorized the creation of a special tribunal that had the
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inherent authority to expedite the deportation of foreign terrorist without disclosing
classified information to the deportee or his legal counsel (Simon & Benjamin, 2000). In
addition, the law made it illegal for anyone to render financial or material assistance to a
designated terrorist or their organization and it mandated that investigators recover and
test all taggants in an attempt to trace the origin of the explosive(s) used in terrorist
attacks (Simon & Benjamin, 2000).
In the first term of the Clinton administration counterterrorism initiatives were
directly focused on providing local law enforcement agencies resources to protect
Americans from external threats of violent extremists, building coalitions abroad in order
to disrupt terrorism networks and more importantly, improve airport security both on the
ground and in flight (Roberts, 2010). In President Clinton’s second term, his
administration had become increasingly aggressive towards international terrorists. In
1996, terrorists attacked the Khobar Towers and killed Nineteen United States Air Force
personnel and wounded 372 (Riedel, 2015). On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombs exploded
in front of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. As a
result of this attack, 291 people were killed and nearly 5,000 injured (Corsun, 1998).
Among the dead were 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service Nationals employed by the
U.S. Embassy (Corsun, 1998). On October 12, 2000, near Aden, Yemen, suicide
terrorists used a small boat filled with explosives, pulled alongside of the USS Cole and
detonated their explosives. The explosion ripped a hole in the side of the USS Cole
approximately 40 feet in diameter and killed 17 U.S. Navy personnel and injured 40
others (FBI, 2000). The Clinton administration was being heavily criticized for not being
forceful enough against terrorists who continued to take the lives of American soldiers,
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diplomats, and personnel. The Clinton administration was accused of using the “failed”
counter-terrorism policies of diplomacy and economic sanctions employed by the Jimmy
Carter administration. As the Clinton presidency was coming to an end, President Clinton
could ill afford to appear weak on terrorism if his vice-president, Al Gore was to succeed
him in the Oval Office. The administration pivoted in their approach towards terrorism
and became more aggressive in tone and willingness to use military force as a first option
in combating terrorism. With a laser focus on international terrorist abroad and radical
jihadists in the United States, the Clinton administration “shrugged” off anti-abortion
terrorists as radical criminal fanatics best dealt with by local law enforcement. The
actions of Timothy McVeigh, although concerning and horrific, was considered an
anomaly of hatred that would quickly dissipate and there was no quantitative justification
to dedicate resources combatting non-jihadist homegrown terrorism.
U.S. Terrorism Policy from George W. Bush to Barack Obama
George W. Bush (2000-2009)
In his examination of the impact of religion on George W. Bush, Fineman
contended:
[T]his president—this presidency—is the most resolutely ‘faith-based’ in modern
times, an enterprise founded, supported and guided by trust in the temporal and
spiritual power of God…But the Bush administration is dedicated to the idea that
there is an answer to societal problems here and to terrorism abroad; give
everyone, everywhere, the freedom to find God, too. (Fineman et al., 2003).
The scholarly literature on President W. Bush is equally limited in reviewing his
politics and religion, noting there is a similar reluctance to examine Bush’s faith and its

91
impact on his political decision making. His campaign biography, published in 2000, as
well as later works on the Bush administration refer to his faith, but do not explore its
relevance or effect on his conduct in office. In five works on the Bush presidency, there
are only two chapters on religion. One chapter is a brief discussion of his use of religious
rhetoric, preference for moral certainties, and belief in universal values (Pfiffner, 2004).
The other chapter explores Bush’s political relationship with the religious right (Berggren
& Rae, 2006). This lack of material gives rise to questions regarding the Bush presidency
and the role faith had with domestic policies addressing terrorism.
President Bush transformed the White House into a place of faith drawing on his
evangelical faith, and his cabinet members’ choices reflected his strong religious
background. His devotional habits during his administration, noting that he "opened
every cabinet meeting with prayer and insisted on a high moral tone," promoted the idea
and strength of religious connections to the creation of public policy while in the White
House (Mansfield, 2003). The Bush White House was noted as being driven by a
morality that supported a non-smoking, tea-totting, non-cussing affair, promoting a
higher set of standards by the nation’s leaders. George W. Bush’s former speechwriter
David Frum (an Orthodox Jew) gave an interview in 2003, in which he explained that if
researchers wanted to understand the Bush White House, “you must understand its
predominant creed and culture of modern Evangelicalism” (Frum, 2003, p. 3).
In many ways, George W. Bush management style was that of a Fortune 500
CEO. He was decisive in most of his actions and was very impatience when it came to
bureaucratic “red tape” which he often deemed as unnecessary (Pfiffner & Davidson,
2003). This was in stark contrast to his father George H. W. Bush and his predecessor
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Bill Clinton, who, as career politicians and government stalwarts, deemed it imperative to
analyze every issue thoroughly and ensure that all angles had been examined and the
appropriate response prepared depending on the outcome (Pfiffner & Davidson, 2003).
President G. W. Bush, however, saw it as a strength to act decisively and intuitively. In
his words, “I just think it’s instinctive. I’m not a textbook player. I’m a gut player”
(Woodard, 2002). President Bush took his role in the Oval Office seriously and if a
decision had to be made, he felt obligated as president “to force decisions, and to make
sure it’s in everybody’s mind where we’re headed” (Woodard, 2002).
Confronted with a continuing rise of terrorism at home and abroad, both Clinton
administrations were forced to place greater emphasis on terrorism, and as a result,
between 1996 and 2000, the administration nearly doubled annual counter-terrorism
expenditures (Dobbs, 2000). That emphasis did not continue when the George W. Bush
administration assumed office in January 2001. During the 2000 American presidential
election campaign, George W. Bush gave one foreign policy address. Not unexpectedly,
domestic priorities prevailed at his Administration’s outset: education reform, the
environment, private school vouchers, faith-based initiatives, energy sources and
production, creation of prescription drug benefits, tax relief, an economic stimulus
package, health care, values, ethics, and propounding a philosophy of “compassion in
government.” (Stein, 2002, p. 52). During the first 8 months of 2001, the Bush
administration took very little action regarding counter-terrorism, despite the warnings
provided to him by the Clinton administration (Gellman, 2002). Bush’s national security
team met formally nearly 100 times before the 9/11 attacks, but terrorism was the topic
during only two of those meetings (Bridis, 2002).
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When George W. Bush ran for president, it was clear that if he won, the United
States military would no longer assume the role as the “world police.” Although
President Bush believed that America should have a strategic military presence around
the world, he was opposed to the substantial commitment the Clinton administration
invested in long-term nation-building and humanitarian missions. Instead, the Bush
administration placed emphasis on limited, but tactical global uses of military force and
envisaged more of a support role in the areas of multilateral partnerships and nation
building (Dobbins, Poole, Long, & Runkle, 2008). Domestic issues which contained
foreign policy components--such as illegal drugs, trade questions, terrorism prevention,
immigration concerns, energy matters, and currency stability-- also had some priority, but
only if they affected the lives and immediate economic or physical well-being of
Americans (Stein, 2002). In terms of foreign policy, the Bush administration had
primarily focused its attention on China and Russia while simultaneously determining
whether or not to entangle themselves in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Leffler, 2011).
President Bush, along with his senior advisors did not consider the threat of global
terrorism or the rising influence of radical Islam in America (Leffler, 2011). Richard
Clarke, the chief counter-terrorism expert on the National Security Council along with
CIA Director George Tenet, did their very best to convince in-coming President Bush,
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, that Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden were a
credible threats and that the issues regarding radical Islamic terrorism should be treated
with a sense of urgency (Leffler, 2011).
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The Bush administration was not completely dismissive of the warnings regarding
counter-terrorism, but it became increasingly clear their agenda superseded any concerns
of the previous administration. The Bush National Security Team was more concerned
with devising a strategy on how to deal with "rogue" states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and
North Korea with a specific focus on the best course of action to contain Saddam
Hussein’s dictatorship in Baghdad (Leffler, 2011). In the end, President Bush would take
no definitive action on the counterintelligence provided to him by CIA Director Tenet or
Terrorism expert Richard Clark. For the first 10 months of his administration, President
Bush focused on fulfilling his campaign promises by executing his domestic agenda.
On September 4, 2001, Robert Mueller was sworn in as the sixth director of the
FBI. However, with just seven days on the job, Mueller would be propelled into
overseeing the largest criminal investigation in American history. Bush’s domestic
agenda was completely derailed as the president was faced with one of the worst
domestic terror incidents since Oklahoma City in 1995.
At 8:46 a.m. on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a
nation transformed (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). A hijacked commercial
airliner traveling at hundreds of miles per hour and carrying some 10,000 gallons of jet
fuel plowed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan (9/11
Commission Final Report, 2004). At 9:03 a.m., a second airliner hit the South Tower and
Fire and smoke billowed upward while Steel, glass, ash, and bodies fell below (9/11
Commission Final Report, 2004). In less than 90 minutes, the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center, where approximately 50,000 people were employed, collapsed (9/11
Commission Final Report, 2004). The uncertainty of what was happening terrified the
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Americans nationwide. As state and federal law enforcement officials attempted to
determine what was happening in New York City, at 9:37 a.m., a third airliner crashed
into the western front side of the Pentagon (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004). At
10:03 a.m., a fourth airliner had targeted the White House but heroic passengers, who had
been informed by friends and relatives via cell phone that America was possibly under
terrorist attack, overtook the hijackers forcing the plane to crash in a field in Southern
Pennsylvania (9/11 Commission Final Report, 2004).
During the 9/11 attacks, President Bush had been visiting Emma E. Booker
Elementary School in Sarasota, Florida when his Chief of Staff, Andrew Card entered the
room, walked directly towards the president, and whispered in his ear that the World
Trade Center had been struck by a commercial airliner (Warshaw, 2003). President Bush
paused as if he were processing the information that had just been told to him. Shortly
after, the Secret Service quickly escorted President Bush out of the school and rushed
him back to Air Force One (Warshaw, 2003). While in the air, President Bush contacted
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice via secure communication and instructed
her to begin to coordinate a response (Warshaw, 2003).
In a 2012 interview, then FBI director recounted his meeting with President Bush
to discuss the United States’ plan of action. According to Mueller, the conversation went
something like this:
Mr. President, we have command centers that have been set up at each of the sites
and we’ve started to identify the persons responsible for the attacks by their seat number.
The president stops me and says “Bob, that’s all well and good, and that’s what I expect
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the FBI to do. The FBI has done it throughout its existence. But my question to you today
is, ‘What are you doing to prevent the next terrorist attack? (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 15)
After experiencing the worst terror attack on American soil, it had become clear
to President Bush and his senior advisors that he had to do an about-face on his agenda to
focus primarily on domestic issues (Brooks, 2012). The attack on the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center had forced President Bush into the role of a wartime president
instead of the reformer he spoke of on the campaign trail. Condoleeza Rice began to
coordinate a War Cabinet as soon after she received the phone call from Air Force One
(Warshaw, 2003). The cabinet consisted of senior level officials and they all were given
specific assignments (Warshaw, 2003). CIA Director Tenet was charged with finding the
source of the terrorist attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was charged with
raising the military alert to Def-Con 3 to protect against further attacks, while Secretary
of State Colin Powell, was charged with gathering information and support from
President Vladimir Putin of Russia (Warshaw, 2003). The response to the 9/11 attacks,
was a "global war on terror" (Leffler, 2011).
By 3:30 p.m. on September 11th, only hours after the first attack, Air Force One
had landed at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska where Bush talked by conference call to
the key players of the newly formed War Cabinet (Warshaw, 2003). Intelligence agencies
from around the world began providing credible information as to who may have been
responsible for the 9/11 attacks which allowed Tenet to surmise with certainty that the
global terrorism group known as Al-Qaeda had were responsible for the September 11th
attacks (Warshaw, 2003). The Bush administration began to prioritized terrorists’ threats
and catapulted Saddam Hussein to the top of their list. In addition, Al-Qaeda, who was

97
said to be responsible for the attacks, the Taliban and regimes that harbored and succored
terrorists were immediately classified as enemies of the United States that had to be
brought to justice (Leffler, 2011). On September 12th, President Bush made the following
public statement, “The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out against our
country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (Barnes, 2001, p. 1869).
Bush was determined to send the message and the war on terror was strategically crafted
to send a strong message to terrorists’ networks around the world that America would
spare no expense or resource in eliminating terrorism networks who threatened the
United States or their interests. Military and intelligence officials were ordered to extract
actionable intelligence, detain for as long as necessary, rendition known terrorists, and, in
a few cases, torture terrorist suspects who refuse to willingly cooperate (Leffler, 2011).
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon and the abortive attack (possibly aimed at the White House or Camp David)
that resulted in the crash of a jetliner in Pennsylvania had resulted in a new and
extraordinary emphasis by the Bush administration on combating terrorism (Richelson &
Evans, 2001). President Bush was emotionally impacted that more than 2,600 people died
at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the Pentagon; 256 died on the four planes and the
death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (9/11 Commission Final
Report, 2004). For this reason, during the last 10 days of President Bush’s first term, key
administration officials, particularly President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, repeatedly emphasized that their longterm objective is the destruction of terrorism networks a goal to be achieved by the death
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or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure and support base, and
retaliation against states that aid or harbor terrorists (Richelson & Evans, 2001).
The 9/11 attacks forced a massive overhaul of the FBI. In 2002, while testifying
before Congress, then FBI Director, Robert Mueller stated, “Starting immediately after
the planes hit, when over half of our 11,500 agents suddenly found themselves working
terrorism matters, it became clear that our mission and our priorities had to change.” Just
a few years prior, former FBI Director Louis Freeh sought to implement changes that
would have strengthened the agencies capabilities in preventing domestic terrorists
attacks but this proposed shift in policy and mission was met with both internal and
external resistance because terrorism was still classified and an overseas problem and the
FBIs core mission was “fighting crime” (Freeh, 2002). That all changed post 9/11. After
the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there became a consensus
among policy makers, politicians, and veteran FBI agents that the agency needed to
change its core mission if there was any chance of preventing a catastrophe of this
magnitude from ever happening again on American soil.
In the beginning of 2003, Muller and his top management team conducted a
reassessment of their reorganization efforts and concluded their efforts were only
adequate enough in the short term in preventing domestic threats of terrorism (Gulati, et
al., 2016). In order address future threats to national security, Mueller and his team
realized they needed to construct a model of prevention that synthesized both intelligence
and law enforcement, an approach Mueller later coined as the “building foundations for
intelligence” (Gulati, et al., 2016).
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Although Mueller and his team made significant progress in their reorganization
of the Bureau’s counter-terrorism strategy, it was deemed not sufficient enough for
protecting the nation’s national security. Rather than the FBI thwarting domestic terror
plots from internal intelligence gathering, there was too much reliance on external tips
(Gulati, et al., 2016). This concerned Mueller and his team because the goal was to create
a counter-terrorism response model that was proactive and gave them the ability to
systematically analyze domestic terror threats based on internal data collection. To
address this weakness, Mueller and his team established a new organizational unit at
headquarters known as the Directorate of Intelligence (Gulati, et al., 2016). Although
attitudes were changing in regards to the FBI’s new role in matters of national security,
they had not changed at a pace to Mueller’s satisfaction. Furthermore, in order for the
organizational culture to shift from the rigid mindset of prosecution and law enforcement,
he thought it was imperative to hire a senior executive outside of the FBI who had an
extensive background in intelligence gathering (Gulati, et al., 2016). This director would
be spared the bureaucratic chain of command and report directly to Mueller. His selection
of an National Security Agency (NSA) executive, although initially controversial, would
later prove to be a good strategy. From the onset, the new director changed the hiring
selection process. Whereas many of the pre-9/11 analysts were promoted into their roles
from clerical positions, many of the new analysts had graduate degrees or military
intelligence backgrounds (Gulati, et al., 2016, p. 20). Between fiscal years 2001 and
2006, the number of analysts in the FBI more than doubled, from 1,023 to 2,161 (Gulati,
et al., 2016, p. 20). This new team of intelligence professionals were tasked for just one
mission: integrate and disseminate valuable intelligence information (Gulati et al., 2016).

100
In 2007, Mueller enacted another one of his priority initiatives called the Strategic
Execution Team (SET) and their function was to build the FBI’s intelligence capabilities
and integrate intelligence into FBI operations (Gulati et al., 2016, p. 24). The SET team
focused on standardizing and upgrading the Field Intelligence Group’s (FIG) best
practices and codified models (Gulati et al., 2016). Once that task was complete, they
placed them in a 61-page report, and rolled out a training program for all field personnel
in 2008 which emphasized integrating national security and law enforcement at lower
levels of the organization for effective, efficiency and continuity purposes (Gulati et al.,
2016).
Under the Bush administration, in accordance with Muller’s massive
organizational restructuring of the FBI, substantial progress was made. Although not
perfect, the territorial informational gridlock shifted from a “need-to-know” culture, to a
“need-to-collaborate” environment, with information flowing more freely between state,
local, and federal governments. In 2006, then FBI Director Robert Mueller, speaking
before Before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, reported on the benefits of a
collaborative, unified, national intelligence work force:
The National Security Branch structure took effect on September 12, 2005, in
response to a directive from the President to the Attorney General. The NSB consists of
the FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD), the Counterintelligence Division (CD), the
Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and the new Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Directorate. Combining our national security workforce and mission under one leadership
umbrella enhances our contribution to the national intelligence effort and provides us
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with the opportunity to leverage resources from our U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC)
partners, as well as our federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners.
The success of multi-agency collaboration was evident as the FBI began to dismantle
terrorist networks at home and abroad. For example, Operation Blackbear, initiated in
2001, was responsible for the arrest and conviction of three people found to be funneling
resources to terrorist organizations (Mueller, 2006). In January 2006, a sixty-five count
indictment of eleven individuals associated with ELF and ALF was handed down on
charges including arson and destruction of an energy facility on behalf of both ELF and
ALF movements.
Between 2009-2010, the FBI and law enforcement in general, had some of the
most successful multi-agency investigations in United States history (Dyson, 2012).
Collaboration and information sharing allowed law enforcement to “connect the dots”
and prevent numerous terrorist attacks (Dyson, 2012). One of the most significant
changes in helping law enforcement capture and thwart incidents of domestic terrorism
post 9/11, was the creation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). JTTFs are locally
based, multi-agency teams comprised of law enforcement investigators, investigators,
intelligence analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists who are experienced
in investigating acts of terrorism (Bjelopera, 2013). Prior to 9/11, FBI and DOJ had only
twenty-nine JTTFS in operation. Post 9/11, Seventy-one more JTTFs were created along
with 4,400 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents (Bjelopera,
2013). The FBI, Homeland Security and DOJ now consider the JTTFs the nation’s front
line on terrorism since they are the “first responders” to acts of terrorism by investigating
acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those
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employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas (Barker & Fowler, 2008).
Although JTTF investigations are highly tactical, they are equally determined. JTTFs
expend a massive amount of resources in combating terror threats by developing human
sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots (Bjelopera, 2013)
President Bush’s style of political leadership exhibited a confidence and moral
certainty that helped the nation deal with the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Towers and the Pentagon (Pfiffner, 2003). Bush’s moral certainty reflected
his deeply held religious beliefs which were evident in his public and private life
(Pfiffner, 2003). He was convinced that the United States was now duty bound to
eviscerate “evil” anywhere in the world with seeking approval or support from other
nations (Pfiffner, 2003). The positive side of President Bush’s moralistic and Manichaean
view of the world is the moral clarity it brought to U.S. policy (Brookhiser, 2003). In
spite of the sharp criticism he received during his presidency, overall, conservatives were
satisfied that Bush’s certainty and conviction enhanced his leadership during the war on
terrorism.
Barack H. Obama (2009-2016)
“And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering
innocents, we say to you now that, "Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You
cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you." - President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address,
January 20, 2009
On January 20, 2009, America elected Barack H. Obama, its first AfricanAmerican president. In the United States, at least to some, his election was indicative that
America had become the utopian post racial society envisioned by Dr. Martin Luther
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King Jr. World leaders saw this as an opportune moment for U.S. policy to shift from
being hawkish in its war on Terror to becoming more deliberate in terms of who is
considered terrorist. President Obama was viewed as a leader who would prefer conflict
negotiation over the use of military force. For the most part, that was indicative of his
style. However, like his predecessor, he knew that in order for America and its allies to
feel safe, terror networks like Al-Qaeda, and ISIL must be destroyed or incapacitated and
Osama bin Laden had to be eliminated.
When President Obama took office, his administration inherited a multiplicity of
challenges not seen since Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in 1981. President
Bush was leaving the White House with a 34% job approval rating (Gallup, 2009). On
the global stage, his ratings were equally abysmal. According to the Pew Global Attitudes
Project (2008), 19 of the 24 nations polled, including several strong U.S. allies, expressed
little confidence in Bush as he neared the end of his presidency (Pew, 2008). The war in
Afghanistan, the Invasion of Iraq, the misleading of America and its allies on the
stockpile Weapons of Mass destruction, the recession, Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib
prison, and the infamous waterboarding scandal made President Bush, Vice-President
Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld extremely unpopular. So
much so, that in 2012, the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission found President Bush,
Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld guilty of war crimes in absentia for the illegal
invasion of Iraq (Foreign Policy, 2012). Not only would President Obama be charged
with restoring America’s credibility abroad, but after a polarizing campaign, Obama had
to reassure Americans that he would focus more on domestic issues, specifically, jobs,
the economy, and the war on terror.
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President Obama, like his predecessor George W. Bush, was in agreement that
terrorism must be eradicated. However, he was opposed to the Bush strategy which he
deemed as a hindrance in fighting global terrorism because of its maverick styled
unilateral approach. Although Obama and G. W. Bush had sometimes diametrically
opposed strategic military strategies, President Obama could not ignore that the situation
in Iraq was stabilizing while Afghanistan was declining (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). For
this reason, over the objections of his senior advisers, and to the dismay of many of his
supporters, President Obama chose to replicate President Bush’s second-term strategy for
Iraq, sending an additional 45,000 American troops to Afghanistan, further increasing
economic assistance (Jenkins & Godges, 2011). Obama, in many ways, was Reaganesque
in his approach towards counter-terrorism in that it was much more focused with
expected outcomes. Like Bush however, he was in full agreement that America should
avoid international entanglements unless they proved to be absolutely vital America’s
national interests. Moreover, Obama believed that America should not be the lone voice
in the world denouncing terrorism embraced the tenet that the international community
should also have an integral role in fighting terrorism. President Obama had made it clear
that the days of unilateral intervention was ending and transformational diplomacy was
part of the new strategy.
The election of Barack Obama should have been a symbol of progress and pride
for the United States of America. President George W. Bush could be heard telling an
attendee at the 2009 Obama inauguration, “This is a great day for our nation.” However,
a segment of American society saw the elevation of an African-American to highest
elected office in America, as a threat to their existence and the beginning of the end of the
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White majority. In 2016, D’Vera Cohn at the Pew Research Center released a report that,
according to the U.S. Census Bureau, for the first time in history, minorities babies
(50.2%) under the age of 1-year old were slightly more than half of the babies born in
2011 (Cohn, 2016). Also in 2016, Time Magazine journalist Josh Sanburn reported on a
study conducted by the University of New Hampshire that found natural decreases in the
White population across 17 states in 2014, including Florida, New Mexico, Pennsylvania
and West Virginia, which together comprise 38% of the U.S. population (Sanburn, 2016).
Between 2015 and 2016, there were several demographers reporting that by the year
2060, Whites would no longer be the majority population in America. Although the
resentment of President Obama was in large part rooted in racism, the Obama
administration, like their predecessors, were short-sighted in that they assumed the
avalanche of White hatred directed towards President Obama could be explained away as
simply deep-seeded racism. The lack of inquiry to determine substantive or alternative
reasons for this animus alienates this segment of the population, which in turn
metastasizes into radical and violent extremist behavior. The theory put forth by Robin
DiAngelo (2011) gives a plausible explanation beyond racial hatred that caused Whites to
react negatively towards the election of Barack Obama. In her theory, DiAngelo
postulated:
White people in North America live in a social environment that protects and
insulates them from race-based stress. This insulated environment of racial
protection builds White expectations for racial comfort while at the same time
lowering the ability to tolerate racial stress, leading to what I refer to as White
Fragility. White Fragility is a state in which even a minimum amount of racial
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stress becomes intolerable, triggering a range of defensive moves. These moves
include the outward display of emotions such as anger, fear, and guilt, and
behaviors such as argumentation, silence, and leaving the stress-inducing
situation. These behaviors, in turn, function to reinstate White racial equilibrium.
(p. 54)
The return to this White racial equilibrium after the election of President Obama was
often carried out in pseudo-quasi-judicial tribunals that lacked any real authority and only
served as a means to unite like-minded dogmatic anti-government radical extremist. In
2009, a group in Georgia that called themselves The American Grand Jury, issued their
own indictment of President Obama by concluding that he committed fraud and treason
by falsely claiming he was a citizen of the United States when in fact, he was born in
Kenya (Potok, 2009). In 2011, billionaire real estate developer Donald Trump
spearheaded what was known as the Birther Movement which questioned the veracity of
President Obama’s national origin and demanded that the president release his birth
certificate to the public. Republicans in leadership positions began to openly normalize
racially divisive and demeaning rhetoric. Tennessee RNC chairman Chip Saltsman sent
out a CD of “Barack the Magic Negro” as a Christmas present (Sinderbrand, 2008).
Rather than rebuking her colleague, Young Republican vice-chairman Audra Shay found
amusement in a post on her Facebook page sent to her by a colleague that read “Obama
bin Lauden is the new terrorist....Muslim is on their side...need to take this country back
from all of these mad coons........ and illegals.” Shay responded, 8 minutes later, “You
tell em Eric! lol” (Avlon, 2009). This type dehumanizing and racially demeaning rhetoric
advanced a new concept of “othering” the first African-American president of the United

107
States by intentionally undermining the prevailing legitimacy of the Oval Office. Ultraconservatives rejected the notion that criticism of President Obama was disrespectful and
they were content with their modes of critique intentionally being a ubiquitous
commodification of White supremacy. After decades of promoting the values of hardwork, ethics, morality, and merit-based equality, the radical fringe of the Republican
Party rejected the homogeneous and monolithic and replaced it with racism, nativism,
and White male patriotism. This obscene level of hate in conjunction with its corollary of
intensified partisanship, glamorized right-wing extremism during the Obama
administration in pursuit of political, materialistic or individualistic gains. Although
President Obama was a strong advocate of American exceptionalism, human rights,
education, clean energy, winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and reestablishing American standing and leadership in the world, domestic extremism, he was
deeply distrusted by ultra-conservatives.
Since September 11, 2001, the threat of violence inspired by radical right-wing
ideologies has been largely overshadowed by the “war on terror” and the extraordinary
effort expended by both the George W. Bush and the Obama administrations to thwart
attacks by jihadists inspired by al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and
other militant Islamist groups (Mueller & Stewart, 2011). In October 2015, at an event
hosted by the Program on Extremism, Assistant Attorney General for National Security
John Carlin announced the creation of the post of Domestic Terrorism Counsel to
coordinate cases arising from right-wing extremism, an acknowledgment that extremists
weaned on radical homegrown, right-wing ideologies have killed more people in the U.S.
since 9/11 than jihadis (Bruer, 2015). In fact, U.S. domestic terrorism groups outnumber
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international groups seven-to-one and are a far larger threat to America than radical
Islamist (McGarrell et al., 2007). A study conducted under the Obama administration
described far-right extremists are predominately White males, late 20s and early 30s, who
believe they have a patriotic duty to advocate for the elimination of all immigration
policies and the systemic marginalization of minorities currently in America. Because of
their views toward minorities, they are more likely than other domestic terrorists to attack
in groups (55.5%), to target complete strangers (48.4%), and to use weapons (52.4%)
(Gruenewald, 2011). Right-wing extremist pursue the agendas of their groups in various
ways. Some limit themselves to lobbying and political activism, while others resort to
acts of violence such as murder and domestic terrorism (Garland & Simi, 2011).
The Obama administration translated its democratic liberal worldview into a
counterterrorism policy that limits the prerogatives and work methods of American
security and intelligence agencies (Ganor, 2014). The stark difference between the
Obama and G.W. Bush administrations was that “the war on terror” was an abstract
enemy under Bush. President Obama however, was focused in his approach and put faces
and names together and compiled a list of who exactly the enemy was and why they were
a threat to the security of the United States (Ganor, 2014). President Obama and his
national Security team surmised that when the definition of the threat is too broad, it may
undermine the efficacy of the counterterrorism strategy and make it more difficult to
identify to devise an effective strategy (Ganor, 2014).
In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization
strategy which was devised to address the forces or conditions that influence people
living in the United States to become so radicalized and extreme in their views they
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ultimately feel compelled to engage in acts of domestic terrorism. This is the first such
strategy for the federal government, which is called combating violent extremism (CVE)
and is just another tool in assisting law enforcement in identifying root causes of
terrorism (Bjelopera, 2014)
Conclusion
Non-jihadist incidents of domestic terrorism have never been a top federal
counter-terrorism priority for any incoming president. In the media, the Obama
administration considered the importance of focusing on non-jihadist domestic terrorism
until December 14, 2012, when a lone gunman Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook
Elementary and murdered 20 children and six teachers. However, the FBI’s focus never
waned on domestic terrorism because of the reorganization efforts that occurred under the
Bush administration. Nevertheless, incidents such as Sandy Hook feature prominently
among the concerns of law enforcement officers because of the dramatic increase in
domestic incidents of terror, active shooters, and lone wolf radical extremist that ambush
and murder police officers (Bjelopera, 2013). In 2011, former Los Angeles Deputy Police
Chief Michael P. Downing included “Black separatists, White supremacist, sovereign
citizen extremists, and animal rights terrorists” among his chief counterterrorism
concerns (Gertz, 2011).
A frequent point made in the current literature on the U.S.-led war on domestic
and international terror is that the war and its public discourse is a continuation from the
George W. Bush administration. Researchers explored the political discourse of terrorism
and counterterrorism during the Clinton, G. W. Bush, and Obama administrations.
However, what is lacking are the challenges of maintaining an ongoing narrative and
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including diverse perspectives. By examining presidential discourse on terrorism,
contemporary research articles continue to demonstrate continuities in counterterrorism
approaches from Reagan to Obama. This study suggests that, based on Reagan's initial
“war on terrorism”, Clinton articulated thoughts of “catastrophic terrorism” and a “new
terrorism” both at home and abroad, which became a cornerstone for thinking about the
issue over the past two decades. Clinton’s counterterrorism discourse provided an
important rhetorical foundation for Bush and Obama on how to respond to domestic
terrorist attacks such as the Oklahoma City bombing. Far from being a radical break,
Bush’s war on terror at home and overseas represents a continuation of established
counter-terrorist understandings and practices (Tsui, 2015).
Rhetoric involving catastrophic terrorism involved giving the nation details of
particular incidents to shock them and allow for quick passage of policies that were
designed to respond to these threats. Some of the broader outcomes, and political
consequences of Clinton’s terrorism discourse (such as anti-terrorism initiatives and a
law enforcement and military approach) was designed to address public fears and
promote funding for significant responses (Bourdieu, 1987).
Fairclough’s (2001) critical discourse analysis (CDA) used a three-dimensional
model as the central framework by which to examine U.S. terrorism statements and
counter-terrorism initiatives implemented from Clinton to Obama. Fairclough’s approach
was distinguished by a concept of discourse that considers language commonly used in
social practices. This discourse is understood as language used when speaking of
terrorism in such a way that speaking generates ideas and concepts from a perspective
that garners public support (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002). Through the process of
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discursive practice, as exercised by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, a type
of communication was created, consumed, and reproduced in response to society’s fears
about domestic terrorism. These Presidents sought to control the message and level of
fear (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).
In the Fairclough CDA study, material from more than 200 official texts including
all of Clinton’s domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism-related speeches, interviews,
and radio addresses published in the Federal Register and the Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States were analyzed. Furthermore, in order to explore the
continuities of U.S. counterterrorism policy, Reagan’s “war on terrorism” material, as
well as Bush’s ‘war on terror’ discourse –which transitioned into the “war on domestic
terrorism” –were evaluated (Clinton, 1995b).
This study of U.S. domestic terrorism discourse not only contributed to our
understanding of the way speaking and writing about terrorism was constructed in the
past, but also to our current understanding of how U.S. domestic counter-terrorism is
framed. The dominant theme in the literature was that the discourse for the current U.S.led war on domestic terror largely originated from the George W. Bush administration.
Before 9/11, there had been a long history of labeling U.S. domestic terrorist threats and
enemies as “terrorism” and “terrorists.” However, the meaning of these words changed
several times, depending on the social and political contexts of various Presidents. The
discursive change in U.S. counter-terrorism is due, in part, to shifts in the political and
social order, and also the way in which the world was understood (Clinton, 1996c).
During the Clinton era, the United States and its allies suffered a number of
significant domestic terrorist attacks, including the World Trade Center bombing in 1993,
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and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995. These incidents were the primary focus of the
Clinton administration's domestic terrorism and counter-terrorism discourse, and led to
solidifying the rhetoric for administrations that followed. In contrast to Reagan’s
terrorism discourse and its focus on state-sponsored terrorism, the Clinton administration
developed and constructed its terrorism discourse by identifying and emphasizing the
characteristics of catastrophic terrorism, or new terrorism. Its characteristics were based
on the terrorists’ targets, the methods they adopted, and the weapons used.
Reviewing the syntax and key discourse phrases utilized by the Clinton
administration, the word “boundlessness” stood out as the most significant feature of
“new terrorism,” in which terrorists emerged “within or beyond our borders” (Clinton,
1995c). As terrorists changed, and they were perceived as “becoming an equal
opportunity destroyer, with no respect for borders” (Clinton, 1996a), emphasis was on the
lack of clear boundaries between external and internal terrorism, where terrorists could
strike a foreign ally or on U.S. soil (Chin-Kuei Tsui, 2012).
John Deutch (1997), former director of the Central Intelligence Agency under
Clinton, echoed the President’s use of boundlessness when he suggested that terrorism
was like the plague of the Middle Ages, frightening both leaders and citizens. It is a
social disease that is spreading and its cure is unknown. Portraying terrorism as a
“disease” was a repetition of a word used by previous Presidents, and not a new rhetorical
expression. In order to intensify the significance of the domestic terrorist threat, Reagan
and his administration adopted a similar theme, depicting terrorism as a cancer, with
politicians actively seeking a cure. Reagan, and later Clinton would say that the plague of
terrorism would spread like a cancer, challenging civilized societies, and sowing fear and
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chaos (Leeman, 1991). These outcomes would occur if society, through its leaders,
permitted terrorism to succeed anywhere. Thus, by employing a medical metaphor,
terrorism was interpreted as a disease that could strike anywhere in society (Leeman,
1991).
Post 9/11, the concept of a new style of terrorism became a prominent concept
and theme in the G. W. Bush administration’s war on terror discourse. President Bush
and his top officials adopted the same rhetorical strategy established by the Clinton
administration to construct their narrative on terrorism discourse which became a primary
weapon in responding to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. General Colin
Powell, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Bush, routinely referred to “the scourge
of terrorism” (Jackson, 2005) while justifying U.S.-led global and domestic responses to
terrorism. This type of rhetoric graphically described the characteristics of terrorism and
promoted the theme that the terrorist threat required aggressive counter-actions and
measures. Fairclough (2001) pointed out the significance of the fact that “different
metaphors imply different ways of dealing with things” (p. 100). When responding to
terrorism, the rhetoric interpreted these acts as a dangerous disease and an extreme social
threat to all human beings. Those who did them had to be eliminated and cut out of
society, like the cancer to which their acts had been likened (Jackson, 2005).
Oklahoma City was a “wake up call” for terrorism experts in 1995, as well as law
enforcement officers. It was unnerving that weapons of mass destruction were now
available to ordinary citizens who had grievances against United States could easily
engage in acts of domestic terrorism. It was suggested that domestic terrorists would
likely try to obtain chemical and biological weapons to attack civilian targets since they
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were easy to acquire and had a significant lethality (Deutch, 1997; Laqueur, 1996). The
Oklahoma incident was also thought to mark a turning point in the history of domestic
terrorism: for the first time, a non-state terrorist individual had used chemical weapon to
attack civilian non-combatants (RAND, 1999).
Before this tragedy, terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction had only
been part of theoretical scenarios. However, the bombing came to symbolize the threat of
such weapons domestically. They were no longer a theoretical possibility, but a reality
(RAND, 1999).
The 1995 bombing and other domestic terrorist attacks in the 1990s were
examples of White extremist terrorism. What was even more alarming for the Clinton
administration was that the two main suspects were both American nationals. Their
motivations for carrying out the act was that they disagreed with policies on gun control,
and they were strong supporters of the militia movement (Linenthal, 2001). After
reviewing the Oklahoma City bombing, the administration decided to amend its antiterrorism legislation, which had initially concentrated on fighting international terrorism.
Now the administration addressed the immediate threat of “home-grown” terrorism
(Linenthal, 2001).
Oklahoma City appeared to display characteristics of modern terrorism: its
unbounded nature and the means adopted by the terrorists identified them as a clear and
present danger to national security. In Clinton’s public rhetoric, the President emphasized
a new approach for responding to the transformation of ‘homegrown’ domestic terrorism.
By developing the discursive construction of a borderless threat, this ideology would later
provide a foundation for Bush’s “war on terror” and pave the way for the various security
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acts following 9/11. With the concept of “new terrorism,” Clinton asserted that the
United States had become vulnerable to terrorism both from without and within our
borders.
Other concerns materialized during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies
concerning domestic “cyber-terrorism,” a new tactic. The threat was first articulated in
Clinton’s terrorism discourse, and later used by the Bush administration after 9/11
Clinton’s cyber-terrorism narrative closely echoed the concepts that supported the idea of
the new terrorism being boundless. The convenience of technology, and the opportunities
provided by emerging technologies supported terrorists’ breaching the traditional barriers
of private and government facilities to achieve large scale social disruptions.
Reviews by data experts showed a dramatic worldwide increase in the number of
people possessing the skills to carry out cyber-attacks, escalating from a few thousand in
the early 1980s to over 17 million in 1996. Another projection that came to fruition was
that the number would reach 19 million by 2001 (Critical Foundations, 1997). The
Clinton administration faced the reality that cyber-terrorism was not just a possibility; it
was now a fact of life that the government was required to counter.
A close study of Clinton and Bush’s terrorism discourse reveals that their counterterrorism policy was a core issue for the government. Each administration faced domestic
attacks, and the terrorism issue was frequently mentioned by each President. It emerged
as an ongoing topic stressed by many senior officials. The Clinton administration also
declared on several occasions that terrorism was one of the most significant and
dangerous threats to the United States in the post-Cold War period. In Clinton’s 1995
remarks at the Air Force Academy, he said that “fighting terrorism is a big part of our
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national security today, and it will be well into the 21st century” (Clinton, 1995d). Each
President (Clinton, Bush, and Obama) had heightened American’s fears by promoting the
fact that terrorism destroys innocent lives.
Each of these Presidents developed specific interpretations of terrorism that gave
their perceptions and features of new terrorism, and various scenarios of potential
terrorist attacks. It is noteworthy that they are generally based on similar ideologies and
concepts. The response of each President was to build on Reagan’s foundation of the
“war on terrorism.” Clinton expanded this discourse, and later added the threats posed by
“homegrown” terrorists. Obama has also stressed the dangers of catastrophic terrorism
that involve rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber-terrorism. He has used
legislation such as the PATRIOT Act and bureaucracies such as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Clinton’s discourse provided rhetorical context for the
George W. Bush administration to be able to respond to the tragedy of September 11th.
Obama promoted the idea of freedom, resulting in continuity of U.S. counter-terrorism
policies that removed domestic terrorism as a worst case, unlikely scenario and made
these acts plausible (Christopher, 1996).
Evolution of U.S. Anti-terrorism Policy
Soon after Louis Freeh was appointed FBI director, he wasted no time in
developing a strategy to combat domestic terror threats. In 1998, Director Freeh
submitted a comprehensive strategic plan (FY 1998-2003) designed to address both
domestic and internationally terrorism absent the previous hierarchal structure that one
threat was more significant than the other. FBI Deputy Director, Robert Bryant had been
working on this plan for more than a year and the top strategic priority of this plan was
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National and Economic Security (Freeh, 1999). The first two goals under this priority
were the identification, prevention, and defeat of intelligence operations and the
prevention, disruption, and defeat of terrorist operations before they occur (Freeh, 1999).
In arriving at the priorities and goals of this plan, Director Freeh and Deputy Director
Bryant realized the U.S. faced an increasingly dangerous threat and were making efforts
to reshape the FBI to confront domestic terrorism (Freeh, 1999).
In March of 2000, Assistant Director Dale Watson initiated an internal counter
terrorism planning process entitled MAXCAP 05 (Center for Strategic Management,
2002). This 5-year plan was based on the premise that although the FBI would never be
able to stop all acts of domestic and international terrorism directed towards the United
States and its interests abroad, it could however, create a formidable infrastructure so if
attacked, the FBI would positioned to adequately respond (Center for Strategic
Management, 2002). Consequently, MAXCAP 05 was designed to measure the readiness
of each Special Agent’s assigned field office and their capacity to adequately respond to
viable terrorist threats (Center for Strategic Management, 2002).
In the spring of 2001, data complied from MAXCAP 05 program revealed that
field offices were not adequately staffed with key personnel needed to gather intelligence
such as surveillance teams, translators, Intel analysts, and access to investigative
databases. In short, almost every Special Agent field office reported they were
undermanned and unable to address the terrorism threats or actions of terror (Center for
Strategic Management, 2002). Watson and his team used this information for drafting the
FBI budget and requesting additional funds from Congress to support their
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counterterrorism programs. In September 2001, prior to 9/11, the FBI’s request for
funding was denied (Johnston & Risen, 2002).
The continued rise of confirmed and suspected terrorist incidents have once again
drawn attention to U.S. policies and their implementation. The threats posed by terrorism
are multi-dimensional, covering a wide range of possibilities: the domestic-international
dimension; individuals, small groups, large groups, and governments as the perpetrators
and/or initiators of terrorist activities; poorly organized and well-organized with
widespread natures and purposes; and single-event-focused and campaign-focused in
scope. The responses to these threats required multiple, multi-dimensional perspectives,
and approaches. As dangers continue to emerge, an ongoing need is to gather strong, and
reliable intelligence (Livingstone & Arnold, 1986).
U.S. policies varied widely over time based on how the impact of attacks were
viewed. Repercussions include the nature of the incident, the scope of incident, its aims,
geographical concerns, and political concerns. The FBI’s debacle in investigating the
bombing at Atlanta’s Olympic Village in 1996 highlighted the need for revised domestic
terrorism policies. Two key questions were asked following that incident, which showed
the failures of existing policies. First, given the need for intelligence, why do we not have
sufficient ‘good’ intelligence to prevent or prepare for such incidents? Second, if the
United States lacks sufficient information that can lead to policies that increase
deterrence capabilities, why has no significant action been taken (Fukuyama & McFaul,
2007).
These key questions go to the heart of the domestic terrorist issue. The need to
support preventative measures, and develop a foundation for understanding issues related
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to gathering and using good intelligence in the fight against domestic terrorist policy are
crucial. While the focus remains on ‘difficulties’ and ‘issues,’ the research emphasizes
instances in which good intelligence has paid off. Arnold and Livingstone (1984) noted
that gathering of good intelligence is the best first line of defense.
As U.S. domestic terrorism policies benefitted from information utilizing selected,
identifiable dimensions and contexts, what has emerged are organizations within the
government, particularly inside the intelligence community, which supported strong
responses. As information is distilled into intelligence through data collection, analysis,
and dissemination, what has emerged is a counter-terrorism capability (Crenshaw, 2010).
While research has not previously focused on ‘anti-terrorist policing,’ Crenshaw’s
observations provide insight into how the U.S. has streamlined its bureaucracy to respond
to imminent domestic terror threats. Key factors in creating a domestic terrorist response
included availability, currency, credibility, and various other factors which can be viewed
as creating and affecting a ‘rate of exchange’ for information shared among various
potential end-users.
Carter, Clinton, Bush, and Obama faced hard decisions concerning pre-emptive
strikes or formulating a response to an already delivered action, what is noted throughout
the research is whether or not they had good intelligence. This process of getting and
exchanging material is commonly referred to as the ‘politics of information’ which
routinely affect decision making, and selecting options, based on whether or not available
information is used (Progressive Policy Institute, 2003).
The escalation of attacks typically receives intense media attention and focus,
particularly when these events occur on U.S. soil by radicalized citizens. As society seeks
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to understand these inhumane acts that defy logic, the challenge for the government has
been to create current and relevant policies. To date, the focus has been on highlighting
specific sociopolitical and religious situations that may be of significance and
consequence, thereby promoting a religious overlay (Lacquer, 1987).
As U.S. counterintelligence operatives probe religious sects and various other
disenfranchised extremist groups, great effort has been made to gather good intelligence,
by embedding informants in groups that may use terror as a means to an end. In
coordinating these covert activities, what has been noted is coordination. Participation by
multiple organizations, including the Department of State, Department of Defense, DHS,
and the FBI, make logistical coordination problematic. As these agencies work against
the clock, seeking to penetrate terrorist cells, what has evolved from the Carter
administration forward is their ability to organize effectively and share intelligence.
The success of these organizations is based on their ability to assimilate
information, analyze content, and evaluate human activities in the realm of collecting
information for analysis, disseminating such information, and, in some instances, taking
action. The formation of the DHS, which now coordinates all government responses to
terrorism threats, has ended the lack of sharing of information between agencies. The
sharing of information, particularly when agents penetrated organizations under cover has
become an essential technique and highlights the difficulty, time, and cost associated with
placing an agent in a group such as the Klu Klux Klan or the AOG (Arnold &
Livingstone, 1984). By working together, all agencies receive not only good intelligence,
but credit for their roles in thwarting a planned domestic attack.
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With the evolution of policies mandating the exchange of information, and
requiring agencies to develop the ability to identify the relevance of collected material,
not only internally, but also from other members of the law enforcement community, an
increase in cooperation is readily apparent. Further, sharing information between nations
related to domestic terror threats has become standard (Thompson, 2003). This highlights
a form of cooperation with other governments in which national interests are transcended
and policies and protocols are established between them (Thompson, 2003).
While policies on domestic terrorism required adoption by lead federal agencies
such the FBI, the DOJ, and DHS, jurisdiction remains a challenge. DHS has attempted to
resolved many of these issues and internal disputes over control of particular
investigations, promoting the exchange of communication between local, state, and
federal levels of government. Large security corporations or groups that are also involved
with terrorist threats, such as Blackwater Worldwide, need to be brought into this flow of
information as well. The major challenge for the U.S. government is how much
intelligence to share with private organizations where such sharing may not be in the best
interest of the American people. As the balancing act continues between who is in charge
of various activities, who to share information with, and how much information to share,
increasing the authority of the DHS offers the ability to provide intensive oversight and
ensure full cooperation at every level by all parties (Turner & Lovell, 1998).
Prior to 9/11, there were substantive failures in the realm of domestic security that
plagued the most prominent federal intelligence and investigative agencies in the world.
Even with the oversight of congressional subcommittees, some critics and the general
public have wondered if was there ever anything intelligent about U.S. intelligence
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gathering and domestic terrorism responses. Post 9/11, there was a mandate from
President Bush that called for multiple investigative probes to uncover “strategic”
shortcomings, but more importantly, enact policies that would correct all major
deficiencies. Agency boundaries tied to jurisdiction routinely creates secondary problems
when dealing with situations that are amorphous or fluid. With overlap between agencies
needed, the older concept of a ‘lead agency’ may be implemented by some agency
leaders, and create confusion among operatives and reduce their effectiveness. The
dissolution of inter- and intra-agency jurisdictional wars involving investigative and
intelligence organizations has been, and will likely remain a reality, into the future. These
rivalries, which are slowly being diminished by the DHS, come to the fore when
Congress annually increases funding related to counter-terrorism (Turner & Lovell,
1998).
An additional policy issue surrounding domestic terrorism in U.S. investigative
and intelligence organizations is that while these agencies continue to become
streamlined, the statutes by which they operate are bureaucratic. Policy developments
traditionally followed bureaucratic politics and what has been sought by Presidents and
Congress. Over the years, what emerged as necessary in policy formation are ways of
approaching domestic terrorism via investigative and intelligence organizations that build
collaboration and cooperation. This is a switch to a combined method in dealing with
terrorist incidents and potential acts of domestic terrorism (Goldsmith, 2008).
As domestic terrorism continues to change, there will be a need for policies that
integrate emerging technologies and take into account multi-dimensional approaches and
investigations of potential threats. With an increasing number of terrorist events,
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expenditures on new technology will always be justified if there are also increases in
statistical information. Technology will help streamline jurisdictional issues, increase the
flow of information, promote policy revisions, and highlight immediate threats
(Bodansky, 1993).
Domestic policy has failed at times to appreciate the dynamics of other cultures
and their willingness to respond to global terrorist events, which ultimately affected the
U.S. (Bozeman, 1985). With a relatively rapid turnover of Presidents, the overarching
purposes achieved through a steady developing of particular national terrorism policies
over the course of one or two terms. However, researchers emphasize the fact that midlevel and senior levels bureaucrats generally outlast Presidents and the directors and
supervisors they appoint. These bureaucrats do not always interpret the directives of
Presidents or Directors the same way as their authors and presents the problem of policies
and mandates being shelved in hopes the next President or Director will change direction
following an election (Neustadt, 1960).
When assessing the competence of those who generate U.S. policy, Sloan (1986)
noted there are no guarantees that those involved (e.g., politicians, directors, or even
federal agents) have knowledge of domestic terrorism. Failures in policy and lack of
security enforcement have almost been predictable, with agents lacking prerequisite
training and/or education. Superior performance can conflict with administrative
oversight and progress can be impeded despite strong rhetorical commitments from
leaders to be proactive about terrorist attacks on the U.S. Concerns remain regarding
those who develop counter-measures where, in some cases, individuals acted with
impunity and disregard for lives (Sloan, 1986).
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In complex and difficult scenarios for which policy has not been previously
established, protocols are being developed to meet immediate needs and challenge
organizational interests. With these organizations frequently operating in closed
environments, concerns and challenges regarding who is socially and psychologically
appropriate to write coherent and responsible polices that combat domestic terrorism
(Baritz, 1985; Schlesinger, 1996).
Economic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
This section considers the relationship between economic development and
domestic terrorism. When a traditional economy is replaced by a more contemporary one,
the change may lead to protests and various forms of social unrest, making the society
more prone to terrorist behaviors. However, the lasting effects of such modernization
should be correlated with reducing domestic terrorism. In order to test this hypothesis and
find better support for the theory, the latest Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets
were utilized. The data show that states at intermediate levels of economic development
are more prone to domestic terrorist activity and attacks, as compared to poorer or
wealthier nations. Terrorist attacks would seem to be more likely in states that are not
reducing poverty or providing a proper economic safety net that can cushion the effects
of rapid economic development on a given region. Further, results indicate that countries
which are more democratic and older are less likely to have incidents of domestic
terrorism when compared to less democratic states (Boehmer & Daube, 2013).
The next question is: What is the statistical relationship between a nation’s
economic development and its rates of terrorist activity? Past studies were contradictory s
concerning the development of terrorism. This is not surprising, given the multiple
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explanations and differences between the kinds of domestic terrorism. Furthermore, most
of the studies on this matter model the effects of terrorism development as a linear
relationship. Instead, the relationship between terrorism and development could be
curvilinear, with different states at various stages of progress. Data shows that modeling
development as a curvilinear relationship can help explain how seemingly contradictory
findings from theoretical models created expectations that resulted in different
explanations for the frequency of terror attacks across different levels of development.
Testing the new theory using the GTD dataset found support for the theory.
However, the literature on terrorism provided contradictory evidence that shows a direct
link between low income, poverty, or lack of state assistance, and increased rates of
terrorism. Studies that analyze this subject at the level of individuals only infrequently
found a correlation between poverty and terrorism, or that poverty is one of the key
demographic criteria in becoming a terrorist today (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003;
Sageman, 2004). Berrebi (2007) showed that it is more likely that individuals with higher
incomes had higher rates of joining terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Kavanagh (2011) demonstrated an interaction between education and poverty, and later
participation in terrorist groups.
Mousseau (2011) surveyed individuals in 14 different Islamic states and
concluded that rates of urban poverty predicted support for terrorist organizations in those
regions. Recent studies on the issue found that states with more wealth have a much
higher likelihood of becoming targets of terrorism (Bloomberg & Hess, 2008; Bloomberg
& Rosendorf, 2009), perhaps due to the fact these states are more attractive targets to
terrorist groups (Ross, 1993; Sandler, 1995).
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Piazza (2011) found economic discrimination (real or imagined) against minority
groups to be an important cause of domestic terrorism cases, especially when economic
help is not readily available for those who need it. Piazza noted that states that had either
income disparity or a higher Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, can be positively
linked to terrorist activity in those nations. Some studies found no strong link between a
state’s level of development, rates of poverty, and terrorist activity. Yet other studies
determined that poor states did not fare as well as middle or high-income states regarding
increased levels of terrorist activity and attacks (Abadie, 2006; Dreher & Gassebner,
2008; Krueger & Laitin, 2007; Piazza, 2006).
In contrast, Derin-Güre (2009) found that as a state develops, it become less
inclined to produce terrorist groups or organizations, and experiences decreased levels of
domestic terrorist activity as it is decreasingly targeted by global terrorist groups.
Differences in income have, in varying degrees, been linked to terrorism (Lai, 2007;
Piazza, 2011); increasing income does appear to lower terrorism rates when nations fund
social welfare programs. Alternatively, increasing economic development led to greater
economic opportunity due to globalization (Bravo & Dias, 2006; Burgoon, 2006; Krieger
& Meierrieks, 2010; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004). Given that research on economic
development and terrorist activity has produced mixed results, researchers investigated
the possibility of a curvilinear impact on terrorism. Both Daube (2011) and Enders and
Hoover (2012) showed that middle-income states are more susceptible to domestic
terrorist incidents compared to states with higher or lower income levels.
In contrast to earlier studies on this issue, the present study sought to determine
whether high levels of national economic development had an effect on reducing levels
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of domestic terror attacks and, if so, whether the relationship is non-linear or one in
which the highest and lowest income states have reduced rates of domestic terrorism
incidents as compared to states with mid-level economic and social development.
Furthermore, given that the degree of democracy (or democratic process) coincides with
economic development, it is important to delineate the effects of democracy on economic
development. Once the curvilinear effects of democracy and development are modeled in
this study, the concept was considered that highly democratic states are less likely to have
incidents of domestic terrorist attacks when compared to those that are less democratic.
Therefore, the study also examined the relationship between a state’s economic
development, and the amount of domestic terror attacks using the GTD (LaFree &
Dugan, 2007; START, 2012).
Political Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
Ross (1993) found that economic development does create numerous economic
and social changes (Kuznets, 1955; Olson, 1963; Rostow, 1960), which disturb
traditional patterns and can create conditions that give rise to domestic terrorism
(Crenshaw, 1981). Factors such as economic discrimination against a background of
economic instability may also affect the conditions needed for the growth of terrorism.
The literature shows the many links exist between economic discrimination, deprivation,
and insecurity that further motivate religious, ethnic, minority, and class grievances.
These situations further increase the threat of terrorist incidents.
The present study borrowed from Mousseau’s (2002) theory which, as noted
above, suggested that acts of terrorism are related to a shift away from a traditional clientbased economy to a more market-based one. This mix alters societies and could generate
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political grievances. Some states do possess attributes of both systems. Mousseau found
that this situation could compound a population’s grievances against its government, and
lead to terrorism. This change in an economy does appear to be related to the Kuznets
curve, which shows the difference between development and income inequality. In this
study, however, the assumption is that income inequality is not necessarily the single
cause of terrorist activity, especially when deteriorating economic conditions may worsen
any existing political conflicts, as was often shown in Piazza’s studies.
The argument is not that working-class individuals are more inclined to become
terrorists, but rather that the economic conditions that may give rise to terrorism are
increased when a state attains a mid-level of development. As socioeconomic differences
and other issues (e.g., rising unemployment rates begin to surface), economies based on
social hierarchies that include gift-giving and reciprocity often accumulate a surplus of
influence by obtaining obligations from others that are often related to patronage systems.
These economies are inward-looking, and the societies in which they operate have rigid
social and political norms. In contrast, market economies that rely primarily on contracts
and enforce equality among economic actors challenge these traditions, especially when
accompanied by urbanization. Insider groups from these social hierarchies may then
finally act in the political realm (Piazza, 2006).
Political and religious extremists who use violence against their government and
individuals in their society frequently disrupt client-based economies when faced with the
possibility of privation or other economic insecurity. However, higher levels of state
wealth do provide for economic safety nets that potentially minimize the threat of
terrorist activities. Thus, economic unrest is reduced as the public good is promoted and
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thereby co-opting those who might otherwise have resorted to violence (Burgoon, 2006;
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010).
Some of these same economic issues exist for high and mid-level income states.
However, the former can afford to act by social spending when such problems arise.
Higher levels of wealth frequently provide richer states with more efficient means to
prevent civil unrest and successfully counter terrorist activity, even as development
increases the number of potential targets. Nevertheless, more developed states will still
experience some level of terrorist activity, perhaps due to post-industrial issues such as
environmentalism, abortion, animal rights, or other issues that can be used to incite
violence. In this study, the expectation is that the number of terrorist-related incidents
caused by post-industrial issues will be less than those of states that are in the midst of
transition. Post-industrial states should have fewer economic issues that promote
grievances, and those that do occur will be a less serious threat to the population. Given
the amount of terrorism in states that have mid-level development, modeling this
relationship should give a more linear result as increasing development could promote
domestic terrorism until the pace of transition slows (Meierrieks, 2010).
Meierrieks (2010) gathered data between 1970 and 2000 from144 nations were
examined using a cross-sectional time series dataset. The unit of analysis in the study was
the state-year. The GTD was used to create a count variable of domestic terror attacks
occurring each year. To effectively record the curvilinear effects of development and
democracy, the study included non-linear and squared terms, respectively. The
development terms in these models show a statistically significant difference (i.e.,
expected levels of terror incidents in a state have a non-linear effect on development).
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The lowest income states in the study showed relatively low levels of terrorist
incidents. The number, though, could increase if these nations attain more wealth. Again,
above mid-levels of wealth, the risk of terrorist attacks and related incidents is reduced,
probably due to higher spending on entitlements and reduced cultural tensions
characteristic of development. It is also possible that these states are more effective in
gathering intelligence on terrorism, and successfully stopping terrorists’ efforts (Li,
2005).
The effect of democracy on terror incidents is important because it was expected
that the relative transparency of democratic states made them appealing targets for
terrorist attacks. However, this was not likely the case for those proven to be durable (Li,
2005). Democracy was a unique and vital control variable in this equation because many
of its effects on domestic terrorism were in wealthy states that were also very democratic.
Meirrieks’ (2010) statistical model included democracy as a term by squaring the
primary variable, in hopes of gaining a better estimation of a potentially parabolic
relationship, particularly because the squared term is revealed to be negative and
statistically significant. This is very significant because it demonstrates—in contrast to
previous literature—that it is not the effects of democracy per se, but rather the stability
and success of a government that defines stability. Overall, then, the literature suggested
that higher levels of democracy do seem to add increased safety that reduced the rates of
domestic terrorist attacks. These newer findings are in line with Abadie (2006), who
concluded that the effect of political freedom on terrorism can be modeled as an inverted
parabola. These separate conclusions empirically demonstrated that economic
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development does indeed have a curvilinear relationship with domestic terroristic
activities in countries in the midst of socioeconomic change.
Currently, individuals living in states with different levels of development will
have dissimilar types of grievances against their nations. These can appear to be related
to changes in socioeconomic relationships, and where citizens live and work within their
countries. Transitioning to a more mixed economy can result in a (temporarily) more
dangerous environment that can likely be changed by further development and an
increase in national wealth, which would permit social welfare spending.
Meirriek (2010) also showed the various effects that democracy and regime
durability have, and how they functioned together. By modeling the development process
of states, and their relationship to democracy generally, it is evident that highly
democratic nations are less likely to have incidents of domestic terrorism compared to
others. Very democratic states are generally more stable due to the safety valves of the
electoral process and civil liberties. At the same time, increased amounts of financial
benefits from such governments reduce unrest. Democracies with higher economic
standing internationally have the ability to properly function and disseminate such
benefits. As such, there were lower incidents of resentment by the poor against the rich.
However, these results should not be directly interpreted deterministically or
teleologically, because states that attain higher levels of wealth can fall back into poverty.
The post-2008 financial shocks to global economic markets led to new economic
contractions and debt crises even in the most affluent states. If these states reduce their
safety nets, there would likely be a noticeable increase in income gaps, despite the fact
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that development is ongoing. Another implication of this study is that there should also
be an increase in the rate of domestic terrorism in wealthy states.
Religious Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
When analyzing terroristic behavior, a vital question that remains unanswered
concerns what determines the life or death of the terrorist groups that engage in domestic
attacks? To expand this question: how do these terrorist organizations’ ideology, base
location, peak size, or tactics influence their longevity? Are economic, political, religious,
and geographic considerations in the terrorists’ home country essential to their survival?
Why do some terrorist groups last for decades, while others wither away within the first
year of operation? Addressing these questions is crucial to combating terrorism. Possible
answers can be found by applying survival analysis to the 367 different terrorist
organizations that conducted operations, at some point, from 1970 to 2007. To date, most
studies on the subject of terrorist groups’ survival rates used case comparisons that are
clearly identified by some factors (e.g., achieved political goals, military defeat, theology,
and reduced popular support) associated with a few groups’ demise (Cronin, 2006; 2009).
Case studies continue to offer additional evidence that, by their nature, cannot be directly
applied to terrorist groups in general. Case comparisons do not seem to capture the main
trends of statistical survival analyses that are able to be applied to an increasingly larger
number of terrorist organizations, though they have unique and diverse ideologies.
Nonetheless, these analyses can be used to identify core determinants and other
information regarding terrorist group survival rates (Cronin, 2006).
The GTD has provided large amounts of data on terrorist group tactics and
ideology, for almost 40 years. This data is used in combination with RAND’s data (Jones
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& Libicki, 2008), which focuses on groups’ characteristics (e.g., base of operations, peak
size, religious order, and mandates) from the vantage of how these aspects influence
groups’ duration. A proper knowledge of these determinants can better inform policy
makers on how and when to allocate government resources for counterterrorism, so that
survival rates are greatly reduced. Having a greater understanding of the tactics which
help sustain terrorist groups assists counterterrorism efforts to allocate resources against
various kinds of terrorist attacks (Jones & Libicki, 2008).
Prominent among these factors in longevity is religion. Yet, in an otherwise datarich study conducted by Jones and Libicki (2008), beliefs were mentioned only in
passing. In a later study on the same subject, Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer (2010) used
only global terrorist attacks as their distinctive when considering survival rates, despite
the fact that the majority of terrorist groups engage in both global and domestic terrorism.
In fact, most groups rely heavily on domestic attacks to provide income to fund other
activities. Blomberg et al. included political, socioeconomic, and other factors from
specific countries. The analysis in the present study incorporated these different aspects
from the groups’ home countries, consistent with results from Basuchoudhary and
Shughart (2010). That is, these groups’ survival relies on various conditions such as when
and where they seek refuge when training.
Cronin (2009) examined the dynamics of 457 different terrorist groups identified
in the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) event database.
Cronin’s study centered on displaying the groups’ overall life span, and their achieved
goals, instead of conducting a more traditional survival rate analysis. In the study,
correlated data on the groups’ ages and engagement in negotiations were evaluated;
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however, the study’s results did not show negotiations with their home governments as
having an influence on survival rates. Evaluating data on only the oldest organizations,
introduced bias in the selection process. Furthermore, Cronin did not evaluate potential
relationships between a group’s size, ideology, location, or base-country characteristics
and longevity (Cronin, 2009).
Racial Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
In the days following the September 11th attacks, the United States Congress
passed the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, which was an omnibus bill containing multiple changes
to federal criminal procedure, laws applying to foreign intelligence surveillance,
wiretaps and other methods of intercepting electronic communications, laws related to the
gathering of documentary evidence, DNA collection, and immigration laws. More
importantly, the PATRIOT Act allows federal investigative agencies less restrictions
when obtaining permission for wiretaps on multiple electronic devices and secure
electronic and documentary evidence from multiple sources, such as Internet service
providers, telephones and cell phones, and cable companies. It also removes restraints
that had been in place regarding sharing information among federal agencies. The
increased latitude given to law enforcement activities under the Act, combined with the
relaxed standards and requirements for information sharing, created a concern for
preserving civil liberties, and our nation’s approach to immigration and the path to
citizenship (Rapoport, 2004).
Section 412 of the Act gives the Attorney General (AG) of the United States the
power to hold illegal aliens certified to be a threat to national security for up to 7 days
without bringing charges against them. This standard for detention of individuals is based
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on the reasonable suspicion standard from the Supreme Court, better known as a “Terry
Stop.” The certification by the AG must set forth why there are ‘reasonable grounds to
believe’ that the person being detained would be likely to commit acts of sabotage,
espionage, and terror, try to overthrow the government, or engage in acts that could result
in endangering national security.
After the 7 days end, the individual may be released, although detention could
continue in the event that the illegal alien is formally charged with a crime or other
violation of visa conditions under federal criminal law. If circumstances prohibit
repatriation due to a problem during the immigration process, detention may continue as
long as deemed necessary by the AG, with re-certification every 6 months. Under the
PATRIOT Act, the prospect exists that an individual held in violation of proper conditions
of entry into the United States, but unable to be deported to their home country, could be
possibly held indefinitely without formal charges being filed (Enders, Sandler, &
Gaibulloev, 2011).
In his 1989 dissent in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ (489 U.S. 602),
Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that “history teaches that grave threats to liberty often
come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.” In
2002, Chief Deputy Attorney General for the State of California Peter Siggins reported
that surveys conducted by civil liberties organizations found that 66% of Whites and 71%
of African Americans favored profiling ethnic minorities, particularly those considered to
be Muslims (Siggins, 2002).
Post 9/11 saw a dramatic increase in hate crimes against Muslim Americans.
According to the FBI’s Hate Crime Statistics Report (2015), aggravated or simple
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assaults against Muslims in 2000 was only 12 incidents. In 2001, post 9/11, anti-Muslim
aggravated or simple assaults increased to 93 incidents. FY 2002-2004, there is a
significant decline in the number of anti-Muslim assaults with a peak in 2006 and with
considerable decrease in 2007-2008. Beginning in 2009, anti-Muslim aggravated assault
incidents began to increase and it was unclear as to whether or not there was a direct
correlation between anti-Muslim sentiments and current events. There were several
theories that lacked scholarly inquiry into the root causes as to why anti-Muslim assaults
increased. One of the most populist theories was the election of President Barack Obama.
The theorem purported that the plethora of unsubstantiated reports by right-wing
extremists alleging that President Obama was a “secret Muslim” heightened fears and
agitated anti-Muslim sentiments. Moreover, the Birther conspiracy claiming that
President Obama was not born in America, but actually born in Kenya, only served to
increase tensions and validate the montage conspiracy theories that Sharia law would
soon usurp the U.S. Constitution. This anti-Islamic polemic from the right-wing
continued from 2009-2015 and did not differentiate between so-called moderate Muslims
and radical Islamic fundamentalists. Islam was being framed as a “violent” religion and
anyone of the Muslim faith were de facto supporters of Muslim terrorist. Furthermore,
anti-Muslim sentiment was seemingly justified by right-wing extremists due to several
well publicized and high-profile incidents committed by Muslim extremists on American
soil. In 2009, U.S. Major Nidal Hasan murdered 13 people and wounded 30 others in a
shooting rampage inspired by his radical Islamic views (McFadden, 2009). In 2013, the
Boston Marathon bombers, who killed three people and injured more than 100, admitted
to the FBI they were motivated by their extremist Islamic beliefs. In 2015, there were
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several high-profile attacks that seemed to re-galvanize anti-Muslim animosity back to
pre-9/11 levels. In Garland, Texas, at the Curtis Culwell Center, Muslim radical
extremists Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi Nathan Hunsinger exacted violence on
attendees and organizers for what they deemed as mocking and disrespecting the Prophet
Muhammad at a Muhammad Art Exhibition and Contest (Siron, 2015). The second was
the shooting in San Bernardino, California where, Syed Rizwan Farook killed 14 people
and injured 22 others at a Christmas party. Americans also feared that with the closing of
Guantanamo Bay, former “terrorists” could possibly be relocated to the United States and
wreak havoc in their city or state. Although these fears may have been exaggerated, there
is substantial evidence of an inverse relationship between anti-Islamic hates crimes and
how Muslims are portrayed by right-wing media outlets.
Figure 4 demonstrates the attacks on Muslim Americans from 2001 and ending in
2015. In observing the frequency distribution, the attacks on Muslim Americans was at
its peak soon after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Saudi
Islamic extremists. But attacks on Muslim Americans from 2002 – 2015 has been
consistent, but sporadic. From 2002 – 2005, attacks on Muslim Americans dropped
significantly from the number of attacks reported in 2001. In 2006, attacks on Muslim
Americans increased considerably only to recede back to the low levels reported from
2002 – 2005. In 2009, the attacks on Muslim Americans increased, and would remain
consistently high from 2009 – 2015. This could very well be attributed the election of
President Barack Obama, whom many right-wing conservatives and extremists accused
him of being a “secret Muslim.” Although this hypothesis seems plausible, there is other
evidence that suggest that high-profile attacks against other Americans in the name of
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ISIL or Al-Qaeda directly contributes to anti-Muslim sentiment which traverses from
hateful rhetoric and devolves into violence.

Figure 4. Anti-Muslim Assaults. Note. FBI Hate Crime Statistics, 2015
Muslim Americans were not the only group to see an increase in hate crimes
perpetuated against them because of their identity. Hate-motivated crimes against Sikhs
also increased. Because their customary dress code is similar to that of MuslimAmericans, Sikhs are often attacked due to mistaken identity. In 2012, Wade Michael
Page, a self-proclaimed Neo-Nazi, entered a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin and
opened fire, killing six people and seriously wounding three others. Page, after shooting a
police Lieutenant Lt. Brian Murphy in the throat, committed suicide after he was shot in
the stomach by a responding police officer. Law enforcement later discovered that Page
was a member of the White supremacist group called the Northern Hammerskins (Elias,
2012). After the shooting, FBI and local law enforcement officials concluded that there
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was strong evidence to suggest that Page mistakenly assumed that his targets were
Muslims and he was entering a temple and not a Mosque.
According to the Sikh Coalition (2014), The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to an
exponential increase in hate crimes, employment discrimination, law enforcement
profiling, and school bullying against Sikhs in the United States. Since the FBI does not
record hate crimes against Sikhs, Hindus, or others that Americans often mistake for
Muslims, the hate crimes recorded will under-represent the actual number of hate crimes
directed at Sikhs or other groups that identify with the Islamic faith.
According to research conducted by Florida State University professors Patrick
Mason and Andrew Matella (2014), racial profiling of Muslim Americans or suspected
Muslim Americans went into overdrive post 9/11. In their research, they reported that:
On November 9, 2001, the DOJ mailed interview requests to 5,000 Arab and
Muslim males, 18 - 33 years of age, who arrived in America after January 2000
on student, work, or tourist visas. These were nominally voluntary interviews…
The same month the US Department of State slowed the visa process for males
ages 16 - 45 from Arab and Muslim countries. Further, the INS engaged in mass
arrests of students who had violated the terms of their visas; all of these students
were from Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Yemen
(pp.4-5).
During Spring 2004, the FBI, under intense political pressure from elected
officials in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, again decided to
round up Arabs and Muslims for “voluntary” interviews (Mason & Matella, 2014). On
May 28, 2004, it was revealed that the Justice Department had targeted 5,000 Muslims
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and Arabs for questioning, questioning based on religion and ethnicity, and not on
individualized criminal suspicion (Arab America, 2014). The American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) vehemently opposed these measures promised that litigation would be
forthcoming. The actions taken by the FBI were considered to so blatantly discriminatory
that some local police chiefs worked hard to refute this racial profiling, going as far as
resisting cooperation with federal law enforcement efforts on the grounds that the entire
investigation appeared to violate departmental policies at state and local levels (Rapoport,
2004).
In California, Governor Davis and Attorney General Lockyer were concerned
about possible terrorists congregating in the state. They authorized programs in
September 2001 that supported racial profiling, using reports from and investigative
powers of the Highway Patrol and the Office of Emergency Services, an organization that
was later central in developing the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center. The
Center, one of the first in the nation, was created to process thousands of anonymous tips
and leads on suspicious activity following 9/11. The challenge for this organization has
been separating fictitious reports from potential threats. Threats that are deemed credible
or present a clear and present danger are forwarded to the appropriate law enforcement
agency for follow-up. In January and February of 2016, 1,615 incidents identifying
potential suspects were reported to the Center. Out of the 228 credible reports, 33
individuals remained as subjects of ongoing investigations. The Center, which contacts
an average of almost 60 law enforcement agencies per week, and monitors dozens of
anti-terrorist investigations, remains a tool that has yet to be validated through empirical
testing and review (Shughart, 2006).
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While the Office of Emergency Services Center continues to receive significant
information every day from reports on and tracking of those with an apparent MiddleEastern background, concerns emerged as to what is considered suspicious or dangerous
activities. It is imperative that law enforcement agencies and officials extract relevant and
reliable information from reports received by the Center, knowing that the outstanding
challenge is to flag only behaviors and other indicators that indicate patterns related to
domestic terrorism (STATA, 2009).
To accept that profiling Middle-Easterners is enough to warrant disparate
treatment, Americans would need to accept that most Middle-Easterners have a proclivity
for terrorism—a thought contrary to the Constitution. The horrific nature of the crimes
committed on 9/11 by this group of foreign nationals from Saudi Arabia motivated
officials to specifically investigate all foreign nationals from Middle Eastern countries,
often disregarding other criteria normally a part of such investigations, and has resulted in
social media backlash, civil rights protests, and confusion as to the scope and mandate of
some federal and state investigations.
Systemic Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
The total numbers of domestic terrorist attacks fluctuate annually. While the
numbers of events may vary, their deadliness, destructiveness, and potential for
catastrophic outcomes increased dramatically in recent years. Even states that are
relatively free of terrorism can no longer afford to be complacent. With evidence of
domestic terrorism spilling over from one state to another (Enders et al., 2011), the
potential for disastrous consequences from even a single event must be kept in mind
(Wilkinson, 2001).
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As domestic terrorism is conducted in the pursuit of alternate outcomes, what has
emerged is that many revolutionary terrorists are most interested in simply raising
society’s consciousness or demonstrating the fragility of the current state of society. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, the goal for some domestic terrorists is bringing about a
utopia that they believe will from destroying all government and its authority. Between
these extremes are terrorists who seek optimal economic systems that can follow the
destruction of current institutions. Other groups seek societies that are better served by
altering the current relationships with nature and promoting the reinvigoration of the
planet. At the less ambitious end of the scale of domestic terror, there are those that desire
autonomy or a section of the nation for themselves. Criminologists and other researchers
found that terrorists and their causes are diverse and require a broad scope of
investigation to find commonalities and unifying elements (Laqueur, 2003; Sambanis,
2008).
As terrorism is difficult to define and research, Silke (2004a) observed that
academic researchers almost always choose to discuss differing definitions of terrorism
because there has not been one that has been broadly accepted. For those who choose to
study terrorism, what routinely occurs is dividing it into two categories (domestic and
international), based primarily on the national origin(s) of the perpetrators, the choice of
victims, and the selection of targets. For domestic terrorism, perpetrator and victim
nationalities routinely match, with the violence seeking to resolve issues within a nation,
directed by a group or an individual from that state (Young & Dugan, 2010).
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Social Determinants of Domestic Terrorism
Most debate on domestic terrorism had focused on policies related to prevention.
There was a widespread view that poverty was a feature that creates terrorism and that
view dominated much of the discourse (Kahn & Weiner, 2002) and ran concurrently with
theoretical and empirical studies that addressed the economics associated with conflict. In
particular, the results of a study conducted by Alberto Alesina, Ozler Sule, Roubini,
Nouriel and Phillip Swagel (1996) suggested that poor economic conditions are likely to
increase the probability of domestic terror, and drive citizens to challenge the government
and use violence as a means to be heard. The fact that domestic terrorism is perceived as
a manifestation of political conflict suggests that poverty and adverse economic
conditions play important roles in explaining and understanding acts of domestic
terrorism (De la Calle & Ignacio, 2011).
Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) suggested that aggressive national
anti-terrorism policies were attributable to increases in domestic terror. This highlights
the role that access to information and reporting play in fashioning policy. For example,
the DOJ, DHS, FBI, and the U.S. State Department data are reluctant to publish material
that runs counter to their initiatives or agendas. Instead, they seek to galvanize the public
behind defeating these groups and ignore their messages. There is a single direction to the
messages reaching the public. In 2003, for instance, the MIPT Knowledge Base (2004)
reported 1,536 events of domestic terrorism but only 240 events of international
terrorism, maintaining the focus on domestic terrorists. What is interesting in these trends
is their impact on present and future actions and policies on domestic terrorism (MIPT,
2004; Piazza, 2004).
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Extremist Social Movements and the Internet
The need to study extremist social movements and their presence on Social Media
has become vital. Since social media and other emerging digital technology has become a
necessity, society routinely considers change as inevitable. As world-systems analysts
predict the decline of the U.S. as the world’s leading nation in the coming decades,
extremist social movements have the potential to reshape the world (Walter, Hoover, &
Sandler, 2014).
Research conducted by Wallerstein (1999) suggested that while researchers
cannot predict what will happen in the future with any certainty, what is currently being
promoted are egalitarian and utopian world societies. In trying to create a better world,
societies must be willing to invest moral energy to achieve this while also challenging
ones that would stand against brotherhood, equality, and religious freedoms (Piazza,
2006).
Following a similar course of research, Chase-Dunn and Boswell (2002) predicted
a rise in extremist movements spurred by a global economy that would enable societies to
move beyond borders and seek equitable solutions for all humanity. As this team
promoted the emergence of a global democracy that would likely begin in the United
States and move outward. This equality would also extend to assigning economic,
political and cultural rights, and disregard the influence of the majority in favor of the
individual. This search of a pure and true form of global democracy will ultimately unite
factions opposed to the effort. While legislation is already uniting this form of global
utilitarianism, which continues to gain popularity among the disgruntled, increased
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domestic terrorist attacks on the United States, in an effort to disseminate the goals and
message of social extremist movements can be expected (Frey, 2004).
In a two-pronged attack, leaders of extremist social organizations have been very
successful in using the Internet and social media to publicize their complaints and goals.
They seek to win the hearts and minds of those who may not be willing to engage in civil
disobedience but want to understand and take part in the struggle These digital outlets
provide information about these “e-movements” and new forms of “e-protests” and “eactivisms” (Earl & Schussman, 2003) and highlight the Web as a tool for extremist
groups.
Domestic and international networks are key resources in overcoming difficulties
in leadership and decision making (Castells, 2000). The downside for social extremist
groups that utilize the Internet as their primary means of communication between leaders
and members is that government agencies also have a window into their modus operandi.
Law enforcement therefore has the opportunity to identify immediate and future threats
presented by these groups (Lichbach, 2003).
Conclusion
The dynamic research conducted on the characteristics of domestic terrorists
provides insights that will assist in establishing the comprehensive models used in this
study and assessing the variables involved, which will be qualified by creating themes.
Using poverty, ethnicity, religious ideologies, along with secondary variables, unifying
connections were explored in Chapter 4, and used a qualitative document evaluation
approach that followed scientific methodology and protocols.
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Chapter 4: Methodology
As this researcher sought to develop models that could be used by law
enforcement to predict domestic terrorists’ future activity, case studies with quantitative
analysis was the optimal methodology. By assessing past domestic terrorist events
conducted by various militia groups, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists,
and left- and right-wing terrorist groups, the researcher anticipated successfully predict
behavior. The researcher tested the hypotheses, based on variables from the study, with
bivariate and regression analysis (Yin, 2009). The evolution of domestic terror and their
supporting organizations were defined within the research.
A comprehensive quantitative study, rooted in a traditional scientific approach
afforded the ability to correlate domestic terror incidents and changes in the economy,
political climate, and beliefs. The search for causation was tied to their message and
ultimately led to action, suggesting the approach used, which uncovered commonalities,
and provided justification for producing the predictive models. Given the scope of
domestic terrorist operations in the United States, this researcher sought reliability and
validity by integrating quantitative and case study approaches (Creswell, 2011).
Formulating political hypotheses related to domestic terrorism is based on
principles offered by Fearon (1991), who put forth a set of defined propositions to
explain a group of facts or phenomena, or a fundamental component or aspect of a
research study. This In this study, the researcher addressed multiple hypotheses in an
effort to provide a full explanation of the social phenomenon under study.
To develop the various hypotheses for this study, it was essential to avoid
preconceived assumptions and account for researcher bias, ensuring the validity of the
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examination. In addressing this concern, the hypotheses were not developed until after
completing a thorough review of the research, avoiding scenarios where relevant research
was discounted for a pre-conceived conclusion (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).
Hypotheses 1
H1: The frequency of attacks by domestic terrorists from 1980-2016, has a
direct correlation to the policies and positions of the President of the United States.
The researcher used the political hypotheses, which were validated by empirical
data collected in the literature presented in Chapter 3, to develop the models. They call
attention to the significance of presidential administrations and their domestic policies
from 1977 onward. One political hypothesis suggests that certain Presidents and their
domestic policies resulted in increased domestic terrorist activities. Marschall (2002)
provided a directional political hypotheses and stated that the nature of relationships can
include positive or negative (inverse) and high or low levels of influence. An increase or
decrease in domestic terrorism can be attributed to presidential influence.
Hypothesis 2
H2: Right-Wing Domestic Terrorism will increase as political and religious
rhetoric becomes increasingly partisan.
The systemic hypothesis challenges the nature of society. Our social system and
its relation to domestic terrorism supports a correlation between perceived injustice and
radical extremism. Seeking internal consistency for this hypothesis was a significant
challenge. Reviewing the delivery of social services, education, employment
opportunities, democratic principles, court challenges, and increased crime rates, the data
lend credence to certain elements within society that capitalize and exploit on a segment
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of the population’s belief that the only way the “White race” will survive in the United
States is the systematic expulsion of all non-Whites, forced repatriation, and a return to
White nativism. On the evening of June 17, 2015, self-proclaimed White extremist
Dylann Roof walked in to the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in
downtown Charleston, South Carolina, and murdered nine African-American
parishioners during their weekly Bible study. In his manifesto, Roof cited his contempt
for the American flag and the perceived apathy regarding the felonious deaths of White
people: "I hate the sight of the American flag. Modern American patriotism is an absolute
joke," "People pretending like they have something to be proud of while White people
are being murdered daily in the streets" (New York Times, 2016).
Some terrorism experts and law enforcement officials would classify Dylann Roof
as an anomaly or an outlier. However, terrorism experts have uncovered data to the
contrary. Whether it be a foiled white supremacist act of domestic terrorism or an actual
attack on ethnic minorities, the consensus among the experts is that Roof is emblematic
of under-educated, ultra-right-wing, white male, who presumes that their economic and
social situation would be different if minorities were either exterminated or expelled from
the United States. When elected leaders irresponsibly make public statements
sympathetic to the devastating actions of right-wing domestic terrorists, it only does three
things: empowers their cause, motivate copycats, and it martyrs the perpetrator.
Domestic terrorist organizations capitalized on citizens who are disaffected by a
government they feel has excluded them from life, liberty justice, freedom of speech, and
the right to bear arms. The demonization of the government is the ideal platform to allow
individuals from the same ideological perspective to unite in their opposition to the
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government by openly defying the rule of law. Terrorist groups are skillful at promoting
their message to those disenfranchised persons who see themselves as victims of societal
amalgamation. As membership increases, so does funding. The research has shown a
direct correlation between the financial resources of a terrorist organization and the
likelihood of attacks increasing. For example, a group of bank robbers calling themselves
the Aryan Republican Army pulled off 22 heists in 1994 and 1995 and had ambitions to
use the money to start a revolution (Gumbel, 2015).
Review of historical data supporting the systemic hypothesis highlights key
periods in U.S. history over the past 40 years when the system faltered and domestic
terrorist recruitment increased. These indicators are now being used to develop similar
studies and produce predictive models that allow for proactive measures by law
enforcement (Palazzolo & Roberts, 2010).
With this hypothesis, the researcher sought valid relationships between variables,
expressed as explicitly as possible, and supported by the literature. What emerged as
significant was that the system cannot meet the requirements and expectations of every
U.S. citizen. Trying to minimize the number of those who are dissatisfied with the system
and considering taking violent action, what is suggested is to promote interventions using
law enforcement and/or social services to deal with frustrations early on. The results
should be fewer people signing up for and participating in domestic terrorist
organizations (King et al., 1994).
Hypothesis 3
H3: Identify politics, race, and Nativism will become increasingly radicalized
and divisive.
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The social hypothesis and its testing for this study followed a process in which
individuals made judgments about what other people do, think, or say. The literature
review showed an important deficiency: the percentage of extroverts in focus groups
were not effectively analyzed. As a result, none of the personality variables were useful
for the type of hypothesis testing strategy researchers believe is essential to understanding
domestic terrorists (Newman, 2008).
To rectify deficiencies in forming a social hypothesis, the researcher used
Lalonde’s (2002) social identity-intergroup differentiation theory. Lalonde stated that
individuals have stronger in-group identifications and will perceive greater differences
between their in-group and a relevant out-group. As domestic terrorist leaders and key
subordinates are likely to be extroverts, their writings were analyzed from that
perspective and a deeper understanding of terrorist relationships emerged. The social
hypothesis in this study suggested that the greater the strength of in-group relationships,
the stronger the terrorist organization is or will become (Lalonde, 2002). The evaluation
considered the strength of in-group and out-group identifications, and the relevance of
dimensions associated with social comparisons.
Case Study Selection
The study design addressed the research questions by focusing on the problems
law enforcement faces when assessing changes in domestic terrorism from 1977 through
2015. Case studies typically focus on small groups or individuals within a group and
document the groups’ or individuals’ experience in a specific setting in order to
understand the social phenomenon under study. In order to consider domestic terrorism,
the researcher assessed key variables, perceptions, and goals of domestic terror groups by
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studying documents related to them. Assigning numeric values to social indicators when
increased domestic terrorism occurred gave a temporal dimension and included instances
of escalation. These steps informed the researcher’s construction of a detailed narrative.
From this narrative, models were developed that validated the hypotheses by drawing on
the key variables that addressed the research questions (Yin, 2012).
The purpose of case studies is to give researchers the ability to effectively
evaluate and filter information. A challenge in this study was developing a design that
correctly assigned relevance and value to data. The purpose of this quantitative case study
was to find relevant connections after examining historical documents and assessing key
incidents in presidential administrations from Carter to Obama. With this approach, the
researcher constructed a narrative and the models. These models were a comprehensive
system for monitoring and forecasting changes in the dispersion and character of
homegrown terrorism. The researcher used this empirical inquiry to examine the
phenomenon with a reliable and valid data collection process. This case study focused
exclusively on reviewing existing historical data and sought to identify patterns that
converged with the research hypotheses and operant variables (Ellet, 2007).
The rationale for using a case study approach was that it is effective for
identifying changes within domestic terror groups in the United States. The quantitative
design assisted with identifying asocial variables and areas of development and growth.
The premise is consistent with Yin’s (2009) criteria that the case be of general public
interest and that the social and educational issues have importance for the community.
As researchers continue to understand domestic terrorism and promote its
academic study, a quantitative study using an exploratory research design was
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appropriate for this study. The premise behind each case study was to develop a strategic
inquiry that examined common links. The six-domestic terrorist categories examined
through the lens of historical documents resulted in a comprehensive and contemporary
view of these organizations and their goals. The use of a case study design was consistent
with previous researchers who studied small groups (Horvat, 2013). The strength of the
case study research process lies in its series of steps designed to provide careful analysis
of individual cases (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006). A design that includes multiple
perspectives from different references, and the opportunity to promote new strategies
such as the proactive models, will serve as effective tools for law enforcement (Creswell,
2011).
Dependent Variables
Domestic terrorism continues to remain a challenge for American society. Thus,
examining the dependent variables in relation to organizations was essential for this
study. As research on social phenomenon evolved, Goodwin (2003) highlighted current
studies relying on connectivity metrics which support empirical modeling. The use of
structural measures highlighted connectivity measures. This was particularly relevant
given that connectivity was treated as an independent variable. By reviewing dependent
variables that supported connections between the six types of terror groups studied,
interconnections and connectivity were found when identifying the causes that underlie
domestic terror (Goodwin, 2003).
The traditional mathematical and statistical modeling the researcher used in the
study highlighted the variables and informed the model at the conclusion of this study.
The dependent variables represented the output or outcome whose variation were studied
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and the models and tests explained the interactions between them. In this study, increases
and decreases in domestic terrorism were analyzed to understand how the independent
variables increased a terrorist organization’s success, and was related to the number and
outcomes of their attacks (Nyström, Wikström, Blomqvist, Kautsky, & Isaeus, 2013).
This research relied on dynamic data mining tools that drew on multivariate
statistics. The dependent variable was the target variable; the independent variable was
assigned as a regular variable. When identifying variables through a review of historical
documents, the dependent variables were the events studied (i.e., the terrorist acts) and
allocating expected changes when the independent variable was altered. The application
of known values for the target variable was identified by data analysis, allowing for
identification of target variables to be used in these learning algorithms (Wiersema &
Bowen, 2009). The algorithms derived their validity from a review of the ebb and flow of
domestic terrorism. Basing these changes on the effects of the independent variables
supported the models and the validity of their content and predictions (Wiersema &
Bowen, 2009).
Independent Variables
A review of the historical documents permitted assessing empirical data. Changes
within society provided a foundational base for the study. The temporal guidelines were
driven by changes in residents. Independent variables included economics, politics,
religion, race, social variables, demographics, and the predominance of social media in
contemporary society (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). These variables were assessed in
relation to the formation, actions, and success of individual terrorist groups defined by
pre-qualified categories, with an emphasis on the number of incidents. The number of
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incidents was a measure for the domestic terrorist organization’s success and was
correlated with these key social variables (Brett, 2004).
In traditional scientific, quantitative case study analysis, the value of the
dependent variable is manipulated by the effects and changes produced by the
independent variables. While the independent variable is the operant variable that a
researcher controls, manipulation was limited by societal changes across various time
periods. To this extent, evaluation centered on convergences of the independent variables
with the dependent variable of time and domestic terrorist action. Fluctuations in
economics, social structure, race relations, and emerging technology such as the Internet,
discovered relationships that could not have existed in the past. By accounting for the
importance of time in this study, and the changes occurring among the independent
variables within the research, the conclusions supporting the predictive behavior models
drew on validated methodological approaches (Hastings, 1998).
As law enforcement seeks to better understand domestic terrorism, this study
provides for a means to effectively evaluate the independent variables. What was
emphasized in the conclusions is the challenge of the convergences of independent and
dependent variables in qualifying and validating the influence of each on the final results.
Though there were multiple independent variables, and the researcher could not directly
manipulate the evaluated exchanges. However, the study’s validity and the outcomes
assigned to the statistical models were supported (Kusurkar, Ten Cate, van Asperen, &
Croiset, 2011).
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Control Variable
The control variable, which is designated as the constant within a scientific study
and the element that remains unchanged during the investigation, was the continued
threat of domestic terrorism facing the United States. The control variable plays an
important role in influencing experimental results and is tested relative to the relationship
between the dependent and independent variables (Cheng & Thaga, 2006).
Following the example set by Aradillas-Lopez, Honoré, and Powell (2007),
investigating difference estimation with non-parametric control variables—essential in
developing the study—requires acknowledging that any system existing in a natural state
may have many variables that are interdependent, with each affecting the other. By using
an experiment, the relationship between independent and dependent variables is tested.
Also, what is essential is identifying whether any additional independent variable can
serve as a control variable. With a statistical analysis of the interplay between the
independent and dependent variables (and the effects on the control variable), what is
presented in the conclusions is the ability for law enforcement to utilize these exchanges
and proactivity respond to domestic terrorism.
Conclusion
Dependent and independent variables allowed the various hypotheses to be tested,
provided direction for this study, and offered a methodology that ensures confident and
reliable results. Using a quantitative case study approach supported a comprehensive
evaluation of retrieved historical documents, in which social, system, and political
variables operated as dependent variables and gave a detailed picture of the historical
development of domestic terrorism that ran concurrent with changes in society.
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In Chapter 5, the independent variables were examined using terrorist typologies:
militia, lone wolf, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionists, and left- and rightwing extremists. Convergence among these variables validated the hypotheses.
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Chapter 5: Case Study Analysis
Using a quantitative case study design that explored typologies of domestic
terrorism allowed the researcher to conduct a comprehensive evaluation that addressed
the study’s research questions and problem. As this researcher drew upon empirical data
from historical documents, an accurate depiction of the motivations, social influences,
and organization of different types of domestic terror groups was possible (Creswell,
2011).
The case study method draws out relevant connections from primary, peer
reviewed journal articles, governmental databases, and data collected by law
enforcement. Incorporating this material supported the narrative. This form of empirical
inquiry examined past and present phenomena by the data collected (Ellet, 2007).
Militia and Paramilitary Groups Case Study
The public activities that dominate the militia agenda include public and private
meetings, rallies, and paramilitary training. Of those, rallies and paramilitary training
emerged as potential concerns for law enforcement authorities. However, due to the small
number of rallies and marches, they fail to generate the kind of opposition that would
identify them as a danger. Conducting paramilitary training activities in some instances
may violate state law, depending on the state in which the activity takes place. However,
nationwide legislation prohibiting paramilitary training has not occurred, although there
were attempts to create and enforce laws prohibiting militia training (Crawford, Gardiner,
& Mozzochi, 1994).
Concerning the group dynamics of militias, researchers identified two behaviors
that caused concerns. The first is the propensity of militias to engage in confrontations
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with local or federal authorities using their paramilitary training. The second type of
dangerous behavior is their collecting and/or manufacturing illegal weapons and
explosives, with the intent to use them against specific domestic targets. These activities
stem from the movement’s core ideology of using firearms to resist the government.
Driven by their desire to protect citizens, and feeling themselves to be victims of the
government, they justify their illegal and criminal actions (Abanes, 1996).
The media sensationalized militia confrontations with the government. Events
included mobilizations, in which individuals claiming to be victimized by the government
contact militia groups, as in the incident at Ruby Ridge. Typically, such confrontations
result from individuals refusing to vacate property that has been foreclosed or seized, or
from instances involving people who have warrants against them but refuse to give
themselves up. When a militia organization identifies a victim, members mobilize
support through communication channels such as ham radio or the Internet. A successful
mobilization results when members assemble at a designated location, often armed and
prepared for confrontation between the perceived victim and law enforcement agents,
hoping to force authorities to back down and submit to the will of the militias (Pitcavage,
2001).
Contemporary militia movements are the latest in a series of paramilitary
movements evolving from right-wing ideologies that emerged during the 20th century
(Bennett, 1995). The original Ku Klux Klan militia and their derivatives began in the
1920s. In the 1930s, the world experienced a sudden rise in fascism. Groups such as the
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Silver Shirt Legion and the Christian Front Units appeared and were organized into
paramilitary units. The threat they posed was considered real (Warren, 1996).
The start of the Cold War ushered in new waves of paramilitary groups, causing
the government and law enforcement to fear that some combination of Communist agents
and fifth-column subversives would take place. Counter-militia groups such as the
Minutemen and California Rangers saw it as their duty to arm themselves and defeat
domestic communist threats facing the United States. These types of militias routinely
formed sporadically during this period, driven by issues that addressed concerns ranging
from White Supremacy to surviving the next world war. The Cold War also spawned
militia groups, including the Christian Patriot Defense League, the Texas Emergency
Reserve, the Covenant, and the Sword. The importance of religion is significant in the
history of militias (Cobb, 1996).
As domestic militias seek to validate their purposes and causes, what is central to
the majority of the organizations is challenging the federal government as legitimate. One
of the more successful militias in the Northwest, the Posse, emerged in 1970 to advocate
that a truer form of government would be led by county sheriffs whose primary goal was
to mitigate intrusions by the feds. By challenging the authority of the federal government
and asserting that it was not a legitimate government, their ideology quickly gained
support from the far right and created the image of militias as true freedom fighters.
Militias interpreted each failure of the federal government as a crime against the
people, and treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement as limiting
individual opportunity and freedom. Also, the assaults on Ruby Ridge (ID), Waco (TX)
against the Branch Davidians, and gun control legislation such the Brady Handgun
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Protection Act (1993), provided the groups with pretexts for their criminal actions. Social
media and the Internet fueled their rise in the 1990s and gave individuals who would
otherwise have no access to militia groups a means to communicate with recruiters and
leaders. The militias used the federal assaults noted above to increase organizational
strength and succeeded in funneling the anger of some citizens into action (Eaton, 1995).
As authorities face the challenge of responding to militias who covet illegal
weapons and explosives, and engage in conspiracies to obtain and use them, the need to
understand domestic militias is required. Militias now seek support internationally,
conduct fundraising for weapons and explosives, and seek information about potential
targets. A legitimate threat is that a U.S.-based group could receive directives from
overseas.
The continued goal is to challenge the authority of the American government
(Intelligence Report Summaries, 1999). Despite the potential for danger in every militia
confrontation, many authorities are more concerned with the desire of many militia
members for illegal weapons, and their engaging in conspiracies to obtain or use them.
Such occasions bring the militia movement closest to fitting more traditional definitions
of terrorism (Larizza, 1996).
With many contemporary research studies on terrorism using 9/11 as a baseline
for tracking increases and decreases in activities, Forensten (2015) highlighted the fact
that Americans, and not foreigners, committed 80% of terrorist attacks in the United
States since 9/11. In the 15 years since the attacks, not one domestic terrorist attack was
committed by a foreign terrorist organization, including the most recent mass shooting in
Orlando Florida by Omar Mateen, who was an American citizen. In addition, militia
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groups who cultivated homegrown terrorists perpetrated 26 deadly domestic terrorist
attacks in the post-9/11 era (Forensten, 2015).
One of the key points argued in several research articles is that mainstream media
has been effective in depicting militia groups as a consortium of racists, anarchists, and
lunatics, all waiting for an opportunity to overthrow the U.S. government. New groups,
such as the Arkansas Defense Force, emerged and promote a compelling and reasonable
platform, and operate from the Bill of Rights, the writings of Thomas Jefferson, and
Greek and Romans legislators. They believe that every citizen should be a soldier. What
is often referenced is the famous Thomas Jefferson quote from a letter he wrote to
William S. Smith, a diplomatic official in London, on November 13, 1787, commenting
on Shays’ Rebellion, “the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time, with the
blood of patriots and tyrants… [and] the Constitution asserts that all power is inherent in
the people; requiring them to take action” (Jefferson, 1787).
To support these beliefs, militias are united in the belief that they should be armed
at all times, entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of property, and
freedom of press. Any government challenges to these freedoms demands an immediate
response, and violent (and illegal) actions are accepted as a means to an end (Pitcavage,
1997b; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2016).
Lone Wolf Case Study
Researchers who monitor lone wolf terrorists in contemporary society see a
continuous revision of their modus operandi. Uniformed police are now primary targets,
they note. Lone wolves enjoyed the easing of gun control laws from the 1990s, which
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likely increased the number of mass shootings that have used their preferred method of
firearms, high-velocity weapons (Reid Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).
Forensic psychologists sought to develop a standard profile of the lone wolf.
However, a profile has not yet been developed, but it is widely believed that most
domestic terrorists are unemployed, single, White males with criminal records. Also,
social and psychological characteristics indicate that they are similar to members of other
terrorist groups in that they are older, lack education, and are more susceptible to mental
illness. As lone wolves go through personal radicalization, leading up to their
involvement in terrorist activities, what is significant at the outset is their combination of
personal and political grievances.
Though the individual seeks solitude, what is unique is their desire to elicit
sympathy for their cause, subsequently validating their terrorist action. The Internet has
enabled this process. Given that an enabler now supports the lone wolf, intent is
developed. The final commonality is a triggering event that overcomes the final hurdle
for action. Once radicalization is complete, what occurs—and is likely unnoticed by the
lone wolves themselves—is the creation of their own terrorist signature.
Investigators are now becoming aware of the radicalization process of lone
wolves and what to search for regarding their enablers and the significant triggering
events that would likely lead to action. With this enhanced understanding of lone wolf
profiles, there is a need to understand their intentions. Despite being isolated from
society, they seek recognition through manifestos, e-mails messages, and videotaped
proclamations. In the case of lone wolf Ted Kaczynski (the ‘Unabomber’), his capture
was the result of his desire to be acknowledged when the media published his manifesto,
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which ultimately led to his capture. This desire to be acknowledged is a key weakness of
the lone wolf, but ultimately it is a benefit to law enforcement in understanding the frame
of mind of the lone wolf terrorist (Reid Meloy & Yakeley, 2014).
Lone wolf profiles support the concept of what the FBI termed violent true
believers (Meloy, Jr., 2011) and suggested that these individuals have, in most cases,
experienced developmental growth issues in their late adolescent stages. As young adults,
they present an immaturity due to a psychological issue originating from the pre-frontal
cortex. As a result of this pathology, there impulsivity, psychological grandiosity, selfidentification vulnerability, and biologically-based drives peak during this key growth
period and support self-imposed isolation, leading to a downward trajectory. This
trajectory has been established and follows a path of seeking to be enabled, finding a
triggering event, and committing the act itself.
Erikson (1950) argued that this process could be interpreted as a complex internal
negotiation related to whether the self is a terrorist or a soldier. As reality and fiction
compete within the mind of the lone wolf, those who are incapable of integrating into
society experience a deepening frustration that builds upon itself and the future terrorist
eventually takes action in defense of their own cause. This delusional interplay makes the
lone wolf particularly dangerous, as they are not beholden to group mandates, and
possess a freedom to engage in any activity that presents itself as an opportunity. Every
citizen is a potential target. The Internet has only enhanced the fantasy and made finding
enablers easier. Also, there is always the opportunity to view triggering events online that
may lead to lone wolf terrorist action (Alderdice, 2005; Alderdice, 2007; Bargh &
McKenna, 2009).
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When evaluating the mental status, professional success, and social status of lone
wolves, it is understood that some of these individuals have histories of unfulfilled
personal goals, leading to cases of extreme narcissism. In what has been identified as inbetweeners, they are caught between the confusion of late adolescence and the necessity
to move through identity integration and enter adulthood. They also embody an absence
of anticipated pride and joy, and lack the ability to meet their objectives and personal
destiny. Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich (2013) noted that this type of terrorist is
particularly vulnerable to adult role models who convey a belief in and requirement to
submit to authority. This point is relevant for law enforcement officers pursuing lone
wolves as they mature and draw upon previous experiences in which they may have felt
minimized and treated as less than others (Fonagy & Target, 1996).
A review of cases involving lone wolf terrorist activity between 1940 and 2000
highlighted 171 attacks resulting in 98 fatalities and 305 injuries. Statistics indicated that
60% of lone wolves committed a single attack and 40% committed multiple attacks.
Examples of serial terrorism include racist serial killer Joseph Paul Franklin, believed to
be responsible for an estimated 23 attacks over 4 years; Muharem Kurbegovic, the
“Alphabet Bomber,” who committed 10 attacks in 2 years; and Kaczynski, who
committed 16 bombings during 17 years.
A Department of Justice Report (2015), noted that between 2001 and 2013, 45
lone wolves committed 45 attacks, resulting in the deaths of 55 people and injuring 126.
These domestic attacks involved using bombs, airplanes, biological weapons,
construction equipment, and knives. The report highlights their heightened ability to
attack their targets, despite their lack of education and isolation. Using multiple attackers
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was noticeable before 9/11; afterward, the reality of the lone wolf rose to prominence.
This fear was supported by media sensationalism surrounding lone wolf mass murderers,
including Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 and injured 30 in the Fort Hood shooting (2009);
Jared Laughner, who killed six and wounded 13 in the Tucson shooting (2011); and
Wade Page, who killed six and wounded four in the shooting at the Sikh temple in Oak
Creek, Wisconsin (2012). By highlighting these examples, the data indicates a continued
rise in lone wolf terrorism, enabled by technology and particularly social media (Hamm
& Spaag, 2015).
As lone wolf terrorists focused their attention on uniformed police and military
officers, the results have been 12 law enforcement officers dead or wounded in the 60
years preceding 9/11. This figure doubled in the first 13 years after 9/11: the number of
government officials killed or wounded by lone wolves rose to 24. It was clear that this
form of domestic terrorism presented an immediate danger to the United States. Because
these attacks happened between 2009 and 2013 and coincide with Obama’s presidency, it
was clear that political dissent was a likely the main motivation behind the attacks.
Prior to the Obama administration, Black Power movements, the IsraeliPalestinian controversy, and abortion pro-life radicals, were key reasons why lone wolf
terrorists directed their anger towards law enforcement. In the post-9/11 era, researchers
confirmed that attacks on local, state, and federal law enforcement officers were
motivated by three factors: anti-government sentiment, White supremacy, and anger over
the election of the first African American President. As a result, lone wolf terrorist
emerged from their ranks and displayed their dissatisfaction by engaging in acts of
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domestic terror and the result has been a steady rise in these types of attacks (Sageman,
2008).
The lens through which society views the violent true believer, such as the lone
wolf, is often rooted in psychoanalytic theory, which emphasizes attachments, object
relations, mental structure (especially superego identifications), and internal defenses.
Empirical case studies also focused on social dynamics, including the significance of
social, religious, and political forces at work in terrorism. The lone wolf used his
isolation from mainstream society to validate his actions. They have come to the point
where violence toward organizations and others is considered the only way to receive
validation and praise.
While the motivation for extreme violent action varies, clinical and forensic
psychologists and psychiatrists believe that lone wolves likely have both conscious and
unconscious characteristics that support their action. The mental instability that this
produces in lone wolves who create their own reality, championing imaginary causes like
a contemporary Don Quixote, ultimately justifies the violence in their mind. Their lack of
connection to reality and mental instability make them inherently dangerous (Simi &
Futrell, 2010; Smith, 1994).
Political Extremist Case Study
Political extremists are overtly defined by their strong disapproval of an ideology,
and they are generally contrasted with moderates or centrists on the political spectrum. In
their research on the conditions supporting political extremism, Bartoli and Coleman
(2009) highlighted the importance of power differences within the context of extremism.
When conflict arises, low-power groups are routinely viewed as more extreme than other
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groups engaged in similar activities, but still fundamentally believe in and support our
system of government. In the political arena, marginalized groups and people who
believe that normal modes of conflict resolution are either biased or blocked and give
unfair outcomes, routinely utilize extremist acts. However, some argued that dominant
political groups also employ extreme measures. For example, many argued that Janet
Reno, who sanctioned the attack on the Branch Davidians, is a prime example of a
political extremist who caused the death of innocent civilians. This type of extremism
routinely uses violent means to ensure submission of marginalized groups. However,
political extremists can promote change through non-violent means. Therefore, the
spectrum of political extremism consists of many groups having a variety of
characteristics (Coleman & Bartoli, 2005).
Political platform and positions are routinely aligned when considering the
utilization of violent actions, where the level of violence, targets, differentiating between
military personnel, civilians, and children, defines the level of extremism. The evidence
of political power structures, and the use of extreme violence, is more consistent with
lower power groups routinely resorting to episodic attacks and forms of violence such as
suicide bombings. In contrast, dominant political extremist power groups rely on
structural, institutionalized violence such as covert uses of torture, or allowing the police
force to engage in brutality as a sanctioned code of conduct (Wilcox, 1987).
Political extremist groups and individuals are routinely demonized by society
through the media because their extremist ideologies are almost always associated with
violent behavior or violent rhetoric, which are precursors to violence. What is often
overlooked by the media and law enforcement is the rationale for the extremist behavior.
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As a result, all members that subscribe to an extremist political ideology are framed or
depicted as radicals who only advocate violence to further their political agenda when in
fact there are internal power struggles between individual members with regards to what
course of action will best advance their cause and not all of them include acts of violence.
The development of opposing internal factions in political extremist groups is not
anomalous. Ideological demagoguery is a quintessential trait that often emerges in
political extremist’s groups often with the purpose of unifying those members who
advocate a violence only mentality and expelling or converting those who are open to the
idea of employing non-violent strategies. The key for political extremist groups is to
present a united front because conflict or ambivalence can undermine the very foundation
of the group. The unity of political extremists and their willingness to use violence is its
greatest threat, and arguably its greatest asset in an effort to be heard and respected for
the purposes of government policy modification or actions. When assessing the core
problems facing extremist political factions in contemporary society as they seek
consensus, it is evident that the very consensus they seek undermines their ability to
evolve and grow out of a fixed, closed mindset. The inability for the political extremist to
move beyond extremist attitudes and approaches suggests an inability and
imperviousness to change, with the challenge being that by mainstreaming and moving
towards the middle, the political extremist loses their most valuable asset. In what is
clearly a catch-22, where political extremism requires participants of the group to take
action on certain political issues, what is a determining and defining factor is the level
and severity of the action (Wintrobe, 2006).
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Studies of political extremes in convergence with politics indicate that the former
draws heavily on political philosophy, with establishment of what constitutes the middle
or political center, and addressing how these variables shift together over time, and create
cultural contexts. The development of extremist politics, leading to terrorism, highlights
the ongoing need to study and analyze individual and group behaviors, attributes,
strategies, preoccupations, and internal/external supporters. In considering the different
Presidents, approaches, and the creation of political sub-groups, which morphed into
extremism, what is compelling is how liberal democracies such as the United States
responded to these extremist politics and actions. This does not preclude the government,
or the need to examine the role of the media and electorate in comprehending and
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of democracies and extremists. As past
research uncovered, the study of extremism reveals and supports assumptions concerning
mainstream politics and ethics, highlighting their potential vulnerability to causes related
to extreme dissent (Eatwell, 2006; Fleming, 2014).
Social media promoted the idea of political extremists being on the lunatic fringe,
where simply being labeled a political extremist suggests that the actions of any opponent
offered either directly or implicitly will be rejected out of hand, and is routinely promoted
through the use of censorship, segregation, and persecution. With past research failing to
conduct evaluations through assessments into violent political extremism, it was believed
that an integrated theoretical framework that offers an explanation for an individual’s
involvement in politically motivated violence, was lacking, resulting in research that
offered a poor understanding of causal mechanisms. Examples of political extremist
groups include the following: Black September; Aryan Nation; Mexican Mafia; Bloods
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and Crips Gang; WACO/Branch Davidian Compound; Black Guerilla Family; Original
Knights of the KKK; Weather Underground (Weathermen); American Nazi Party; and
the Aryan Brotherhood. The challenge for society has been understanding and
acknowledging these extremist group’s political positions, as doing so in some instances
requires openly embracing racism and committing political suicide. As religion, ethnicity,
and political ideology, these groups have been attributed with sustained, political
domestic terrorist activities and attacks. The course of action, offered by Eatwell (2006),
is to continue examining the relationships between perceived injustice and poor social
integration, and political/religious violence, which is further mediated by perceived
alienation. By drawing groups together, extremes can be avoided, perceived political
procedural injustices can be resolved, ethnic discord can be minimized, and religious
authoritarianism that supports continuous political discourse, in an effort to avoid
marginalization and the escalation towards violence, can be resolved (Schils & Pauwels,
2016).
A unique argument for the existence of political extremists and their use of terror
is that it continues to challenge the power of the government and avoid what conspiracy
theorists argue is a continued evolution towards a New World Order. With governments
routinely succumbing to tyranny, corruption, strife, and supporting the status quo, some
argue that extremism offers a check to that possibility, with organizations seeking to
generalize the entire population under one form of government. For example, the United
Nations is seen as such an organization as it has already marginalized and has control
over many third world countries. While many nations succumbed, the United States
remains out of the grasp of the United Nations, with conspiracy theorist and political
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extremist George Eaton’s Patriot Report continuing to chronicle the descent of the last
great Western power. Despite being anti-Semitic, and calling for an internal revolution by
White patriots, his writings and literature express more fear toward the dissolution of a
free government and press, challenging independent Christian patriots to fight. This
example highlights the fact that the United States will likely continue to face some form
of political extremism that relies on domestic terrorism, where the members, driven by
fear and the right leader, will succumb and commit violent acts in support of their
political group’s greater good (Eaton, 1993).
Eco-Terrorism Case Study
The behavioral characteristics of eco-terrorists are seen in those willing to engage
in acts of violence to support of environmental or ecological causes that could result in
destroying or damaging property and harming others. Other aspects within the ecoterrorist profile highlight the fact that radical environmentalism is also characterized by
the belief that human society is ultimately responsible for degrading and depleting the
environment. With society failing to act and leaving the destruction unchecked, the result
could be the catastrophic end of the United States and the world’s ecosystems (Leader &
Probst, 2003).
In the FBI’s National Crime Information Center Report (2014), eco-terrorism was
defined as “the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against people or
property, by an environmentally oriented sub-national group, for environmental-political
reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature” (NCIC,
2014, p. 1). Between 2003 and 2008, domestic eco-terrorists were credited with over
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$200 million in property damage, prompting many states to strengthen their laws and set
stronger deterrents on place against these types of crimes (NCIC, 2014).
Disaffected environmentalists, in 1980, formed a radical group called Earth First
and engaged in a series of protests and civil disobedience events (Jarboe, 2002). In 1992,
the ELF was founded in Brighton, England, by radical Earth First members who began to
view protests and acts of civil disobedience a waste of time and ultimately ineffective
(Jarboe, 2002).
Despite the interconnections between philosophies that support eco-terrorism, this
research identified that these organizations support a diverse set of goals and
philosophies. Examples of radical ecology/eco-terrorist organizations include:
Greenpeace, Animal Liberation Front (ALF), People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA), the Earth Liberation Front ELF), the Sea Shepherd Conservation
Society, People for the Earth First, the Hardesty Avengers, and the Coalition to Save the
Preserves. Each has been labeled an eco-terrorist group and been formally charged with
acts of domestic terrorism by the FBI. The diversity of these groups is evident; some
focus on the protection of animals, others the environment, and others seek to find a
compromise between people and the environment and use of extremist or terrorist tactics
to advance their message. Their consciousness and belief in the righteousness of their
cause and organizational mandate makes these organizations a real domestic terrorist
threat. In many instances, the end justifies the means, even if human casualties are
collateral damage (Lepper, 2005).
Radical environmentalists can be recognized by their diagnoses and prescriptions
regarding the impending environmental crisis (Taylor, n.d.). Their diagnoses generally
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involve a critique of the dominant streams of occidental religion and philosophy, which
are said to desacralize nature and promote oppressive attitudes toward it and people
(Taylor, n.d.). Prescriptions generally include overturning anthropocentric and
hierarchical attitudes (Taylor, n.d.).
After reviewing the research, what is essential for the continued success of ecoterrorism and continuing to add new recruits to their cause, is its ability to validate
participant actions. Many eco-terrorist organizations subscribe to the idea of biocentrism,
which is the belief that all human beings are ordinary members of the biological
community and by extension, all living things should be assigned basic rights and
afforded protection under humanitarian laws. Some of the more radical agendas of ecoterrorists include concepts from deep ecology, such as the goal to return the United States
environment to its original, pristine state by ending the effects of industrialization (Eagan,
1996).
Since 1977, when disaffected members of the ecological preservation group
Greenpeace formed the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and attacked commercial
fishing operations by cutting drift nets, acts of eco-terrorism occurred around the globe
(Jarboe, 2002). In recent years, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) became one of the
most active extremist elements in the United States (Jarboe, 2002). The ALF was
classified by the FBI as a terrorist group, whose purpose is to bring about social and
political change through the use intimidation, extremist tactics, and terrorist activities.
ALF eco-terrorists engaged in a steadily growing campaign of illegal activity against fur
companies, mink farms, restaurants, and animal research laboratories (Jarboe, 2002).
According to Fur Commission and the National Association for Biomedical Research

174
(NABR), from 1992-2002, ALF was responsible for approximately $45 million dollars in
damages (Jarboe, 2002).
On March 18, 2002, Pennsylvania State Police discovered heavy equipment used
to clear trees at a construction site in Erie, Pennsylvania, spray painted with the
statements “ELF, in the protection of mother earth,” and “Stop Deforestation” (FBI
Terrorism Report, 2002-2005). On March 24, 2002, police responded to the same
construction site, where a large hydraulic crane had been set on fire, causing
approximately $500,000 in damage (FBI, 2002-2005). It was later reported that ELF sent
a facsimile to authorities’ claiming responsibility for the arson and vandalism (FBI, 20022005). ELF also claimed responsibility for an August 11, 2002 arson on the U.S. Forestry
Scientific Laboratory in Warren, Pennsylvania (FBI, 2002-2005).
In late 2005 and early 2006, the FBI dismantled a network that, according to DOJ,
committed violent acts in the name of both the ALF and the ELF (Bjelopera, 2013). They
called themselves “The Family” and it was reported that they were directly responsible
for at least 25 criminal incidents totaling approximately $48 million in damages
beginning in the late 1990s through early 2000s (Bjelopera, 2013). In 1998, The Family
was responsible for an arson attack at the Colorado Vail Ski Resort that destroyed radio
towers, ski lift towers, restaurants, and the ski patrol office, which resulted in excess of
$24 million in losses (FBI, 2008).
The threat of ecological terrorism has become a major concern of environmental
discourse during the past three decades and ominously shifted focus in the process (Buell,
2009). This neologism has been brandished as a negative epithet from the conservative
right, who are collectively pro-industrialist and have strategically used as lighting”
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rhetoric to stigmatize all environmentalists and animal rights activists as eco-terrorist.
(Buell, 2009). Those on the left often seek and imbalanced compromise which often
creates a callous unilateral negotiation framework designed to allow business leadership
to set the terms of their environmental friendliness and compliance instead of being
relegated to a democratic scrutiny that holds them accountable for animal abuse, dumping
illegal waste, deforestation, oil spills, safety violations, and carbon emissions.
When eco-activist challenge this type of corporate self-aggrandizement, their dissent is
then classified by those on the left as being unreasonable and protest is regarded as
intimidation. Liberal democrats Martin Lewis (1992) and Luc Ferry (1995), posited this
analysis regarding eco-terrorists:
…these movements are atavistic, primitivist, and Luddite; offer no realistic way
to live in the modern world; and are anti-democratic, refusing to abide by
decisions arrived at through democratic processes. Others argue that these
movements are counterproductive to building sustainable societies because they
do not value and support science, which is a critical foundation for environment
related public policies, but is already assailed by religious conservatives and
hardly needs its credibility further eroded in the public mind by radical greens.
When offensive and demeaning statements like this are made, the eco-terrorism
discourse evolves as a predominantly rhetorical weapon not only against radicals but
sometimes even mainstream reformist initiatives (Buell, 2009). In response, radical
extremists, in their resentment of being classified as atavistic ideological bullies or
radical terrorists, begin ratcheting up the level violence and extremism deemed
appropriate to advance their cause. (Amster, 2006; Burns, 2001; McGregor, 2010).
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Anti-Abortion Case Study
Pro-life and Pro-choice ideologues continue to vigorously debate the issue,
whether or not life begins at conception. The Roe v. Wade decision allowed women the
choice of having an abortion. Since this decision, pro-life advocates have insisted that
elected officials balance a woman’s right to choose against the state’s legitimate interests
in regulating abortions, to include protecting a women’s health as well as the unborn
baby. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, using the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, set the stage for battles between the U.S. government and anti-abortion
groups. Now that abortions were sanctioned, anti-abortion violence and terrorist activities
began to be part of the social landscape. Violent and non-violent crimes used in the years
since the decision included kidnapping, assault, stalking, attempted murder, murder,
arson, the threat of bombs, and actual use of bombs on abortion facilities. Jacobson and
Royer (2011) and Nice (1988) explored the aftermath of Roe v. Wade by examining the
impact of violence on clinics and its effects on abortion services. They noted that there
are more documented incidents of anti-abortion terror in the U.S. than Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand combined. Their research highlighted anti-abortion violence, a singleissue form of terrorism, and found that anti-abortion violence in was considered to be a
form of sub-revolutionary terrorism.
The DOJ (1988) identified anti-abortion extremists as a current domestic terror
threat. This decision was precipitated by the murder of Dr. Barnett Slepian, who had
created the National Task Force on Violence against Health Care Providers, which
resulted in prosecuting a number of anti-abortion attacks. The killing of a high-profile
figure brought attention to the issue; the media attention the anti-abortion forces were
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after was achieved. This attention also assisted in apprehending James Kopp, a major
anti-abortion extremist who was ultimately convicted of Slepian’s death.
The FBI, now aware of the emerging threat of anti-abortion terrorism, began to
develop inter-agency task forces to aggressively pursue relevant groups, with the goal of
ending the violence against abortion providers. The challenge for the judicial system and
law enforcement remains significant: the media, in some instances, portrayed Kopp as a
crusader who led people who agreed that this was a just cause and felt the need to
become involved join anti-abortion groups. As a result, many of the attacks against
abortion providers in the United States are conducted by individuals who accept the
correctness of the cause. In some cases, new participants were not affiliated with a
particular organization. However, over time and through indoctrination, the idea—
indeed, the necessity of—engaging in overt criminal acts became a reality. Extremists felt
justified planting a bomb in an abortion clinic or killing an abortion provider (Abadie &
Gardeazabal, 2003; Wilson & Lynxwiler, 1988).
Synthesizing research conducted between 1973 and 2003, U.S. abortion providers
were the targets of over 300 acts of extreme violence. Statistical analyses of attacks on
abortions providers were subjected to meta-analysis in an effort to understand antiabortion violence and its effect on providers’ decisions to offer abortions. Considerations
included women’s decisions end their pregnancy and their location (Jones & Kooistra,
2011; Nice, 1988). The effects of anti-abortion extremism and their activities were
highlighted in 1993, a year that saw heightened anti-abortion activities. At that time, 50%
of U.S. clinics reported being targets of violence and harassment (Feminist Majority,
2006).
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The threat of violence extended from providers and support staffs to patients. To
stem the escalating tide of anti-abortion domestic terrorism, Clinton signed the Freedom
of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) in 1994. The Act created federal statutes
covering cases where individuals were prevented access to abortion facilities. Women
entering health care facilities had to negotiate picket lines, protestors, threats, and insults.
The legislation gave women the right to receive an abortion with free and unencumbered
access to the facilities. The picketers, often considered domestic terrorists, now had to
operate within the law and allow patients the necessary space to enter facilities. The
judiciary could now prosecute offenders who violated FACE (Cozzarelli & Major, 1994;
Doan, 2007).
While anti-abortion extremists were ultimately unsuccessful in obstructing the
market for abortion services, it is clear that this type of activity does impose a cost.
Because anti-abortion forces effectively reduced demand for abortion services and
instilled fear in some women, it could be argued that the movement has experienced
some level of success. Recent studies indicated that despite the prevalence of antiabortion extremism, what remains notable are the effects on the decisions of pregnant
women and abortion providers. Henshaw and Finer (2003) concluded that one of the
primary reasons for recent declines in abortion providers is clinic violence, particularly
the murder of abortionists. However, this claim however lacks validity. While FACE
reduced anti-abortion violence for a decade, this lull in extreme violence does not mean
the threat to providers has disappeared. Studies done after 2000 show that increased antiabortion acts perpetuated the cloud of violence surrounding this issue (Bitler & Zavodny,
2001; Jones & Kooistra, 2011).
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The predominant anti-abortion terrorist groups in the United States include
Americans United for Life, Anglican Priests for Life/Order of Holy Innocents, Anglicans
for Life, Anti-Choice Project, and the largest and most significant organization, the AOG
(described in Chapter 2). These organizations and their leadership work, often
underground, on planning activities while maintaining a more peaceful public image that
seeks new members and funding, as well as continues to challenge the legality of
abortion, the DOJ, and the DHS. The AOG, charged with numerous acts of violence
including kidnapping and murder, is unique in that they rarely communicate and
essentially operate as independent cells. The violent factions of the organizations cannot
be found at rallies and marches; instead, they are buried deep within the organization and
require sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems to bring them to justice (Blank,
Christine, & London, 1996).
The AOG, whose mandate explicitly advocates violence as a means to end
abortion, is a prime example of extremism. Other anti-abortion groups seek to promote
their message while avoiding direct confrontation, if possible. The AOG, which first
came to public attention in 1982, is a prime example of an informal domestic network of
anti-abortion extremists. While many anti-abortion groups publish and distribute
literature, the AOG is unique in that it produces a manual, offering direction on how
individuals should engage in abortion clinic violence. The content is chilling, providing
detailed methods for carrying out butyric acid attacks, bomb making, committing arson,
and other tactics (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004).
Anti-abortion extremists, labeled terrorists by the federal government, gained
traction after Roe v. Wade, has grown from individuals acting alone, to nationwide
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networks such as the AOG. The frequency of anti-abortion attacks has grown apace; there
has been a considerable increase in such activity. Violence fluctuated, but peaked in
1984, 1992, and 1998. Recent data that reflects the success of the Obama administration
in responding to anti-abortion attacks indicates that this type of domestic violence may be
increasing, as noted in a NAF report (2009). It suggested that anti-abortion activity was at
its highest level in the past decade. The need for due diligence and sophisticated
intelligence gathering is needed to support current laws and mitigate the damage inflicted
on those legally seeking an abortion, as well as those providing the means and facilities.
It also points to the need for successful deterrence to end violence by extremist antiabortion groups (Eisinger, 2004).
Left-Wing Extremism Case Study
As a militant form of Marxist-Leninist ideology came to the United States and
was blended with ideologies expounded by groups such as the Weather Underground, the
Black Panthers, and various student groups that emerged on university campuses in the
1970s such as the Students for a Democratic Society, left-wing extremism developed a
strong ideological and political base. This base was founded on the use of terrorism, with
examples such as the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), discussed in Chapter 2.
Media coverage of the SLA and their apparent persuading of Patty Hearst to their
political agenda (she appeared to be actively involved in one of the bank robberies), led
to increased public awareness of this brand of extremism. The formation of M19CO and
various smaller organizations such as the United Freedom Front followed (Jamieson,
1990).
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Research conducted by Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2009) showed that
left-wing terrorism in the United States was ideologically motivated. The central
argument that motivates them to action is that the revolutionary goal is non-negotiable.
As a result, the rigidity of their demands may explain their lack of support and success
compared to nationalist groups such as paramilitary and right-wing extremist
organizations (Arena & Arrigo, 2006).
Left-wing movements are routinely fueled by injustices related to socioeconomic
conditions, and it is not surprising that communism pervades these organizations political
agendas, including their use of terror. Many American left-wing terror groups follow the
examples of successful groups such as ETA (in the Basque region of Spain), the
Provisional Irish Republican Army, and the Irish National Liberation Army (both in
Northern Ireland). The use of violence was incorporated into communist and socialist
ideologies and is reflected in their policies. Many of these policies came from Marxist
revolutionaries, such as Che Guevara, who supported using violence and terror to achieve
equity for entire marginalized groups during the 1970s (Jamieson, 1990).
Despite the early success of left-wing terrorism both abroad and in the United
States during the 1970s, its success as a political ideology led to its marginalization.
Criminal acts associated with these organizations dropped considerably in the 1980s and
1990s. However, with the re-emergence of the New Black Panthers in the early 2000s,
this form of political protest and unrest in the United States again created incidents of
domestic terrorism. While many researchers considered the left-wing movement as
having reached its zenith decades ago, its re-emergence in new forms and new
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organizations suggested a need for law enforcement to study and track them, hoping to
avoid a repeat of their earlier successes (Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
Conclusion
By examining the political dimensions of the various domestic terror groups,
focusing on militias, lone wolves, political extremists, anti-abortionists, and left-wingers,
commonalities were determined, allowing for behavioral characteristics to emerge, thus
supporting the creation of typologies and the development of profiles. Drawing from key
historical documents in plotting the trajectories of the various political factions, the
detailed nature of this case study allows for critical and statistical analysis, utilizing
clustering and bivariate methodologies to search out convergences and divergences. In
Chapter 6, demographic, social, and behavioral characteristics will be identified,
enhancing the outcomes of the case study. The presentation of the findings will assist in
the development of the predictive behavioral models, aimed at assisting law enforcement
in preventing future domestic terrorist activities and incidents.
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Chapter 6: Findings
The findings based on this case study identified key variables in assessing the
following six groups: militias, political extremists, eco-terrorists, anti-abortionist, and
left-wing terrorists. The correlation between these typologies would support risk
assessment through by developing models that focused on demographic, social, and
behavioral characteristics. These characteristics were utilized in bivariate and cluster
analyses designed to assist law enforcement in both understanding and pursuing these
groups. The goal was to create a probabilistic terrorism model which drew from historical
patterns and used intelligence analysis, descriptions of terrorist plans, behavioral patterns,
attack coordination, funding, and planning, to prevent attacks in the future (Samuels,
2006).
Bivariate Correlations
Bivariate correlation is a measure of the relationship between two variables. This
measure seeks to evaluate the strength of the relationship between the variables within
the absolute values ranging from 1 to 0. A stronger relationship validates the correlation.
Assessing the variables listed in the graphs and assigned pre-determined numbers, a
positive relationship in the escalation of terrorism beginning with Carter and concluding
with Obama was confirmed. The process of assigning values was drawn from the
literature. The case study design highlighted the key variables. As law enforcement
agents may need to conduct these correlations in the future, it is suggested that a primary
and secondary review of the assignment of values to the variables being studied be
conducted in relation to domestic terror, with a goal of maximizing the validity and
success of the outputs, which will then support the development of predictive behavioral
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models. Currently, while there are some profiling and predictive behavioral models for
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, there is also a lack of consistency
regarding their use. Adding bivariate correlation may enhance the success of such models
(Samuels, 2006).
Bivariate Correlations Significant Findings
The bivariate analysis gave outcomes of over .80 regarding the demographic
variables. Many of the domestic terror groups operate nationally, and cultivate overt and
covert faces for their organizations. While many of these groups are in rural areas,
technology has allowed universal access and led to new recruits. The case study allowed
for subjective assignment of numbers, with oversight. The outcomes of the bivariate
analysis supported valid and reliable forecast for a continued increase in domestic
attacks. Social, demographic, and behavioral bivariate analysis of the variables all
produced scores over .50. This implies that domestic terrorism has become part of the
fabric of society, and that law enforcement needs to remain vigilant. By examining these
basic research variables, connections to the case studies will not only assist in promoting
the creation of behavioral response models but also educate law enforcement officials and
politicians on key motivating factors identify the most significant factors (Yin, 2009).
The strength of the bivariate correlations has been evaluated in this study by
SPSS. By using bivariate correlation tests such as the one from this study, the relationship
between two variables is reviewed as linear. If one variable increases, the other may also
increases; if one variable increases, the other variable decreases. The uniformity of
outputs produced using SPSS analysis confirmed the escalation of domestic terrorist
incidents, driven by the identified variables (Field, 2006).
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When two dependent variables in correlation with the independent variables listed
in Tables 1-3 were examined, the strength of their connections was confirmed by
highlighting the traits and characteristics that can be used by law enforcement in
understanding terrorists while developing counter-measures based on their social,
behavioral, and demographic traits. The most significant connections were behavioral
traits identified through case analysis. They reflected a strong bivariate correlation (.85)
to the dependent variable, consistent with the number of attacks. In addition, social
media, having opened avenues to new ways to communicate and exchange plans and
ideas, draws a moderate correlation where covert actions need a level of secrecy. As a
result, a reduction in the correlations to social engagements and interactions among the
various groups was observed.
Case Details and Demographic Characteristics
A review of the demographic characteristics of the populations in this study
focused on key variables that could be used in the bivariate and clustering process to
assist law enforcement in developing a demographic profile. The demographic variables
included income, educational attainment, employment status, and location. The
distributions of values within a demographic variable correlated to trends over time. This
study was concerned with the escalation of terrorist activities by reviewing and assessing
demographic characteristics. The following tables detail the six primary categories
evaluating the key variables used to develop the domestic terrorist profiling model. The
variables emerged as significant in the literature, validating their significance for this
research (Schuman & Scott, 1989).
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Researchers and scholars used demographic trends to explain various social
phenomena, including election outcomes, stock market results, and land acquisitions.
Their usefulness is validated. Methodologists and researchers note that bivariate analysis
is not final, but instead, a helpful means that routinely explained two-thirds of the
variance of a social phenomenon. In this study, the researcher added cluster analysis to
support the bivariate assessments (Foote, 1996; Klauke, 2000).
Table 1
The Nature of Extremism
Extremist Group
Militias
Political Extremists
Eco-terrorists
Anti-abortionists
Left-wing extremists
Right-wing extremists

Social Variables
Poor
Politics
Environmental
Nationwide Movement
Politics
Politics

Key Demographics
Uneducated
Older (25-40)
Younger
Binding Theology Principles
Uneducated
Educated

Case Details and Social Characteristics
The identification of social characteristics for this study, promoted the analysis of
attitudes, orientations, and/or behaviors which take the interests and intentions of these
groups into account. The behavioral models were constructed to retain consistency and
reliability, and relied on concepts that included social constructivism, social psychology,
social anarchism, and capitalism, where the identified variables created a sense of
practicality and realism. While the identification of social variables is routinely used in
politics, where its meaning often depends on the context of the group or organization
using it (for example, left-wing and right-wing characteristics), emphasis was placed on
identifying general social attributes and variables. Table 2 includes the key variables used
for bivariate and clustering analysis (Dolwick, 2009; Latour, 2005).
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Table 2
Extremist Organizations
Extremist Group
Militias
Political Extremists
Eco-terrorists
Anti-abortionists
Left-wing extremists
Right-wing extremists

Political Position
Anti-government
Anti-government
Group Actions
Aggressive
Radical
Radical

Political Principles
Pro-1st Amendment
Violent Change
Civil Disobedience
Binding Religious Principles
Promote Group Consensus
Continually Challenge the
Government

Case Details and Behavioral Characteristics
One of the primary purposes of Victoroff ‘s (2005) study was to understand and
profile terrorists by focusing their on actions or reactions in response to external or
internal stimuli. By identifying key behavioral traits that emerged in this case study
review of domestic terrorists, law enforcement could better understand these behaviors
and underlying motivations, a valuable resource can be developed in the fight against
extremist groups. During this study, the researcher conducted bivariate and clustering
assessments of behavioral traits. The focus was activities that could be observed,
measured, and recorded that would consequently allow for learning essential social
components, which are shown in Table 3. In preparing for the analysis, which drew on
two behavioral points of view and considered overt and covert social behaviors. Langbine
(2010) reiterated Lewin’s formula B = ∫ (P x E), where B = Behavior, ∫ = Function, P =
Person, E = Environment. This heuristic supported the validity of the variables identified
in Table 3. The inclusion of this in-depth analysis, despite producing generalized
variables within the report, supported a case analysis, which included assessing behaviors
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that are increasingly recognized by researchers as a critical means of describing internal
driving forces supported by counter-terrorism responses (Langbine, 2010).
Table 3
Extremist Group Characteristics
Extremist Group
Militias
Political Extremists
Eco-terrorists
Anti-abortionists
Left-wing extremists
Right-wing extremists

Extremist Nature
Group Dynamic
Overt
Overt/Covert
Pro-Life
Aggressive
Radical

Political Position
Promote Sovereignty
Challenge Political Structures
Prefer Non-Violence
Overt Use of Violence
Utopian/Equality
Isolationists

Results of Cluster Analysis
The cluster analysis showed there has been an acceleration in the number of
domestic terrorist acts, with concurrent results highlighting increased severity of the
attacks. The analysis, beginning with Carter’s term through Obama’s, highlighted that
with increasing legislation and policies, the outcome nonetheless supported an increase in
domestic attacks. This technique relies on the use of exploratory data mining that is itself
a commonly used for statistical data analysis. The correlation with the bivariate analysis
supported confident and reliable outcomes and assessments.
This study focused on developing a predictive behavioral model for assisting law
enforcement authorities; the clustering analysis assisted pattern recognition, image
analysis, information retrieval, and data compression. As a result, the ability to separate,
differentiate, and then validate the variables in this study (driven by a temporal
oversight), became a reality for having a domestic terrorist response model (Creswell,
2011; Yin, 2009; 2012).
The researcher used a clustering method called Density-Based Spatial Clustering
of Applications with Noise. This method is an advancement in this type of analysis
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technique, and uses well-defined cluster models that are referenced as densityreachability (Rahmah, 2016). The approach is similar to linkage-based clustering, where
the clustering is based on connecting points within certain distance thresholds and only
connecting those that satisfy a density criterion that is identified by the original variant
(defined as a minimum number of other objects within the radius). Defining presidential
terms and the number of incidents allowed an accurate assessment. Using this clustering
methodology confirms the escalation of domestic terrorist attacks. It is anticipated that
the ongoing development of predictive behavioral models will continue to employ
clustering techniques to highlight and confirm domestic terror patterns (Willis,
LaTourrette, Kelly, Hickey, & Neill, 2007).
Conclusion
The convergence of outcomes produced by the individual case studies of the
various organizations, and the identification and emergence of the key variables within
each of the groups, allowed for bivariate analysis coinciding with the clustering analysis
and provided some key insights into the historical evolution of the domestic terrorist
organizations. In confirming the central research question, which supports an escalation
of domestic terrorism, moving forward from the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the outputs
also provide a key understanding of primary social, behavioral, and demographic
characteristics. Chapter 7 includes a review of the study’s findings, with the continued
discussion focusing on how elected leaders are promoting the problems associated with
domestic terrorism, and how a lack of policy and enforcement has aided in the expansion
of this social problem.
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Analysis
This chapter includes analysis of a series of typologies of domestic terrorists,
explores issues related to the increase of incidents, and considers the impact of a number
of administrations and their policies (or their absence) impacted attacks. By correlating
relevant definitions, literature, and statistical analyses, an enhanced understanding of this
significant social issue emerges.
A Typology of Domestic Terrorism
The diversity of domestic terrorist groups operating in the United States has been
extensively explored in case studies. When examining the goals of militias, lone-wolves,
sovereigns, anti-abortion groups, eco-terrorists, and left- and right-wing political
extremists, the factor that makes each of them a significant social phenomenon is that
they used (and in some cases, continue to use) violence as a means to advance a radical
agenda. If researchers and criminologists explore domestic terrorism as a monolithic
entity, important aspects of their evolution and continued growth may be missed. These
oversights contributed to the escalation of criminal violence displayed by these various
groups (Boxall et al., 2015).
The various typologies defining domestic terrorism can be divided into four
categories: ethnic, ideological, political, and religious. In the case of ethnic extremists
such as the KKK, their racial purity ideology is a central consideration. The Army of God
has a religious stance against abortion. Green Peace operates from an ideological
platform that seeks to save the earth from humanity. The Black Panthers promoted their
political struggle to achieve equality in the United States. Many right- and left-wing
groups sought to expand before the end of the Cold War by confronting the American
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power structure and attempting to change it to their vision for the country. Leftist
ideologues demanded the government correct social injustices and abuses of power, and
right-wing groups sought to curb what they saw as intruding into their lives.
In this study, the researcher highlighted variables that define particular groups.
What emerged is that they all use radical and extreme approaches to solving their
concerns. Whatever social, demographic, or ethnic differences distinguish them from one
another, the overall unifying factor is their acceptance of violence to achieve their goals.
This makes each typology a danger to the nation (Huntington, 1993).
Counterterrorism Strategies In The 21st Century
According to the infamous Chinese general, military strategist, philosopher, and
writer, you must always have a strategy when confronting or being confronted by an
enemy. In his legendary military treatise, Art of War (1963), Sun Tzu writes:
If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior
strength, evade him. If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him.
Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him
no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. If sovereign and subject are in
accord, put division between them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear
where you are not expected (p. 80).
In 2002, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, released
by the Bush Administration, made a statement that was not only timely, but prophetic:
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose
avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-
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called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is
statelessness. (p. 15).
Since 9/11, domestic counterterrorism expenditures have increased significantly.
According to a study conducted by researchers John Mueller and Mark Stewart (2014):
Domestic counterterrorism expenditures per year were about $25 billion in
2010 dollars before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These increased
by about $75 billion in the subsequent decade or so. Spending on homeland
security by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the
Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the
Department of Energy, and 26 other such federal agencies was $50 billion more in
2010 dollars than in 2001, adjusting for inflation. …..Overall intelligence
operations were $80 billion in 2010. A core function is “protecting against the
threat of international terrorism in the United States,” and we conservatively
estimate increased intelligence expenditures since 9/11 devoted to domestic
homeland security to be $15 billion in 2010 (p. 238)
A key way to fight the threat of homegrown terrorists is to develop an
understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent radicalization
from morphing into terrorist plotting (Bjelopera, 2014). Counterterrorism investigators
must strategically develop a lesson plan on how to learn everything there is to know
about about the targeted person or group. Ultimately, an effective counterterrorism
investigator must learn to think like a terrorist (Silke, 2003). More specifically, you must
think like the terrorist in the subgroup you are investigating. Although psychopathological profiles are helpful, they should not be referred to as the primary instrument
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for drafting a counterterrorism plan. When developing a comprehensive counterterrorism
strategy, the goal is to create a plan that demands a clear understanding of the
motivations and causes of terrorism. Terrorists, even those with the same ethnic or
religious background, should not be considered a homogeneous group considering their
motivations and beliefs are oftentimes very different.
Once the investigator develops the ability to think like a terrorist, he or she can
now begin prepare a plan to assess the degree of the threat and develop proactive security
measures to manage the threat (Silke, 2003). Counterterrorism operations are extremely
expensive, particularly those that specific members in a group or an individual terrorist.
According to Mueller and Stewart (2011), the United States spent roughly $1 trillion
dollars in the pursuit and capture of Osama bin Laden from 2001 through 2011.
Government resources are finite. That being the case, counterterrorism operations must
be well planned and very strategic. This quantification allows intelligence teams to
answer some very crucial questions before embarking on a counterterrorism mission. For
example, Are they an immediate threat? How many key members or leaders have been
captured or killed? If key members or leaders of this group are captured or killed, what
members or other groups are likely to retaliate against the U.S. and their allies?
Campbell (2005) argued that the challenge of overcoming terrorism is the ability
out-think and out-maneuver the terrorists. His strategies include:
(1) the ability to formulate complex relational models, (2) an awareness
and recognition of the critical level variables, (3) an understanding of their
influence and interrelation, (4) a determination of the controllable and
non-controllable aspects of each variable, (5) the implicational value of
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such factors as applied to potential terrorist scenarios, and (6) an
assessment of the potential consequences of shifts in each variable’s
valuation to the overall model. (p.2)
Almost all significant terrorist attacks are motivated by an agenda for political or
policy change. To affect this change, extremist are willing to engage devastating terrorist
acts. Furthermore, when developing a counterterrorism strategy, the IQ and the financial
resources of the perpetrator must be considered. Osama bin Laden vilified and framed in
public as the epitome of evil, a terrorists, and a homicidal psychopaths. The danger is this
labeling is that it is assumed that the terrorist is dull-witted and angry. This is a
misnomer. Terrorists, especially those who are well organized, could never sustain
success in combating the FBI, CIA, NSA, and military intelligence if they did not possess
a high degree of rationality and intelligence (Woo, 2004).
Terrorist Network Deconstruction Model
The FBI has enjoyed much success post 9/11 I thwarting terrorists plots. Although
they have proven strategies to combat and prevent terrorist acts, their approach towards
domestic terrorism will have to be modified in order to adjust to a political climate that has
become increasingly anti-FBI. Since its inception, the agency has always endured some
form of criticism. However, in 2016, the public vitriol towards the top law enforcement
agency by elected officials was unprecedented. Both Republican and Democrat leaders
sharply criticized the investigative efforts of the FBI and even accused the agency of being
partisan. More concerning is the willingness of elected officials to openly support extremist
behavior and ideology, knowing, it is an affront to civility and the behavior is criminal.
Moving forward, the FBI will have to come up with new clandestine and creative
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approaches when investigating radicalized persons or groups that politicians openly
support. Elected officials that openly criticize the FBI and the intelligence community in
favor of extremist behavior, will embolden these dissident groups to engage in terroristic
behavior with impunity, while creating a culture of timidity in the ranks of counterterrorism
authorities. When this happens, we become less safe as a nation.
When constructing a counterterrorism strategy, the focus of the policy should be
one of deterrence and mitigation because realistically, the U.S. government does not have
unlimited resources which is what it take in order eliminate acts of terrorism. Moreover,
domestic terrorism has existed in America for more than one-hundred years and despite
the best efforts of every U.S. president within that time, none of them have been
successful in eradicating terrorism.
These components and recommendations below are not new concepts, but some
of them have different approaches which should at least be considered when drafting a
comprehensive or tailor-made counterterrorism strategy.
Intelligence Gathering/Analysis
Over the years, law enforcement officials have discovered that terrorist are
extremely disciplined. This can be attributable to their military styled training and the fact
that some members are actually military veterans. Their political cause is the most
important thing in their lives (Dyson, 2012, p. 61). Terrorists learn from the mistakes of
other terrorists and realize that the only way to avoid being captured or killed, is to keep a
low profile and follow the protocols anonymity. A person who has such dedication will
go out of his way to follow security procedures, even if it limits his ability to function
(Dyson, 2012, p. 61). He would rather travel ten or even twenty miles away to a remote

196
area to mail a letter rather than risk being followed or captured on surveillance (Dyson,
2012). When investigators consider how vigilant and disciplined terrorists are in avoiding
detection, they now understand the importance of intelligence gathering.
The value of law enforcement officers reading and carefully studying clandestine
“how to-function” documents is akin to a football coach having the opposing team’s
playbook (Dyson, 2012, p. 62). For this reason, counterterrorism analysts and officers
must invest time in reading extremist manuals, manifestos, or writings in general.
Without question, this is one of the most important task in thwarting terrorist activities.
Just as we view the act of terrorism as an act of war, collecting good intelligence should
be considered the task that disrupts terrorist activities.
The collection of raw intelligence is a very good strategy, however, if it cannot be
converted into actionable intelligence, it then becomes useless. It is not uncommon for
counterterrorism analysts to sift through thousands of documents, recorded conversations,
phone records, surveillance videos and social media pages before determining whether or
not the information discovered is worth expending valuable resources.
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #1: Intelligence Gathering/Analysis.
Gathering intelligence presents opportunities for counterterrorism agents to disrupt
domestic terror networks. Investigators should be aware that many groups, particularly
domestic entities in the United States, have documents that instruct their members with
respect to operations (Dyson, 2012, p. 58). The FBI, in conjunction with cooperating law
enforcement agencies, should consider raids as an opportunity to disrupt terror networks
by taking subtle actions. For example, if a counterterrorism raid uncovers terrorist
training manuals, maps, security manuals, etc., after the information is analyzed, media
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outlets should also receive materials created by the FBI’s counterterrorism team that
discredits the leaders, the organization, and their purpose. As a strategy, the information
will be compiled by the counterterrorism team and the objective is to make the material
appear as though is was created by the leadership for select members with the intent to
deceive the rank-and-file membership and their supporters.
Terrorists are known for their commitment to using psychological warfare to their
advantage. If they are to be neutralized to the point of ineffectiveness, counterterrorism
teams must out-think them at every turn. By doing so, frustration is inevitable and the
likelihood of dissention and distrust becomes highly probable. Internal power struggles
and internal strife creates organizational instability which benefits law enforcement in
that crucial mistake will be made or members become counterterrorism assets.
Covert Operations
Covert operations is one the oldest forms of intelligence gathering. Although it
has been effective, it has also been deadly. Undercover operatives that were exposed
were either tortured, murdered, or imprisoned for their betrayal. Although covert
operatives are useful in the fight against terrorism, it is very risky and extremely
dangerous. Many domestic terrorism networks provide members and followers with
security manuals that teach them how to detect informants and the tactics used by the
police to penetrate the network (Dyson, 2012). Moreover, renditions, enhanced
interrogations techniques and torture are frowned upon by leaders of the United States
even if they yield results.
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #2: Covert Operations. As stipulated
earlier, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy is crucial in disrupting activities of a
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terrorist network. Disaggregating a terrorist network into its component parts can
illuminate how terrorists in different functional roles calculate costs and benefits
(Kroenig, & Pavel, 2012). For example, a person who sympathizes with an extremist
movement, but refuses to jeopardize his or her own life setting off explosives, is more
likely to offer financial or other types of support to the network (Kroenig & Pavel, 2012).
The new role of the agent provocateur is to create an environment of distrust since
it is necessary to disaggregate the terrorist network. In conducting case analysis of radical
extremist and terrorist organizations, although they posses different styles and ideologies,
there is one common denominator that unifies them all: they are all distrustful of the
government and they are extremely paranoid when it comes to informant infiltration. This
paranoia give the covert operative an advantage to disrupt operations by creating internal
distrust and infighting. Depending on the mission, the covert operative may never be
required to join the extremist group or terrorist network to disrupt the entire organization.
For example, militia groups, like many others extremist groups, although divided by
ideology, they are extremely skeptical. Once the counterterrorism team has gathered
enough actionable intelligence and the agent provocateur is competently knowledgeable
about the targeted terror network, he or she can discreetly begin their campaign of
“sowing” seeds of discord. The agent provocateur could arrange for billboards to be
strategically placed throughout the city and create notices that go out to members of the
community advising them to report “suspicious activity” because it has been “brought to
the attention” of law enforcement that international terrorism networks are posing as
militia groups in order fund terrorist operations abroad and in the United States.
Considering the likelihood that the agent provocateur will draw the most suspicion, the

199
counterterrorism team would stage the arrest of the covert operative, charge him or her
with the crime, thus making the propaganda real in the minds of the residents. As a result
of the highly publicized arrest, it should be enough to “sow the seeds” of distrust.
Residents and supporters who were normally quiet, may now decide to assist law
enforcement because infiltration by a foreign enemy would be deemed as completely
unacceptable.
Social Media Disruption
Because so much of the radicalization process occurs within the marketplace of
ideas, counterterrorism efforts must involve activity in the same realm (Bjelopera, 2014).
We have often seen, through the media, how active shooters and domestic terrorists use
social media to espouse their ideas and recruit like-minded individuals. They inspire
radicals to engage in acts of domestic terrorism. YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter have
all been used at one point or another to promote and inspire terrorist action. The strategy
of monitoring radicalized social media pages, in my view, is insufficient.
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #3: Social Media Disruption. The
counterterrorism strategy of monitoring extremist social media sites is very limiting and
only provides law enforcement with valuable information after the fact. Counterterrorism
teams must take a new approach: create their own social media platforms. Although
monitoring other social media sites can be an effective investigative tool, the intelligence
community should create their social media outlets equivalent to Stormfront, Ayan
Nations.org, Council of Conservative Citizens, or Gab. This allows the cyber counterintelligence team to monitor extremists for hate speech that encourages violence, death
threats, inflammatory rhetoric that advocates targeting federal buildings and elected
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officials. More importantly, they can collect the IP addresses of those users who are
considered potential threats in order to pinpoint an address or location. The challenge
here would be to establish sufficient internal controls that prevent abuse. In addition,
Considering the potential legal implications and political backlash, plausible deniability
must be factored into this strategy.
The Capone Approach
To counter violent domestic terror plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two
tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” (Bjelopera, 2014).
The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on
lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations, unrelated
misdemeanor or felony bench warrants. The purpose of this strategy is to apprehend the
suspect while law enforcement either gathers more evidence to file more serious charges
or disrupt a potential acts of violence. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically
these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses,
white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants Bjelopera, 2014, p. 19). The Al
Capone approach works well when you do not have time to secure a warrant and
apprehending the subject has become an issue of national security and public safety.
While these techniques may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots,
their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities as well as civil rights
organizations who are concerned that this approach is a license to target racial and ethnic
minorities for racial profiling (Bjelopera, 2014).
Counterterrorism Strategy Proposal #4: The Capone Approach. Law
enforcement officers, particularly FBI agents, should make every effort to avoid direct
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confrontation with terror suspects until its time to make an arrest(s). When we look back
on the 1995 Bombing in Oklahoma City or 1992, Ruby Ridge, we recognized that these
two incidents were the catalyst for the militia movement and other anti-government
movements to grow their membership by using these incidents as recruiting tools. Today,
any confrontation with the FBI, or any federal law enforcement agency has the potential
of giving the perpetrator status among both followers and sympathizers.
The Al Capone approach should never be used (or give the appearance) to
intimidate or harass a suspect for the purposes of disruption. It should however, continue
being used to prevent a suspect from fleeing the country or thwarting terrorist plot.
When utilizing the Al Capone approach, counterterrorism experts should maintain
a list of each of these suspects along with a systematic approach of following up with
these individuals to keep track of their movement once they have been released. If they
have been deported, its equally important to know their whereabouts. It is critical to
making sure they have not “slipped through the cracks” and returned to engaging in acts
of domestic terrorism.
Limitations of the Study
Limitations in this study included the fact that the study was circumscribed by
previously published documents and research. That is, there are likely items relevant to
the study that the researcher did not find. The quantitative analysis was limited by prior
findings and the data derived from this study. While the researcher explored primary and
secondary sources, interviewing professionals from various fields could have offered
insight and increased the overall depth of the research (Ellet, 2007). However, reflecting
on the subjective nature of domestic terrorism, and seeking a foundation on which to
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understand it, what was possibly lost by not having assessments beyond the available
resources was compensated for by extensive data mining (Creswell, 2011; Yin, 2009).
Increase in Homegrown Terrorism
As the literature review was collated with case studies and led to examining a
number of post-9/11 incidents, the researcher discovered that of 74 cases chosen for
analysis, approximately 85% of these terrorist plots were either carried out or attempted
by U.S. citizens or permanent residents. These homegrown terrorists, once law-abiding
citizens, permanent residents, or visa card holders, were usually radicalized within the
Unites States (Congressional Research Service, 2009). The overall numbers presented in
the data clustering, shown in Appendices A-F, reflect an almost 152% increase from
1977-2016, where there was significant and phenomenal spikes in homegrown terrorism
activity. Earlier data, beginning with President Jimmy Carter, shows gradual increases,
with occasional inactivity followed by some periodic spikes. However, data collected
after 9/11 clearly indicated that the threat of homegrown terrorism increased drastically
and would continue to rise based on deeply entrenched radical and religious beliefs
(Rohlinger & Earl, 2012).
Elected Leaders Contribute to the Problem
With the correlation of the case studies and the statistical analysis during the
terms of the six Presidents within the time frame, the researcher highlighted policies and
practices that escalated the problems associated with domestic terrorism. These policies
and practices began with Carter and his evangelical approach to issues, particularly his
proclivity to engage in multi-lateral peace agreements, to Reagan’s original war on terror
(which almost exclusively focused on global terrorism), and back again to the different
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evangelically-inspired policies promoted first by President George H. W. Bush and later
by his son, George W. Bush. When President Clinton took office, he had the daunting
task of addressing David Koresh and his Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas at a time
when anti-government sentiment was still at its a peak. The incident at Ruby Ridge under
the George W. Bush administration was an effective recruiting tool and was responsible
for the influx of new recruits to the sovereign citizen and militia movements (Simmons,
1999).
When President George W. Bush presented a challenge to Roe v. Wade, by telling
Americans to “reflect on the sanctity of life,” a second wave (the first being in his
father’s term) of pro-choice radicalism began to emerge but nothing equivalent to the
pro-life extremism witnessed in the 1990s. The threat level was extremely low to almost
non-existent, but post 9/11, after his perpetual War on Terror began, radical Islamic
terrorist incidents sharply increased. According to New American’s International Security
experts (2016), there were 107 incidents of domestic terrorism post 9/11 from December
2001 through December 2008. If the War on Drugs was considered a referendum on the
civil liberties of urban minorities; the War on Terror was equally considered an assault
on this Islamic faith. As a result, anti-Islamic sentiments as well as radical Islamic
extremism devolved into a chasm of intolerance.
When President Barack Obama assumed control of the Oval Office, radical rightwing groups re-emerged in conjunction with political extremists and hate groups that
considered the election of an African-American president as clear indication that Whites
had somehow lost control of America and they needed to collectively “Take Back Their
Country.” On its praxis, the conceptualization of “taking back” is a grim reminder that
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recapturing outdated American ideals and customs that marginalized women and
minorities begins at the existential level but evolves into sinister strategy to marginalize
and dehumanize selective groups of people based on race and gender in an attempt to
undergird the premise superiority, specifically, White male domination. The domestic
extremist, despite the odds, is determined to influence society from the lens of
anachronistic ideals and norms. Radical Republicans sided with right-wing extremists in
berating President Obama with impunity and attempting to humiliate him on the world
stage by forcing him to show his birth certificate as justification of his authenticity to
serve as President of the United States. The entire process was demeaning and was
considered equivalent to slaves in the 1860s proving their freedom by providing slave
owners or traders their free papers. More destructive to American democracy was that
mainstream conservatives gave subtle (sometimes overt) signals that under the Obama
administration, radical, extremist behavior would now be welcomed as long as the vitriol
was directed towards President Obama. Instead of the congratulating the historic victory,
radical conservatives were committed to making President Obama’s ascension to the
highest political office in America feel as though his decision was an act of self-imposed
marginality.
President Obama and his incoming administration recognized immediately that he
was in precarious position. On one end of the political spectrum, President Obama was
faced with an insouciant democratic party still vexed that Hillary Rodham Clinton was
not the party nominee. On the other end of the political spectrum was an insolent
Republican Party that vowed to make him a “one term president” and refused to work
with the newly elected Commander-and-Chief even if it would be beneficial to the
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American people (Hulse & Nagourney, 2010). This public display of resistance from
conservative elected officials in the highest levels of government created a climate for
political and religious extremism to flourish. The animus projected towards President
Obama created such rigid lines of demarcation and distance between Democratic and
Republican ideals that radical conservatives viewed any acts of utilitarianism as liberal
appeasement. This Republican strategy was myopic in scope in that conservatives either
did not consider or concern themselves with the residual effects of their extremism.
During the Obama administration, from 2009-2016 (including foiled plots), there were
291 incidents of terrorism (New American, 2016). Moreover, when President Obama was
succeeded in office by Real Estate Developer and reality television personality, Donald J.
Trump in 2017, Democrats in Congress have seized the opportunity to exact revenge on
the Republican controlled Congress by mimicking their blueprint of obstruction
superimposed on President Obama’s legislative agenda for the last eight years. Although
this one-upmanship revolves on the axis of power and respect, the chronic polarization
between the two major parties will only further divide America along the lines of political
and moral ideology. As a result, partisan propaganda will only intensify and be directly
responsible for an increase in domestic terrorism as substantive issues such as
employment, national debt, the economy, education and healthcare erode into obscurity.
When President Obama settled into his new role as commander-and-chief, there
was a miscalculation of his counterterrorism strategy that fueled anger in America and
abroad. During the campaign, candidate Obama pledged to end the War on Terror and
commit fewer military resources to Afghanistan and abroad. Liberal ideologues
considered this approach refreshing while conservatives criticized the move as being
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weak at a time when America needs to show its strength. Both critics and supporters were
taken aback when President Obama implemented his aggressive counterterrorism strategy
(Becker & Shanemay, 2012). President Obama and his security team crafted a “Kill List”
a process where the team decided on which terrorists should be killed or captured based
on their threat level towards the United States or their allies. Moreover, the Obama
administration waged a relentless drone strike campaign in Pakistan and Yemen because
counter-intelligence revealed that these countries were safe havens for suspected
terrorists (Savage, 2012).
Based on the data analyzed for this study, there is a clear connection between
politicians and their policies, and increased incidents of domestic terrorism. The level of
terrorism appears to coincide with the ability of the various typologies to develop
connections and create enough fear take action. This is noted in a DOJ (2009) report that
outlined potential threats for violence in reaction to Obama’s election. However,
discounting the variables supported by this study will put U.S. citizens in greater danger
(Samuels, 2006).
Lack of Policy and Enforcement directed at Homegrown Terrorism
As the threat of homegrown terrorism expanded from 1977 to 2001 (pre-9/11), an
aspect that has remained a concern for the law enforcement officials are policies that fail
to send a clear message of zero tolerance and are backed by retributive deterrence.
Several trials, such as McVeigh’s and Kaczynski’s, received sensationalized media
coverage. For the most part, society and its politicians avoided tackling the issue of
domestic terrorism pre-9/11. As a result, federal, state, and local domestic terror laws
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were primarily inadequate which allowed the terrorists organizations to become more
unified, more organized, more defiant and unfortunately, more deadly.
The events on 9/11 serves as a constant reminder of the dangers of complacency.
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh, in his testimony to the Joint Inquiry Committee,
highlighted that the government was not efficiently organized to confront terrorism and
terrorism was not the clear priority because the threat it posed was under-appreciated
(Freeh, 2002). Post 9/11, the FBI has revamped its entire organization and domestic
terror threats are now given equal priority to international terrorist threats. However,
considering international terrorism has a “head start” in the areas of strategy and policy
development, there must be a continual effort to formulate comprehensive and detailed
policies for responding to domestic threats of terrorism. Although DHS took on some of
the responsibility of responding to internal threats, there continues to be ongoing
concerns about their ability to actively reduce incidents of domestic terrorism without
continued collaboration with the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies. (Oliver &
Steinberg, 2006).
Conclusion
Analyzing the policies and ideological positions of former U.S. Presidents from
the perspective of domestic terrorism, there is clear evidence that responses to domestic
terror threats were usually reactive instead of proactive from 1977-2001 (pre-9/11). It can
be argued that this approach led to somewhat of a quiet evolution and expansion of
domestic terror groups that resulted in them being substantial threats to public spaces.
When elected, every U.S. President has an agenda for the nation, and the world, during
their time in office. What can be correlated to the study’s outcomes are specific periods
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of increase in domestic terror threats. As future Presidents responding to domestic terror
threats, what is necessary is a balanced and thorough approach that provides retribution
while avoiding escalation. Weak policy positions regarding domestic terrorism are as
equally irresponsible as aggressive and intrusive ones that the average American would
consider infringing on the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Lastly, using
predictive behavior models and continuing to use a case study approach to study the
problem can provide a foundation for solid and thoughtful policy decisions in the future.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
In this final chapter, the researcher considers the contribution of this research and
revisits using a scientific approach to the issue. The researcher also presents findings that
could develop ‘learning algorithms’ to be used in a model by which law enforcement
could anticipate incidents. Such a model could be supported by the clustering data in
Appendices A-F and by reviewing all domestic terrorist incidents through the seven
presidential terms (the primary independent variable in this study). Final conclusions
offer insight into the policy implications of developing a domestic terrorist behavioral
model while acknowledging the study’s potential use.
Contribution of Research
The researcher designed this quantitative case study to bridge the gap between
current knowledge and the three hypotheses of this study on the frequency of domestic
terror. In a detailed historical analysis spanning seven Presidents and 40 years of politics
and policies, the findings from this study can assist future researchers in correctly
identifying domestic terror typologies, their key characteristics, and societal variables,
which sometimes led to increased attacks. Following established protocols, law
enforcement officials can use the conclusions from this study to inform responses to
domestic terror events by utilizing the predictive model schemas that are validated
through empirical data (Yin, 2012).
This researcher identified reliable outcomes that promote the continued
examination of domestic terrorism. With the constant changes in society and its norms,
what is offered by this research is insight into the effects of policies and their successful
(or unsuccessful) implementation. Yin (2009) highlighted the need for studies to build on
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each other and produce similar outcomes. This researcher expects that future social
scientists could benefit from this wide-ranging assessment.
Policy Implications
The essential policy implication for future U.S. Presidents from this study is the
need for diligence in developing coherent policies and strategies that respond to domestic
terrorists. By identifying key variables within certain organizations and their goals, it may
be possible to reduce threats and, as a result, save lives. As leaders of the United States
consider their options when reviewing predictive behavioral models, past trends, and
develop policies that promote inclusion rather than isolation and social fragmentation,
these may serve to reduce incidents. While hoping for positive results from the policies
developed, the President, Congress, and state and local officials also need to develop
significant, retaliatory deterrents.
To date, the United States has had domestic terrorist policies that have not been
effectively shared with the terrorists or the public. To create a coherent message to
domestic terror groups, the government must be willing to engage parties in a broader
dialogue while also prosecuting offenders to the fullest extent. It is possible that dynamic
changes may then occur within even the most radicalized groups and typologies who
simply want their message to be heard and acknowledged by the government (Rohlinger
& Earl, 2012).
Ethics and Reflexivity
While conducting this research study, ethical mandates of the American
Psychological Association and Nova Southeastern University were followed to limit
researcher bias. The goal was to produce a study that would have validity as well as
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sound reflection, and a circular logical relationship which produces reliable and confident
causes that is correctly related to outcomes. Having peer review when assigning
quantitative values to the data used to develop a model supported by generated variable
tables, helped produce confident and reliable outcomes (Yin, 2012).
Future Research Concepts
It is expected that with the increased threat of domestic terrorism, future studies
will expand their scope and include additional social, ethnic, demographic, and political
variables in their assessment. With numerous federal agencies awarding grants for longterm research projects, future research designed to explore the long-term effects of
policies on a variety of extremist groups would be essential in furthering this area of
study. These studies could also heighten the awareness of those in elected office, and
even those who previously believed that the only way to promote their agenda is to
engage in the attention-grabbing acts of violence.
As these studies continue, one factor that would remain constant is the
opportunity and ability to protect the public from those who would use them as a means
to an end. Advances in behavioral studies could produce superior behavioral models than
those used presently to address domestic terrorist behavior. By including social
perspectives, the researcher hopes that the realization emerges that by using violence, the
intended message is lost; as a consequence, violent behavior undermines the entire cause
(NIH, 2009).
Contribution of Research
This research study and its contribution to the academic community is aimed at
assessing and examining a social phenomenon by developing a behavioral model. The
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focus of the research was to offer researchers and society a unique and comprehensive
look at the social phenomenon of domestic terrorism. While the variables presented in
this study are subject to change and were given numerical values subject to interpretation,
the aspect that is offered this study is the ability to look at the past and avoid making the
same mistakes again. The opportunity for policy makers and law enforcement to learn
and grow, and possibly save lives, makes this study a potentially valuable contribution.
Findings
The findings from the tool developed for law enforcement authorities to use in
responding to acts of domestic terrorism are highlighted in Tables 4-6, with the variables
being aligned with quantitative assignments in Tables 7-9. The historical data, obtained
through DOJ databases, allowed alignment of the social, ethnic, and demographic
variables with the appropriate Presidents: Table 4 for Jimmy Carter, Table 5 for Bill
Clinton, and Table 6 for George Bush. A potential challenge during the research phase
was for law enforcement and the policy makers to understand the social dynamics of
these organizations while accounting for norms which, in this instance, were developed
under various Presidents. The aspect that is significant in the bivariate analysis is the
continuous increase in domestic terrorist violence, according to the designated variables.
As policymakers and other officials use these predictive models, the key is oversight.
However, by including professional criminologists in the design and quantitative
assessments, bias would be limited, and reliability would increase. The expected result is
a more accurate understanding of domestic terrorists, which would then support
appropriate levels of funding, training, and articulating the appropriate message to
terrorists operating openly in communities across the United States (Hoffman, 1988).
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Table 4
Two-Tailed Pearson Correlations 1

VAR00002

VAR00003

r
p
N
r
p
N

Correlations
VAR00002
1
6
-.739
.094
6

VAR00003
-.739
.094
6
1
6

Table 5
Two-Tailed Pearson Correlations 2

VAR00002

VAR00003

r
p
N
r
p
N

Correlations
VAR00002
1
6
.059
.912
6

VAR00003
.059
.912
6
1
6

Table 6
Two-Tailed Pearson Correlation 3

VAR00002

VAR00003

r
p
N
r
p
N

Correlations
VAR00002
1
6
.000
1.000
6

VAR00003
.000
1.000
6
1
6
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Table 7
Quantitative Review 1

Extremist Group
Militia
Political Extremists
Eco-terrorists
Anti-abortion
Left-Wing
Right-Wing

Quantitative Assignments
Attempted Attacks
7
6
9
8
7
7

Actualized Attacks
8
8
7
7
7
8

Quantitative Assignments
Attempted Attacks
8
7
8
9
9
7

Actualized Attacks
8
8
8
9
7
8

Table 8
Quantitative Review 2

Extremist Group
Militia
Political Extremists
Eco-terrorists
Anti-abortion
Left-Wing
Right-Wing

Table 9
Quantitative Review 3

Extremist Group
Militia
Political Extremists
Eco-terrorists
Anti-abortion
Left-Wing
Right-Wing

Quantitative Assignments
Attempted Attacks
7
8
9
8
8
7

Actualized Attacks
9
8
9
7
7
8

Conclusion
The following totals represent the clustering of numbers: Carter—14 domestic
terrorist incidents; Reagan—55 incidents; George H. W. Bush—29 incidents; Bill
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Clinton—34 incidents; George W. Bush—60 incidents; and Obama, completing his final
term as of 2016—48 incidents. It is evident from the data, literature review, case studies,
and statistical analyses that domestic terrorism is not only a clear danger to American
safety and security, but also a threat to the stability of its democracy.
In the future, tools and resources to support law enforcement agencies that
consider social variables will become necessary. Future studies are recommended in an
effort to fill the gap observed during the research phase of this study.
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Appendix A: Incidents during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)
Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

Description

03/22/77

Denver, Colorado 1

0

TER

bombing attributed to Chicano activist

04/23/77
08/03/77

Washington,
1
New York City, 1
New York
Evanston, Illinois 0

0
7

bomb explodes in locker at airport
FALN bombs two office buildings;

0

05/03/79

Wilmington,
0
North Carolina
Chicago, Illinois 0

TER
TERnatl
TERpol
THW

05/09/79

Evanston, Illinois 0

1

11/03/79

Greensboro,
5
North Carolina
Chicago, Illinois 0

11

12/01/79

Sabana Seca,
Puerto Rico

10

TERnatl

05/29/80

Fort Wayne,
0
Indiana
Chicago, Illinois 0

1

04/22/80

Bethesda,
Maryland

1

0

TERright
TERpol
TERpol

01/12/81

Muniz ANGB,
Puerto Rico

0

0

05/28/78
01/01/79

11/15/79

06/19/80

2

1

5

12

1

TERnatl
TERpol
TERright
TERpol

TERnatl

mail bomb slightly injures campus police
officer at Northwestern University
extortion attempt threatening release of
uranium dioxide
FALN bombing at Shubert Theatre
bomb slightly injures student at
Northwestern University
shooting attack at protest
bomb ignites on American Airlines flight
which lands safely; 12 passengers suffer
from smoke inhalation
Macheteros members ambush Navy bus
in Puerto Rico, killing 2 sailors and
injuring 10
Vernon Jordan Jr., civil rights leader, shot
and injured
mail bomb injures president of United
Airlines
Ali Akbar Tabataba’i, former senior
officer in Iranian Shah’s SAVAK, shot at
home by Daoud Salahuddin, a radical
Black Muslim under instructions from
Iran
Macheteros terrorists bomb 9 Air
National Guard jets, causing $40 million
in damage

Total Incidents: 14. Total dead: 11; Total injured: 49
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Appendix B: Incidents during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989)
Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

03/17/81

Mobile, Alabama 1

0

TERright

03/30/81

Washington, DC 0

4

TER

04/16/81

New York City,
New York

1

0

TERnatl

04/21/81

Tulsa, Oklahoma 1

0

RCSI

10/20/81

New York City,
New York
Warren County,
New Jersey
Los Angeles,
California

TERleft
TERleft
TERnatl

3

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

3

0

1

13

0

0

3

1

0

08/17/83

Detroit, Michigan 3

0

TERpol

11/07/83

Washington, DC 0

0

TER

12/01/83

Seattle,
Washington

0

0

THW

12/31/83

New York City,
New York

0

1

TERnatl

12/21/81
01/21/82
05/04/82
05/05/82
05/16/82
04/02/82
09/25/82
12/31/82
04/15/83

Somerville,
Massachusetts
Nashville,
Tennessee
San Juan, Puerto
Rico
Berkeley,
California
Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania
New York City,
New York
Los Angeles,
California

TERnatl
TERpol
TERnatl
TERpol

Description
United Klans of America murders Black
teenager
President Ronald Reagan and 3 others
injured in attempted assassination by
Hinkley
bomb explodes in JFK airport terminal
fatal self-inflicted radiation dose using
stolen source
Weather Underground member Kathy
Boudin captured after killing 3
UFF members murder New Jersey State
Police officer
Kemal Arikan, Turkish Consul-General,
assassinated by Armenian terrorists
Orhan Gunduz, honorary Turkish Consul
in Boston, assassinated by Armenian
terrorists
mail bomb injures secretary at Vanderbilt
University
shooting attack on navy sailors
mail bomb injures professor at University
of California

RCSI

shooting attack

TERnatl
TERnatl

two bombings in Manhattan and
Brooklyn by FALN
bomb in car kills Armenian Victor
Galustian
Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam secretary
killed by members of Fuqra, a Black
Islamic sect; 2 members killed setting fire
in AMI temple
bombing at U.S. Capitol building; later
linked to Revolutionary Armed Task
Force
authorities prevent attempt by proKhomeini students to set fire to theater
where 500 anti-Khomeini Iranians were
attending a singing performance
FALN bombings at federal and city
buildings; 1 policeman injured
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Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

Description

04/01/84

New York

0

0

THW

two Canadians arrested in NY attempting
to purchase large amounts of pathogenic
bacteria (tetanus and botulinal toxin) from
a Rockville, MD, firm

04/18/84

San Ysidro,
California

22

19

RCSI

shooting attack at McDonalds restaurant

04/18/84

Denver, Colorado 1

0

TERright

Alan Berg killed by White supremacists

08/29/84

The Dalles,
Oregon

0

2

TERrel

09/09/84

The Dalles,
Oregon

0

751

TERrel

12/07/84

Whidbey Island,
Washington

1

0

TERright

12/25/84

Pensacola, Florida 0

0

TERright

03/01/85

03/13/85
03/15/85

New York City,
New York

Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania
Berkeley,
California

0

0

THW

11

0

RCSI

0

1

TERpol

08/15/85

Paterson, New
Jersey

0

1

TER

11/10/85

Santa Ana,
California

1

0

TER

11/15/85

Ann Arbor,
Michigan

0

2

TERpol

12/11/85

Sacramento,
California

1

0

TERpol

04/16/86

Cokeville,
Wyoming

2

79

TERright

followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh use
water to infect two officials with
salmonella; both sickened, one
hospitalized
salmonella poisoning in restaurants by
followers of Bhadwan Shree Rajneesh
Robert Matthews, leader of The Order, a
right-wing group, killed in raid by federal
agents
three abortion clinics bombed
letter writer threatens to contaminate New
York City’s water reservoirs with
plutonium unless charges against
Bernhard Goetz are dropped; testing was
announced to have detected femtocurie
levels of plutonium in the water on 26
July
police assault on headquarters of radical
Black group Move starts fire
mail bomb injures student at University of
California
Tscherim Soobzokov, alleged Nazi war
criminal, injured by bombing possibly
linked to JDL; died 6 Sep
Alex Odah, officer of American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee, killed by
bombing possibly linked to JDL
bombing injures two
Unabomber bomb kills Hugh Scrutton, a
computer store owner, with bomb in
paper bag behind store
two Aryan Nation members take 150
students and teachers hostage at an
elementary school; bomb accidentally
explodes, killing one terrorist and injuring
many children; second terrorist commits
suicide
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Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

04/05/86

Chicago, Illinois 0

0

THW

04/20/86

Edmond,
Oklahoma

15

6

RCSI

09/05/86

New York City,
New York

0

30

TER

09/29/86

Coeur d’Alene,
Idaho

0

0

TERright

10/28/86

Fort Buchanan,
Puerto Rico

0

1

TERnatl

12/01/86

Arizona

0

0

THW

12/14/86

New York City,
New York

0

0

THW

12/31/86

San Juan, Puerto
97
Rico

140

RCSI

02/20/87

Salt Lake City,
Utah

0

1

TERpol

03/01/87

Atlantic City,
New Jersey

0

0

THW

10/23/87

Vermont

0

0

THW

11/29/87

Livermore,
California

0

0

THW

04/12/88

New Jersey

0

0

THW

11/10/88

Norwalk,
Connecticut

0

0

THW

Description
members of Libyan-linked street gang El
Rukn arrested attempting to obtain SAM
to attack an aircraft at O’Hare IAP
shooting attack by postal employee at
post office
tear gas bomb set off 5 minutes before
end of Russian dance troupe performance
at New York City’s Metropolitan Opera
House by Jewish extremists
four bombs explode in Coeur d’Alene, at
department store, restaurant, federal
building, and armed forces recruiting
station, set by Bruder Scheigen Strike
Force II
Macheteros bombings at military facilities
6 members of Arizona Patriots indicted
for planned bombings of the Phoenix
ADL regional office, a Phoenix
synagogue, the Simon Wiesenthal Center
in Los Angeles, and the Ogden Utah IRS
facility
Dennis Malvasi sets bomb in Planned
Parenthood building in Manhattan,
leaving rental agent handcuffed nearby;
bomb fizzles
three employees set fire in Dupont Plaza
Hotel; most fatalities were in the hotel
casino; the employees were in a labor
dispute with the hotel’s management
bombing injures computer store owner
apparent Islamic terrorist plot to bomb
Atlantic City casinos called off due to
alerted authorities
Lebanese national and two others, all
members of Syrian Socialist National
Party, arrested attempting to enter
Vermont from Canada with bomb
components
bomb exploded in parking lot of Sandia
National Laboratories
Yu Kikumura, member of Japanese Red
Army, arrested in New Jersey with bombs
to be detonated in Manhattan 3 days later
animal rights activist arrested leaving
pipe bomb at U.S. Surgical Corporation
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Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

01/17/89

Stockton,
California

6

30

RCSI

03/10/89

San Diego,
California

0

0

TERpol

03/13/89

Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania

0

0

THW

03/18/89

Indianapolis,
Indiana

0

1

RCSI

03/19/89

Atlantic Ocean,
Puerto Rico

47

0

RCSI

08/21/89

Atlanta, Georgia 0

15

TERright

1

TER

0

TERright

12/21/89
12/18/89

Mountain Brook,
1
Alabama
Savannah,
1
Georgia

Description
shooting attack on children in playground
of elementary school; gunman then fatally
shot himself
pipe-bomb exploded in van of Sharon Lee
Rogers, wife of U.S.S. Vincennes captain,
planted by pro-Iranian terrorists
US FDA inspectors in Philadelphia
discover two grapes laced with minimal
amounts of cyanide in shipment from
Chile following warning telephoned to
U.S. embassy in Santiago
child maimed by bomb in toothpaste tube
in K-Mart store; apparent teenage
perpetrator commits suicide 20 April
explosion in gun turret of battleship
U.S.S. Iowa off Puerto Rico kills 47;
Navy cites some evidence of sabotage
gas canister in parcel explodes at NAACP
regional office
Judge Robert Vance killed by mail bomb,
wife injured
Black civil rights lawyer Robert Robinson
killed by mail bomb

Total Incidents: 55. Total dead: 233; Total injured: 1092
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Appendix C: Incidents during the Presidency of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993)
Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

Description
pipe-bomb exploded in van of Sharon
Lee Rogers, wife of U.S.S. Vincennes
captain, planted by pro-Iranian
terrorists
US FDA inspectors in Philadelphia
discover two grapes laced with
minimal amounts of cyanide in
shipment from Chile following
warning telephoned to U.S. embassy in
Santiago
child maimed by bomb in toothpaste
tube in K-Mart store; apparent teenage
perpetrator commits suicide 20 April
explosion in gun turret of battleship
U.S.S. Iowa off Puerto Rico kills 47;
Navy cites some evidence of sabotage
gas canister in parcel explodes at
NAACP regional office
Judge Robert Vance killed by mail
bomb, wife injured
Black civil rights lawyer Robert
Robinson killed by mail bomb

03/10/89

San Diego,
California

0

0

TERmil

03/13/89

Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania

0

0

THW

03/18/89

Indianapolis,
Indiana

0

1

RCSI

03/19/89

Atlantic Ocean,
Puerto Rico

47

0

RCSI

08/21/89

Atlanta, Georgia

0

15

TERright

12/21/89

Mountain Brook,
Alabama

1

1

TER

12/18/89

Savannah, Georgia 1

0

01/30/90

Tucson, Arizona

1

0

03/25/90

New York City,
New York

87

0

RCSI

arson fire in social club

04/24/90

Oakland, California 0

2

TERleft

two Earth First members injured in
explosion while transporting bomb in
car

10

4

RCSI

shooting attack at GMAC office

1

1

1

0

24

20

TERpol
TERpol
RCSI

Rabbi Meir Kahane assassinated by
Al-Sayyid Abdulazziz Nossair
Mustafa Shalabi killed in Brooklyn by
Islamic group members
shooting attack at Luby’s restaurant
Minnesota Patriots Council plots to
assassinate law enforcement officials
using ricin
Parivash Rafizadeh, wife of former
senior officer in Iranian Shah’s
SAVAK, shot near her home
federal marshals in shootout with
White supremacist Randy Weaver in
Idaho kill his wife and son

TERright
TERpol

10/16/91

Jacksonville,
Florida
New York City,
New York
Brooklyn, New
York
Killeen, Texas

03/01/92

Minnesota

0

0

THW

03/26/92

Franklin Lakes,
New Jersey

1

0

TERpol

04/19/92

Ruby Ridge, Idaho 2

0

RCSI

06/18/90
11/05/90
02/25/91

Rashad Khalifa assassinated
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Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

Description

04/27/92

Los Angeles,
California

58

4000

RCSI

Black riots following not guilty verdict
in trial of four policemen for beating
Black offender

05/01/92

Olivehurt,
California

4

10

RCSI

shooting attack at high school

01/25/93

Langley, Virginia

2

3

TERpol

02/26/93

New York City,
New York

6

1040

TERpol

02/28/93

Waco, Texas

86

25

RCSI

03/10/93

Pensacola, Florida 1

0

06/22/93

Tiburon, California 0

1

06/24/93

New Haven,
Connecticut

0

1

06/24/93

New York City,
New York

0

0

THW

04/01/93

Los Angeles,
California

0

0

THW

08/18/93

Wichita, Kansas

0

1

TERright

12/14/93

Garden City, New
6
York

19

TERleft

TERright
TERpol
TERpol

Mir Amail Kansi, an Afghan Islamist,
shot several CIA employees in cars in
front of CIA headquarters
truck bombing in garage of World
Trade Center
Branch Davidian cult members kill 4
ATF agents, injure 16, when agents
raided their compound in Waco, TX;
10 cult members killed; compound was
sieged until 19 Apr when another raid
was attempted and the compound
burned down
abortionist David Gunn shot and killed
by abortion opponent
bomb injures scientist from University
of California
bomb injures professor at Yale
University
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and
others arrested for role in World Trade
Center bombing, thwarting plans to
bomb United Nation Headquarters, the
Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel,
the George Washington Bridge, and
FBI offices in New York City
FBI arrests skinheads planning to
machine gun worshippers at First
African Methodist Episcopal Church
in Los Angeles in hopes of starting a
race war
abortionist George Tiller shot and
injured at an abortion clinic
Colin Ferguson shot and killed 6,
injured 17 on Long Island train,
professing hatred of Whites

Total number of incidents: 29. Total dead: 339; Total injured: 5134
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Appendix D: Incidents during the Presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2001)
Date
03/01/94
04/26/94
06/20/94

Location
New York City,
New York
Colorado Springs,
Colorado
Fairchild AFB,
Washington

Killed

Inj.

TER

1

3

TERpol

1

1

RCSI

4

22

RCSI

04/29/94

Pensacola, Florida

2

1

TERright

09/12/94

Washington, DC

1

0

TER

10/29/94

Washington, DC

0

0

THW

12/10/94

North Caldwell,
New Jersey

1

0

TERpol

12/30/94

Brookline,
Massachusetts

2

5

TERright

04/19/95

Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma

169

675

TERright

04/24/95

Sacramento,
California

1

0

TERpol

05/01/95

Washington, DC

0

2

THW

09/12/95

Essex, Maryland

5

0

RCSI

10/10/95

Hyder, Arizona

1

100

RCSI

12/23/95

Arkansas

1

0

THW

Description
gunman fires at van of Orthodox
Jewish students at the Brooklyn Bridge
mail bomb kills man and injures his
wife
shooting attack at base hospital
abortion opponent shot and killed
abortionist and his bodyguard and
injured abortionist’s wife
Frank Corder flew Cessna from MD
into White House, striking tree near
President’s bedroom, killing himself
and causing damage to White House
lone gunman with semi-automatic
weapon fires shots at White House
from sidewalk in front on
Pennsylvania Avenue
Unabomber mail bomb kills New York
advertising executive Thomas Mosser
gunman kills 2 abortion clinic workers
in MA, then drives to Norfolk, VA,
and fires on clinic before arrest
Timothy McVeigh and co-conspirator
Terry Nichols set off a truck bomb
explosion in front of Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building, causing a partial
collapse killing 168 people and
injuring hundreds
Unabomber mail bomb kills Gilbert
Murray, president of California
Forestry Assn., at office
Man, with unloaded gun scales White
House fence; jumper and Secret
Service agent shot and injured by
another guard
Car bombing at shopping mall,
apparent murder plot
Amtrak train derailed near Hyder, AZ,
by sabotage to tracks with nearby note
claiming responsibility by Sons of
Gestapo, later attributed to railroad
employee
Thomas Lewis Lavy arrested in
Arkansas for possession of ricin, a
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Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

02/27/96

Houston, Texas

0

1

RCSI

06/01/96

New York

0

0

THW

06/01/96

New York

0

0

THW

04/27/96

Atlanta, Georgia

2

110

TERright

01/02/97

multiple

0

0

TER

02/22/97

Atlanta, Georgia

0

4

TERright

02/24/97

New York City,
New York

2

6

TERpol

03/26/97

Rancho Sante Fe,
California

39

0

RCSI

04/31/97

New York City,
New York

0

2

THW

01/29/98

Birmingham,
Alabama

1

1

TERright

03/24/98

Jonesboro, Arkansas 5

11

RCSI

04/21/98

Springfield, Oregon 4

25

RCSI

04/24/98

Washington, DC

2

TER

2

Description
biotoxin; Lavy commits suicide the
next day
Radioactive source theft
Several individuals arrested in plot to
kill Republican officials; seized
weapons included radioactive
materials
Several individuals arrested in New
York planning to kill Republican
officials; seized weapons included
radioactive materials
Pipe bomb explodes in park at night
concert at Summer Olympic Games; 1
killed, 1 died at nearby location of
attack
Letter bombs received at Egyptian
newspaper offices in Washington, DC,
New York City, and a prison in
Leavenworth Kansas; similar device
exploded at Egyptian Newspaper
office in London, UK, injuring 2
guards
Bomb explodes in Atlanta, GA,
nightclub frequented by homosexuals;
4 injured
Lone Palestinian gunman fired on
tourists on observation deck of Empire
State Building; Danish national was
killed and other tourists injured before
gunman killed himself
Discovery of mass suicide by 39
members of Heaven’s Gate cult, tied
by cult members to Comet Hale-Bopp
Would-be Palestinian suicide bombers
are arrested at their apartment while
planning to bomb New York subways
Bombing at abortion clinic kills one
guard and injures a nurse; Eric
Rudolph suspected in case
Shooting attack at middle school by
two students; 4 students and 1 teacher
killed, 9 students and 2 adults injured
Shooting attacks at residence and high
school
Gunman enters U.S. Capitol building
and kills two guards; one tourist and
gunman are injured
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Date

Location

Killed

Inj.

TER

Description

10/19/98

Vail, Colorado

0

0

TERleft

Arson attacks by the Earth Liberation
Front at Vail ski resort cause $12
million in damages

10/23/98

Amherst, New York 1

0

TERright

Abortionist shot and killed at his home

04/20/99

08/10/99
09/15/99
10/31/99
12/14/99

Littleton, Colorado 15

Los Angeles,
California
Fort Worth, Texas
Atlantic Ocean,
Massachusetts
Port Angeles,
Washington

27

1

5

8

8

217

0

0

0

RCSI

TERright
RCSI
TERpol
THW

mass shooting at Columbine High
School by two students; 12 students
and 1 teacher killed, 23 wounded; both
gunmen (Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold) committed suicide
shooting attack at Jewish daycare by
White supremacist
shooting attack at church service
intentional crash of Egypt Air flight
off Nantucket Island by copilot
terrorist arrested crossing from Canada
with material to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport

Total number of incidents: 34. Total dead: 486; Total injured: 1011
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Appendix E: Incidents during the Presidency of George W. Bush (2001-2009)
Date

Location

Killed Inj.

TER

02/07/01

Washington, DC

0

1

THW

09/11/01

New York City,
New York

2759

8700

TERpol

09/11/01

Alexandria,
189
Virginia
Somerset County, 45
Pennsylvania

200

TERpol
TERpol

09/18/01

West Palm Beach, 1
Florida

10

TER

10/09/01

Washington, DC

4

7

TER

12/22/01

Atlantic Ocean,
Florida
Chicago, Illinois

0

1

THW

0

0

THW

04/22/02

Los Angeles,
California

2

4

TERpol

05/08/02

Clinton, Maryland 0

1

09/10/02

0

0

1

1

1

0

5

0

1

0

10/07/02

Lackawanna, New
York
Montgomery,
Alabama
Glenmont,
Maryland
Aspen Hill,
Maryland
Spotsylvania
County, Virginia
Bowie, Maryland

TERmil
THW

0

1

10/09/02

Manassas, Virginia 1

0

10/11/02

Fredericksburg,
1
Virginia
Falls Church,
1
Virginia
Ashland, Virginia 1

0

09/11/01

05/08/02

09/21/02
10/02/02
10/03/02
10/04/02

10/14/02
10/19/02

0

0
0

TERmil
TERmil
TERmil
TERmil
TERmil
TERmil
TERmil
TERmil
TERmil

Description
gunman fires on the White House from
outside the perimeter fence; gunman is
shot and injured by a guard
crashing of two hijacked planes into
World Trade Center towers, causing fires
and collapse
crashing of hijacked plane into Pentagon
crashing of hijacked plane into rural area of
Pennsylvania, following attempt by
passengers to regain control of aircraft
anthrax-laced letters mailed to West Palm
Beach, Florida, USA, and New York City,
New York
anthrax-laced letters mailed to Washington,
DC
British citizen prevented from igniting shoe
bomb on flight from Paris to Miami
US citizen arrested for seeking to use dirty
bomb in US
Egyptian gunman kills two Israelis, injures
four at the El Al ticket counter at the Los
Angeles International Airport
owner of Italian restaurant shot in robbery
by Beltway snipers
6 U.S. citizens arrested for terrorist
connections
liquor store employees shot in robbery by
Beltway snipers
1 killed at grocery store by Beltway
snipers
5 killed in separate shootings by Beltway
snipers
1 killed at shopping mall by Beltway
snipers
1 child injured at a middle school by
Beltway snipers
1 killed at gas station by Beltway snipers

1 killed at gas station by Beltway snipers
1 killed at shopping mall by Beltway
snipers
1 killed at restaurant by Beltway snipers
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Date
10/22/02

Location

Killed Inj.

TER

11/28/03

Aspen Hill,
Maryland
New York City,
New York
Alexandria,
Virginia
Meridian,
Mississippi
Columbus, Ohio

0

0

THW

08/01/04

Albany, New York 0

0

THW

08/01/04

New York City,
New York
New York City,
New York

0

0

THW

0

0

THW

Red Lake,
Minnesota
Los Angeles,
California
Santa Cruz,
California

10

7

RCSI

0

0

THW

0

4

TERleft

12/05/05

Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania

0

0

THW

12/29/05

Toledo, Ohio

0

0

THW

03/05/06

9

04/07/06

Chapel Hill, North 0
Carolina
Atlanta, Georgia 0

0

TERpol
THW

06/22/06

Chicago, Illinois

0

0

THW

04/01/06

New York City,
New York
Seattle,
Washington
Bailey, Colorado

0

0

THW

1

5

2

5

TERpol
RCSI

Nickel Mines,
Pennsylvania
Chicago, Illinois

6

5

CRI

0

0

THW

03/19/03
06/01/03
04/08/03

08/03/04

03/21/05
08/01/05
11/29/05

04/28/06
09/27/06
10/02/06
12/01/06

1

0

0

0

TERmil
THW

0

0

THW

7

8

RCSI

Description
1 bus driver killed by Beltway snipers
US citizen arrested for planning to
sabotage Brooklyn Bridge
11 arrested for planning attacks on U.S.
servicemen
shooting attack at factory
arrest of terrorist plotting to bomb
shopping mall in Columbus
2 arrested plotting assassination of
Pakistani diplomat
2 arrested planning to bomb Penn Station
during Republican National Convention
terror cell leader arrested in London for
planning attacks on financial centers in the
US
shooting at Red Lake Indian Reservation
school
4 arrested plotting attacks on Los Angeles
targets
4 injured, including several children, by
incendiary attacks by suspected animal
rights activists
1 arrested plotting attacks on refineries in
Wyoming and New Jersey and on the
transcontinental pipeline
3 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. military
abroad and on domestic targets
man drives vehicle into pedestrians at the
University of North Carolina
2 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. Capitol
and World Bank headquarters
7 arrested planning to bomb the Sears
Tower
1 arrested planning to bomb train tunnels
gunman fires on women at the Jewish
Federation of Greater Seattle
hostage taking and shooting attack at high
school
hostage taking and shooting attack at
Amish schoolhouse
1 arrested plotting grenade attack on
Chicago area shopping mall
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Date
04/16/07

Location

Killed Inj.

TER

Blacksburg,
Virginia
Cherry Hill, New
Jersey
New York City,
New York
Clinton, Michigan
Los Angeles,
California

33

17

RCSI

0

0

THW

0

0

THW

0
0

1
1

RCSI
TERleft

06/12/08

Columbus, Ohio

0

0

THW

04/27/08

Knoxville,
Tennessee
Alabama

2

7

TER

11

6

RCSI

Binghamton, New 14
York
New York City,
0
New York

4

RCSI

0

THW

05/31/09

Wichita, Kansas

1

0

06/01/09

Little Rock,
Arkansas

1

1

TERright
TERpol

06/10/09

Washington, DC

1

1

09/11/09

Owosso, Michigan 2

0

09/23/09

Springfield,
Illinois

0

0

THW

09/24/09

Dallas, Texas

0

0

THW

10/24/09

0

THW

11/05/09

Sudbury,
0
Massachusetts
Foot Hood, Texas 13

44

12/25/09

Michigan

3

TERpol
TERpol

05/09/07
06/03/07
08/01/07
02/24/08

03/10/09
04/03/09
04/20/09

0

TERright
TERleft

Description
shooting attack at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute
6 arrested plotting armed attack on Fort
Dix
4 arrested in Trinidad plotting to bomb
fuel pipelines near JFK airport
radioactive source theft
animal rights activists attempt home
invasion of biomedical researcher, injuring
the researcher’s husband
1 arrested plotting attacks on U.S. and
European targets
gunman fires on congregation at a church
multiple shootings at residences and
businesses in Samson and Geneva, AL
shooting attack at immigrant center
4 arrested plotting bombing attacks on
New York Jewish centers and attacks
against Air National Guard aircraft
1 doctor killed (George Tiller) in shooting
attack at Reformation Lutheran Church
1 Army private killed (William Long),
second injured in shooting attack at Army
Navy Career Center
1 guard killed (Stephen Johns) in shooting
attack at the Holocaust Museum
abortion protester shot and killed outside a
school; the gunman also killed an area
businessman
US citizen arrested plotting to detonate car
bomb at the federal building in
Springfield, IL
terrorist arrested planning to bomb Dallas
Fountain Place
1 arrested plotting attacks on shopping
malls and assassinations of two politicians
shooting attack at Soldier Readiness
Center at Foot Hood
Yemeni terrorist attempts to detonate bomb
on flight from Amsterdam to Detroit; bomb
only ignites, and passengers and crew
subdue the terrorist

Total number of incidents: 60. Total dead: 3117; Total injured: 9054
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Appendix F: Incidents during the Presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2016)
Date

Location

03/18/10

Austin, Texas

04/04/10

Killed Inj.
13

TER

Alexandria,
1
Virginia
New York City, 0
New York
Anchorage, Alaska 0

2

TER

0

THW

0

THW

09/01/10

Silver Spring,
Maryland

1

0

TER

09/17/10

Washington, DC

0

1

THW

10/10/10

Washington, DC

0

0

THW

11/04/10

Portland, Oregon 0

0

THW

12/07/10

Maryland

0

0

THW

01/08/11

Tucson, Arizona

6

13

TER

03/07/11

Lubbock, Texas

0

0

THW

05/10/11

New York City,
New York
Seattle,
Washington
Killeen, Texas

0

0

THW

0

0

THW

0

0

THW

09/06/11

Carson City,
Nevada

5

7

RCSI

04/20/12

Aurora, Colorado 12

58

RCSI

05/01/10
06/12/10

06/08/11
04/27/11

2

TER

Description
suicide crash of small plane into federal
office building
shooting at gate outside Pentagon; gunman
killed
failed car bombing in Times Square by
Pakistani terrorists
2 arrested plotting mail bomb
assassinations
3 hostages held by gunman at Discovery
Communications headquarters; gunman
killed by police
attempted shooting at Capitol Hill;
gunman shot and injured by guards
Pakistani-American arrested plotting
bombing attack on Washington subway
1 arrested plotting bombing at Christmas
tree lighting ceremony in Portland
1 arrested plotting bombing of military
recruiting center
Jared L. Loughnershooting attack at
political event at a supermarket; U.S.
District Judge John Roll and five others
were killed; U.S. Representative Gabrielle
Giffords and 12 others wounded
1 arrested plotting bombings of domestic
targets
2 arrested plotting attacks on a Manhattan
synagogue
2 arrested plotting attack on Seattle
military recruiting station
thwarted attempt to attack restaurant near
Fort Hood with bombing and shooting
attack; Naser Abdo arrested
shooting attack at restaurant, killing 4 (2
died immediately, 2 died later of injuries)
and injuring 7 others; casualties included 3
Nevada National Guard soldiers killed and
2 injured; gunman also died of selfinflicted wounds
shooting attack at movie theater; suspect
was arrested afterwards; suspect had
booby-trapped his nearby apartment with
explosives which were successfully
disarmed by police
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Date

Location

Killed Inj.

TER

08/05/12

Oak Creek,
Wisconsin

7

4

TERright

08/14/12

LaPlace, Louisiana 2

4

TER

08/15/12

Washington, DC

0

1

TERleft

12/14/12

Newtown,
Connecticut

28

3

RCSI

03/15/13

Boston,
Massachusetts

3

264

TERpol

04/17/13

Washington, DC

0

0

THW

04/19/13

Watertown,
Massachusetts

2

2

TERpol

05/12/13

New Orleans,
Louisiana

0

19

RCSI

09/16/13
11/01/13

Washington, DC 13
Los Angeles, CA 1

3
7

RCSI
TER

04/01/14

Fort Hood, Texas 4

16

RCSI

04/13/14

Overland Park,
Kansas

0

TERright

3

Description
6 killed, 4 injured in shooting attack at a
Sikh temple shortly before worship service
on Sunday morning; one of those injured
was a police officer, another was president
of the temple; the gunman was shot and
killed at the scene by police
2 police officers killed, 1 injured while
investigating attack that injured another
officer; 7 arrested, 2 of whom were injured
in the shootout; several of those arrested
had ties to the sovereign citizen movement
1 guard shot and injured while subduing
gunman at Family Research Council
offices
shooting attack at elementary school kills
20 children and 6 adults; shooter killed
himself and had killed his mother earlier
that day
two bombings at Boston Marathon kill 3
(including 1 child) and injure 183
(including 8 children)
two letters testing positive for ricin mailed
to Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker and
President Obama are found at mail
screening facilities; a third letter to an
official in Mississippi was awaiting
testing; an individual in Mississippi is
arrested and charged in the case
1 police officer killed, one injured during
manhunt for the Boston Marathon
bombers; one terrorist killed and one
injured and captured
two gunmen fired on crowds at Mother’s
Day parade; 19 injured, including 2
children
shooting attack at Washington Navy Yard
shooting attack at Los Angeles
International Airport; 1 TSA officer killed,
2 TSA officers and several civilians
injured
shooting attack on Fort Hood; 3 killed, 16
injured; in addition, the gunman killed
himself
shooting attack at a Jewish community
center and Jewish retirement home; 3
killed, including one teenager
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Date
04/27/14

Location

TER

1

0

2

0

5

0

East Orange, New 1
Jersey
Blooming Grove, 1
Pennsylvania

0

Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma
New York City,
New York

1

2

1

3

11/28/14

Austin, Texas

1

0

TER

12/20/14

New York City,
New York
Garland, Texas

3

0

TER

2

1

TERpol

06/17/15

Charleston, South 9
Carolina

1

TERright

04/16/15

Chattanooga,
Tennessee

6

2

TERpol

11/04/15

Merced, California 1

4

TERpol

11/27/15

Colorado Springs, 3
Colorado

9

TERright

12/03/15

San Bernardino,
California

16

23

TERpol

01/01/16

Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania

0

2

TERpol

06/01/14
06/08/14

06/25/14
09/12/14

09/25/14
10/23/14

05/03/15

Skyway,
Washington
Seattle,
Washington
Las Vegas,
Nevada

Killed Inj.

1

TERpol
TERpol
TERright
TERpol
TERright
TERpol
TERpol

Description
shooting attack killed 1
shooting attack near night club killed 2
shooting attack at restaurant and store; 3
killed, including 2 police officers; both
shooters killed themselves
shooting attack killed 1 teenager
shooting attack on police officers; shooter
evaded a manhunt in nearby woods until
30 Oct
knife attack at food processing plant killed
1, injured 1; attacker was shot and injured
axe attack on police officers injured 2, one
severely; police shot and killed the attacker
and injured one bystander
shots fired at Mexican consulate, US
courthouse, and police station during early
morning hours; failed attempt at arson at
consulate; attacker was shot at by police
shooting attack killed two police officers,
gunman shot and killed himself
attempted shooting attack at event
involving art critical of Islam, one guard
shot and injured
gunman killed 9 in attack at Emanuel
African Methodist Episcopal Church on a
Bible study group; South Carolina state
congressman among those killed; 1 injured
gunman killed 4 Marines and injures 1
Navy sailor (who died 18 Jul of injuries), 1
police officer, and 1 Marine, at two
locations; gunman was shot and killed by
police
student stabbed two students and two staff
at the University of California; attacker
was shot and killed by police
gunman killed two civilians and one police
officer outside a Planned Parenthood
clinic, also injuring 4 civilians and 5 police
officers
two attackers killed 14 and injured 21 at a
county employee meeting and Christmas
party;
gunman shot and injured a police officer;
attacker was shot and injured
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Date

Location

Killed Inj.

02/11/16

Columbus, Ohio

1

4

06/12/16

Orlando, Florida

50

53

04/07/16

Bristol, Tennessee 1

3

04/07/16

Dallas, Texas

9

5

TER
TERpol
TERpol
TERleft
TERleft

Description
attacker injured 4 in machete attack at a
restaurant
shooting attack at nightclub
shooting attack killed one civilian, injured
one police officer and three civilians
sniper attack killed 5 police officers,
injured 8 police officers and two civilians
at protest rally

Total number of incidents: 48. Total dead: 200; Total injured: 534

